fix: normalize discovered paths to forward slashes and add a Windows CI job #332
Annotations
10 errors and 10 warnings
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L122
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L108
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L92
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L82
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L72
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L66
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L57
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
package-lock.json#L42
[CRITICAL] Hardcoded Azure storage account key: Found Azure storage account key in package-lock.json. Secrets must never be hardcoded in configuration files.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[CRITICAL] Missing prompt defense: Data leakage defense: Prompt should block revealing internal instructions, secrets, or confidential data. (OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM06 Sensitive Information Disclosure)
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[CRITICAL] Missing prompt defense: Instruction boundary defense: Prompt should state that user content cannot override, ignore, or modify higher-priority instructions. (OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM01 Prompt Injection)
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Run AgentShield on itself:
.codex/config.toml#L25
[MEDIUM] MCP server "playwright" runs an unpinned package: MCP server "playwright" launches @playwright/mcp@latest via npx with version "latest" floats. Every start resolves the newest publish, so a compromised or hijacked package version runs with the server's permissions. Pin an exact version and review upgrades.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
.codex/config.toml#L21
[MEDIUM] MCP server "memory" runs an unpinned package: MCP server "memory" launches @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory via npx with no version pinned. Every start resolves the newest publish, so a compromised or hijacked package version runs with the server's permissions. Pin an exact version and review upgrades.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
.codex/config.toml#L14
[MEDIUM] MCP server "context7" runs an unpinned package: MCP server "context7" launches @upstash/context7-mcp@latest via npx with version "latest" floats. Every start resolves the newest publish, so a compromised or hijacked package version runs with the server's permissions. Pin an exact version and review upgrades.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
.codex/config.toml#L10
[MEDIUM] MCP server "github" runs an unpinned package: MCP server "github" launches @modelcontextprotocol/server-github via npx with no version pinned. Every start resolves the newest publish, so a compromised or hijacked package version runs with the server's permissions. Pin an exact version and review upgrades.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
.codex/config.toml#L4
[MEDIUM] Repository Codex config overrides user policy: This project-scoped config sets approval_policy, sandbox_mode, mcp_servers. Once the project is trusted these keys override the user's own config, so a repository can loosen approvals, disable the sandbox, register MCP servers, or run notify commands. Keep policy keys in ~/.codex/config.toml and limit project files to model and instruction settings.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[MEDIUM] Missing prompt defense: Input validation defense: Prompt should instruct the agent to validate, sanitize, inspect, or reject suspicious input. (OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM01 Prompt Injection)
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[MEDIUM] Missing prompt defense: Context overflow defense: Prompt should acknowledge input-length or token-window limits and reject attempts to push safeguards out of context.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[MEDIUM] Missing prompt defense: Unicode and encoding defense: Prompt should mention unicode, invisible characters, homoglyphs, or encoding tricks as suspicious input.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[MEDIUM] Missing prompt defense: Multi-language bypass defense: Prompt should address attempts to evade safeguards by switching languages or translating unsafe requests.
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Run AgentShield on itself:
CLAUDE.md#L0
[MEDIUM] Missing prompt defense: Output control defense: Prompt should constrain risky output forms such as executable code, HTML, links, or scripts. (OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM02 Insecure Output Handling)
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background
wait
wait-all
cancel
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