(Fixture for /stability and /postmortem. Stands in for an incident
tracker export, e.g. PagerDuty/Statuspage, or a pasted incident log.)
- Detected: 09:41 (latency alert)
- Resolved: 09:58 (connection pool size increased)
- Severity: Sev-2
- Postmortem: None written. Fixed and closed same day.
- Detected: 16:02 (customer-reported)
- Resolved: 17:10 (manually requeued stuck jobs)
- Severity: Sev-2
- Postmortem: None written. Fixed and closed same day.
- Detected: 08:15 (spike in support tickets)
- Resolved: 09:00 (token TTL config rolled back)
- Severity: Sev-2
- Postmortem: None written. Fixed and closed same day.
- Detected: 14:02 -- alert fires: p99 latency > 5s
- Acknowledged: 14:06 -- on-call engineer acks
- Root cause identified: 14:19 -- billing webhook retry loop (PR #491) has no backoff/cap, exhausts the connection pool under a single slow downstream call
- Mitigated: 14:24 -- pool size increased, retry loop disabled
- Fully resolved: 15:10 -- fix deployed (PR #508 follow-up), retry loop rewritten with exponential backoff
- Severity: Sev-2
- Customer impact: ~12 minutes of degraded API latency (p99 5-8s), all customers, no data loss, no failed payments (webhook is idempotent)
- Postmortem: Not yet written -- this is the incident to feed
/postmortemfor a worked example. Note this is the second connection-pool incident in 90 days (see Incident 1).
None on record. Current ~500 req/s capacity estimate is based on Incident 4 traffic levels at the time, not a deliberate load test.