Update topology, loop, llm, models, and pebbledb sources

Incorporate updated versions of internal/llm/client.go, pkg/analysis/topology/obfuscation.go (+ internal/external tests), pkg/analysis/loop/scev.go (+ test), pkg/models/constants.go, and pkg/storage/pebbledb/store.go. go build ./... and go test ./... pass.

Author: svczero

internal/llm/client.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
+	"unicode"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 
 	"github.com/BlackVectorOps/semantic_firewall/v4/pkg/models"
@@ -184,8 +185,11 @@ func executeOpenAIRaw(ctx context.Context, sysPrompt, userMsg, apiKey, model, ap
 	userItem.Content = json.RawMessage(userJSON)
 
 	reqBody := models.OpenAIResponsesRequest{
-		Model:          model,
-		Store:          true,
+		Model: model,
+		// Do not retain payloads server-side. Audited commit messages and diffs
+		// can originate from private/proprietary repositories; persisting them on
+		// the provider is an unnecessary data-exposure surface for a security tool.
+		Store:          false,
 		Items:          []models.OpenAIItem{sysItem, userItem},
 		ResponseFormat: &models.OpenAIRespFmt{Type: "json_object"},
 	}
@@ -411,8 +415,45 @@ func validateOutput(res models.LLMResult) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid verdict type '%s'", res.Verdict)
 	}
 
-	forbiddenPhrases := []string{"ignore previous", "system prompt"}
-	lowerEv := strings.ToLower(res.Evidence)
+	// Structural bounds: the evidence field is a plain-string summary. An
+	// over-long or control-char-laden value is itself a signal that the model
+	// was steered off-protocol, independent of any specific phrase.
+	if utf8.RuneCountInString(res.Evidence) > models.MaxEvidenceRunes {
+		return fmt.Errorf("evidence exceeds maximum length (%d runes)", models.MaxEvidenceRunes)
+	}
+	for _, r := range res.Evidence {
+		// Allow common whitespace; reject other control characters that have no
+		// place in a plain-text summary and are frequently used to smuggle
+		// delimiters or terminal escapes past naive substring checks.
+		if r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == '\t' {
+			continue
+		}
+		if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f {
+			return fmt.Errorf("evidence contains disallowed control character U+%04X", r)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Normalize before matching so spacing/case tricks do not defeat the check.
+	// This is a defense-in-depth backstop, not the primary control: collapse
+	// runs of whitespace and lowercase, then scan for known injection markers.
+	lowerEv := collapseWhitespace(strings.ToLower(res.Evidence))
+	forbiddenPhrases := []string{
+		"ignore previous",
+		"ignore prior",
+		"ignore the above",
+		"ignore all previous",
+		"disregard previous",
+		"disregard prior",
+		"disregard the above",
+		"system prompt",
+		"system message",
+		"developer message",
+		"you are now",
+		"new instructions",
+		"override instructions",
+		"begin data",
+		"end data",
+	}
 	for _, phrase := range forbiddenPhrases {
 		if strings.Contains(lowerEv, phrase) {
 			return fmt.Errorf("unsafe content: '%s'", phrase)
@@ -421,6 +462,28 @@ func validateOutput(res models.LLMResult) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// collapseWhitespace lowercases nothing (caller does that) but reduces every
+// run of Unicode whitespace to a single ASCII space, defeating the common
+// "i g n o r e" / "ignore\u00a0previous" spacing evasions against the phrase
+// denylist above.
+func collapseWhitespace(s string) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.Grow(len(s))
+	prevSpace := false
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if unicode.IsSpace(r) {
+			if !prevSpace {
+				b.WriteByte(' ')
+				prevSpace = true
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		b.WriteRune(r)
+		prevSpace = false
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
 func parseLLMJSON(content string) (models.LLMResult, error) {
 	cleanContent := cleanJSONMarkdown(content)
 	var result models.LLMResult
@@ -476,3 +539,5 @@ func (t *testProxyTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error
 	}
 	return rt.RoundTrip(req)
 }
+
+

pkg/analysis/loop/scev.go

@@ -457,27 +457,22 @@ func deriveTripCount(loop *Loop) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	var isUpCounting, ivOnLeft bool
+	var isUpCounting bool
 	var isInclusive, isNEQ bool
 
