Ficus runs entirely locally and makes no network calls, but it does touch sensitive material:
- It reads your Claude Code transcripts under
~/.claude/projects/to compute usage, and writes them to a SQLite database in~/.claude/carbon-ledger/. - It stores receipt files and their bytes in that database. Receipts carry names, amounts and sometimes addresses.
- The
StopandSessionStarthooks execute on your machine on every session.
Anything that could leak transcript content or receipt data, execute unexpected code through the hooks, the skills or the dashboard, or make a network call from a tool that is supposed to make none, is a security issue worth reporting.
The dashboard is a particular case: it embeds ledger strings into an HTML file
that opens over file://. Every value reaches the DOM as a text node, never as
parsed markup. A way around that is a security issue.
The estimates. The methodology is documented as ±50% order-of-magnitude and disagreeing with a factor is a normal issue, not a vulnerability.
Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Open a private security advisory on GitHub. Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker could do with it.
Ficus is a fork of
claude-carbon pinned at
43fb883. Several upstream components were deleted in this fork
because of their attack surface — the OAuth-token-reading statusline, the
pipe-to-shell installer, and the auto-update path (see the README's fork
provenance section). A vulnerability that only exists in upstream code this fork
does not ship belongs in
upstream's advisory queue,
not here.