Merge pull request #485 from szhygulin/docs/skill-v8-cosmetics

docs: full reflection of skill v0.6.0 + MCP companion in README + SECURITY

Author: szhygulin

README.md

@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@ This is an agent-driven portfolio management tool, not a wallet replacement. The
 user-intent ──► agent ──► MCP server ──► WalletConnect / USB-HID ──► Ledger Live / host ──► Ledger device
 ```
 
-Layered defenses catch most single-layer compromises: a server-side prepare↔send fingerprint, an independent 4byte.directory selector check, agent-side ABI decode + pre-sign hash recomputation, on-device clear-sign or blind-sign-hash match, a WalletConnect session-topic cross-check, a `previewToken`/`userDecision` gate, and — for skeptical users on high-value flows — a `get_verification_artifact` that routes bytes to an independent second LLM. **See [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md)** for the full defenses table, threat mapping, honest limits, and verification recipes.
+Layered defenses catch most single-layer compromises: a server-side prepare↔send fingerprint, an independent 4byte.directory selector check, agent-side ABI decode + pre-sign hash recomputation, on-device clear-sign or blind-sign-hash match, a WalletConnect session-topic cross-check, a `previewToken`/`userDecision` gate, and — for skeptical users on high-value flows — a `get_verification_artifact` that routes bytes to an independent second LLM. The companion `vaultpilot-security-skill` (see Agent-side hardening below) extends this with agent-side invariants the server cannot omit: outer dispatch-target allowlist, chain-must-be-explicit refusal, Tier-1 bridge facet decoder, set-level intent verification on revoke flows, durable-binding source-of-truth verification on validator / market / LP / xpub selection, byte-fingerprint preview + drainer-template refusal on `sign_message_btc/_ltc`, and mandatory second-LLM cross-check on hard-trigger ops. **See [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md)** for the full defenses table, threat mapping, honest limits, and verification recipes.
 
 ### Agent-side hardening (strongly recommended)
 
-The `CHECKS PERFORMED` / `VERIFY-BEFORE-SIGNING` directives VaultPilot emits are authored by the MCP server itself — a compromised server could silently omit them. Install the companion [`vaultpilot-security-skill`](https://github.com/szhygulin/vaultpilot-security-skill) so the agent runs the bytes-decode + hash-recompute invariants regardless of what the MCP says:
+The `CHECKS PERFORMED` / `VERIFY-BEFORE-SIGNING` directives VaultPilot emits are authored by the MCP server itself — a compromised server could silently omit them. Install the companion [`vaultpilot-security-skill`](https://github.com/szhygulin/vaultpilot-security-skill) so the agent runs its cryptographic integrity invariants on every signing flow regardless of what the MCP says — bytes decode (#1) + outer dispatch-target allowlist (#1.a) + hash recompute (#2) + chain-must-be-explicit refusal (#2.5) + bridge-recipient cross-check (#6b) + approval-class surfacing (#11) + mandatory second-LLM on hard-trigger ops (#12.5) + set-level intent verification (#14) + durable-binding source-of-truth (#15):
 
 ```bash
 git clone https://github.com/szhygulin/vaultpilot-security-skill.git \