 	switch binOp.Op {
 	case token.LSS:
 		isUpCounting = true
-		ivOnLeft = true
 	case token.LEQ:
 		isUpCounting = true
-		ivOnLeft = true
 		isInclusive = true
 	case token.GTR:
 		isUpCounting = false
-		ivOnLeft = true
 	case token.GEQ:
 		isUpCounting = false
-		ivOnLeft = true
 		isInclusive = true
 	case token.NEQ:
 		isNEQ = true
-		ivOnLeft = true
 	default:
 		loop.TripCount = &SCEVUnknown{Value: nil}
 		return
@@ -497,7 +492,11 @@ func deriveTripCount(loop *Loop) {
 	} else if found := findIV(binOp.Y); found != nil {
 		iv = found
 		limit = binOp.X
-		ivOnLeft = !ivOnLeft
+		// IV is on the right-hand side (e.g. "limit < i"). Normalize to the
+		// canonical "iv OP limit" form by reversing the comparison direction.
+		// For symmetric NEQ this is a no-op. Strictness/inclusivity is preserved
+		// by the swap (e.g. "limit < i" == "i > limit": both strict), so only the
+		// counting direction needs to flip.
 		if !isNEQ {
 			isUpCounting = !isUpCounting
 		}
@@ -523,21 +522,26 @@ func deriveTripCount(loop *Loop) {
 			// Determine if Dead (TripCount 0) or Divergent (Unknown)
 			isDead := false
 			if isUpCounting {
-				// Condition: i < limit. Loop runs if Start < Limit.
-				if startC.Cmp(limitC) >= 0 {
-					// Condition is false immediately.
+				// Condition: i < limit (or i <= limit when inclusive).
+				// Loop runs if Start < Limit, or Start == Limit when inclusive.
+				cmp := startC.Cmp(limitC)
+				if cmp > 0 || (cmp == 0 && !isInclusive) {
+					// Condition is false on entry. For "<" equality is dead;
+					// for "<=" equality runs exactly once, so not dead.
 					isDead = true
 				} else if stepC.Sign() <= 0 {
-					// Start < Limit, but step is negative (or zero). Diverges.
+					// Start <= Limit, but step is negative (or zero). Diverges.
 					loop.TripCount = &SCEVUnknown{Value: nil}
 					return
 				}
 			} else {
-				// Condition: i > limit. Loop runs if Start > Limit.
-				if startC.Cmp(limitC) <= 0 {
+				// Condition: i > limit (or i >= limit when inclusive).
+				// Loop runs if Start > Limit, or Start == Limit when inclusive.
+				cmp := startC.Cmp(limitC)
+				if cmp < 0 || (cmp == 0 && !isInclusive) {
 					isDead = true
 				} else if stepC.Sign() >= 0 {
-					// Start > Limit, but step is positive. Diverges.
+					// Start >= Limit, but step is positive. Diverges.
 					loop.TripCount = &SCEVUnknown{Value: nil}
 					return
 				}
@@ -812,3 +816,5 @@ func negateSCEV(s SCEV) SCEV {
 		return &SCEVGenericExpr{Op: token.MUL, X: s, Y: &SCEVConstant{Value: big.NewInt(-1)}}
 	}
 }
+
+

pkg/analysis/loop/scev_test.go

@@ -137,6 +137,36 @@ func TestTripCountLogic(t *testing.T) {
 			funcName: "count",
 			expected: -1, // Unknown
 		},
+		{
+			name: "Inclusive equality up (runs once)",
+			src: `package main
+			func count() {
+				// Start=5, Limit=5, "i <= 5": runs exactly once, not dead.
+				for i := 5; i <= 5; i++ { }
+			}`,
+			funcName: "count",
+			expected: 1,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Inclusive equality down (runs once)",
+			src: `package main
+			func count() {
+				// Start=5, Limit=5, "i >= 5": runs exactly once, not dead.
+				for i := 5; i >= 5; i-- { }
+			}`,
+			funcName: "count",
+			expected: 1,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Exclusive equality up (dead)",
+			src: `package main
+			func count() {
+				// Start=5, Limit=5, "i < 5": false on entry, dead.
+				for i := 5; i < 5; i++ { }
+			}`,
+			funcName: "count",
+			expected: 0,
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tc := range tests {
@@ -247,3 +277,5 @@ func TestFloatExclusion(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("Expected 0 IVs for float loop, got %d", len(l.Inductions))
 	}
 }
+
+

pkg/analysis/topology/obfuscation.go

@@ -185,7 +185,10 @@ func AnalyzeObfuscation(t *FunctionTopology) ObfuscationProfile {
 	}
 
 	// 4. Indirect / reflective call ratio from the call signatures the topology
-	//    already collected. extractCallSignature tags these "dynamic:" / "reflect:".
+	//    already collected. extractCallSignature tags these "dynamic:" / "invoke:";
+	//    reflection invocation emits the dot-form "reflect.Call" (see
+	//    isIndirectCallSig for the verified form set and why "reflect:" alone was
+	//    insufficient).
 	totalCalls, indirectCalls := 0, 0
 	for sig, n := range t.CallSignatures {
 		totalCalls += n
@@ -398,12 +401,57 @@ func structuralConstOperands(instr ssa.Instruction) map[*ssa.Value]bool {
 // "go:invoke:T.M", "defer:invoke:T.M") are NOT matched — only the bare
 // "invoke:" prefix and "go:dynamic:"/"defer:dynamic:" are. Pinned by
 // TestIsIndirectCallSig; closing the gap should update that test deliberately.
+// isIndirectCallSig reports whether a call signature represents indirect or
+// reflective dispatch -- the calls whose target is not statically a named
+// function and which therefore evade call-target detection.
+//
+// SIGNATURE FORMS ARE EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED against topology.ExtractTopology on
+// real SSA built with ssa.InstantiateGenerics (the mode both ir/builder.go and
+// scan.go use). Do not infer forms from the emitter source alone -- the
+// optimizing SSA build resolves some calls differently than NaiveForm would.
+//
+//   - "dynamic:"        raw function-pointer call. VERIFIED.
+//   - "invoke:"         interface method dispatch. VERIFIED.
+//   - "go:dynamic:"     dynamic call spawned in a goroutine.
+//   - "defer:dynamic:"  dynamic call in a defer.
+//   - reflect invocation: reflect.Value.Call and friends. VERIFIED to emit the
+//     DOT-form "reflect.Call" / "reflect.MethodByName" via extractFunctionSig
+//     (<pkg>.<func>), NOT the colon-form "reflect:Call". The colon-form branch
+//     in extractCallSignature is UNREACHABLE under InstantiateGenerics (verified
+//     by exhausting method-value / method-expression / stored-value shapes), so
+//     matching only "reflect:" silently MISSED all reflection dispatch and
+//     under-counted IndirectCallRatio to zero for reflection-hidden capabilities
+//     -- precisely the evasion technique the signal exists to catch. Both forms
+//     are now matched; the colon-form is retained for loader-independence.
+//
+// Only the reflect *invocation* entry points count as indirect dispatch.
+// reflect.TypeOf / reflect.ValueOf and similar introspection helpers also emit
+// "reflect.<Func>" but are ordinary direct calls, not dynamic dispatch, so they
+// are matched by name, not by a blanket "reflect." prefix (which would also
+// capture a user package named reflect).
 func isIndirectCallSig(sig string) bool {
 	return hasPrefix(sig, "dynamic:") ||
-		hasPrefix(sig, "reflect:") ||
+		hasPrefix(sig, "reflect:") || // colon-form: unreachable under this loader, kept defensively
 		hasPrefix(sig, "invoke:") ||
 		hasPrefix(sig, "go:dynamic:") ||
-		hasPrefix(sig, "defer:dynamic:")
+		hasPrefix(sig, "defer:dynamic:") ||
+		isReflectInvokeSig(sig)
+}
+
+// reflectInvokeMethods are the reflect.Value methods that perform DYNAMIC
+// INVOCATION of an underlying callable -- the reflection equivalent of an
+// indirect call. Introspection methods (Kind, Type, Field, Len, ...) are
+// deliberately excluded: they do not dispatch a call. Emitted dot-form is
+// "reflect.<Method>".
+var reflectInvokeMethods = map[string]bool{
+	"reflect.Call":         true,
+	"reflect.CallSlice":    true,
+	"reflect.MethodByName": true, // resolves a method dynamically; its result is invoked
+	"reflect.Method":       true,
+}
+
+func isReflectInvokeSig(sig string) bool {
+	return reflectInvokeMethods[sig]
 }
 
 // flatteningScore estimates control-flow-flattening from the dispatcher's
@@ -548,3 +596,5 @@ func totalStringLen(ss []string) int {
 func hasPrefix(s, prefix string) bool {
 	return len(s) >= len(prefix) && s[:len(prefix)] == prefix
 }
+
+

pkg/analysis/topology/obfuscation_internal_test.go

@@ -80,13 +80,38 @@ func TestHasPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestIsIndirectCallSig(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	indirect := []string{"dynamic:func()", "reflect:Call", "invoke:T.M", "go:dynamic:x", "defer:dynamic:x"}
+	indirect := []string{
+		"dynamic:func()",
+		"invoke:T.M",
+		"go:dynamic:x",
+		"defer:dynamic:x",
+		// Reflection invocation: the DOT-form is what ExtractTopology actually
+		// emits under InstantiateGenerics (verified against real SSA). Matching
+		// only the colon-form previously let all reflection dispatch escape the
+		// IndirectCallRatio, under-counting obfuscation for reflection-hidden
+		// capabilities. Both forms must match.
+		"reflect.Call",
+		"reflect.CallSlice",
+		"reflect.MethodByName",
+		"reflect:Call", // colon-form: unreachable under this loader, matched defensively
+	}
 	for _, s := range indirect {
 		if !isIndirectCallSig(s) {
 			t.Errorf("isIndirectCallSig(%q)=false, want true", s)
 		}
 	}
-	direct := []string{"net.Dial", "builtin:println", "closure:func()", "", "call:unknown"}
+	direct := []string{
+		"net.Dial",
+		"builtin:println",
+		"closure:func()",
+		"",
+		"call:unknown",
+		// reflect introspection helpers emit "reflect.<Func>" too but are
+		// ordinary direct calls, NOT dynamic dispatch -- they must NOT count.
+		"reflect.TypeOf",
+		"reflect.ValueOf",
+		"reflect.DeepEqual",
+	}
 	for _, s := range direct {
 		if isIndirectCallSig(s) {
 			t.Errorf("isIndirectCallSig(%q)=true, want false", s)
@@ -272,3 +297,5 @@ func FuzzMaxWindowEntropy(f *testing.F) {
 		}
 	})
 }
+
+