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@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ of `Behavior`, `Wire`, `API` (combine with `+`).
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| Planned |[#8324](https://github.com/akkadotnet/akka.net/pull/8324)|`Akka.Routing`| Behavior |`ConsistentHash<T>` no longer retains the `SortedDictionary` passed to its public constructor — the ring is snapshotted into internal sorted arrays. Mutating that dictionary after construction no longer affects the instance (previously the aliasing was inconsistent: `IsEmpty` and `operator +`/`-` read it live, while `NodeFor` froze it after the first lookup). A `null` dictionary now throws `ArgumentNullException` from the constructor instead of surfacing later as a `NullReferenceException`. No public API removed; the ring built by `ConsistentHash.Create` is byte-identical. (#8293) | None for normal use — `ConsistentHash.Create` already builds the dictionary fully before constructing, so routers/receptionists are unaffected. If you call the `ConsistentHash(SortedDictionary, int)` constructor directly, populate the dictionary before passing it and don't rely on post-construction mutation being visible. |
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| Planned | `fix/gossip-removal-tombstones` | `Akka.Cluster` | Wire + Behavior | Cluster gossip now carries a removal tombstone for every member the leader removes (new `repeated Tombstone tombstones = 7` on the `Gossip` proto message, previously the one vacant field number). A member the leader removed can no longer be put back into the gossip by a peer that has not caught up, which previously blocked convergence permanently and needed a full cluster restart to clear. Tombstones expire after the new `akka.cluster.prune-gossip-tombstones-after` setting (default `24h`), pruned by the leader on a converged tick and reclaimed for good: gossip reception keeps the tombstones of whichever gossip wins the causal comparison, so a peer that has not pruned yet cannot hand a pruned tombstone back. Tombstones are only unioned across the two gossips when neither descends from the other -- equal clocks, or concurrent clocks, where each side may hold a removal the other has not heard about. The field is additive and proto3 ignores unknown fields in both directions, so rolling upgrades are safe; an older node parses the gossip fine but drops the tombstones when it re-emits it, and if that stripped gossip is causally newer than an upgraded node's, the upgraded node adopts it and loses those tombstones too -- so the protection only holds between upgraded nodes and the fix is not fully in effect until every node is upgraded. | No action required. Raise `akka.cluster.prune-gossip-tombstones-after` if the cluster must survive partitions longer than 24 hours, or lower it if a cluster with heavy join/leave churn needs the gossip message kept small -- each tombstone adds a full address plus a timestamp to every gossip message until it expires. |
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| Planned |`feature/default-bounded-shard-rebalancing`|`Akka.Cluster.Sharding`| Behavior | The default `rebalance-absolute-limit` is now `20`, selecting the bounded shard allocation strategy instead of the legacy threshold-based strategy. | To retain the legacy strategy temporarily, explicitly set `akka.cluster.sharding.least-shard-allocation-strategy.rebalance-absolute-limit = 0`. Review `rebalance-threshold` and `max-simultaneous-rebalance`, which do not apply while the bounded strategy is active. |
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| Planned | `fix/artery-shutdown-flush` | `Akka.Remote` (Artery) | Behavior | Graceful transport shutdown now flushes. `ArteryRemoting.Shutdown()` completes each association's outbound channels, waits up to the new `akka.remote.artery.advanced.flush-wait-on-shutdown` (default `2 s`, mirroring classic remoting's `akka.remote.flush-wait-on-shutdown`) for the outbound streams to finish writing what they had already accepted, and only then drains the remainder to `Dropped`. Previously it completed and drained in the same breath, so a message accepted microseconds before shutdown -- an ack, a graceful notice, a handshake reply -- was published as `Dropped` instead of reaching the socket. Two consequences: graceful shutdown may now take up to `flush-wait-on-shutdown` longer per transport (only when a backlog cannot reach its peer; an association with nothing left to write completes at once), and messages that previously surfaced as `Dropped` may now be delivered. Abrupt termination (materializer death without a graceful `Shutdown()`) is unchanged. | No action required. Set `akka.remote.artery.advanced.flush-wait-on-shutdown = 0` to restore the previous drain-immediately behavior, or lower it to cap how long shutdown may wait. Monitoring that counts shutdown-time `Dropped` events will see fewer of them. |
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| Planned | `fix/artery-inbound-quarantine-check` | `Akka.Remote` (Artery) | Behavior | Quarantine is now enforced on the INBOUND path too. Previously Artery only gated outbound sends -- an envelope arriving FROM a uid this system has quarantined was still delivered, and the quarantined peer was only notified once, proactively, at the moment `Quarantine()` was called. A new `InboundQuarantineCheckStage`, woven into the inbound pipeline right after handshake, now drops every inbound envelope (ordinary or control, including system messages) whose origin uid is quarantined, and reactively re-sends a `Quarantined` control notice to the origin for each drop (except for a heartbeat or the peer's own `Quarantined` notice, to avoid a reply storm). The existing one-shot proactive notice in `Quarantine()` is unchanged. Additionally, an ordinary/large outbound stream that terminates while its association is quarantined no longer wedges permanently: the materialize-once gate is released (timer-driven auto-reconnect stays suppressed), so a quarantine-piercing `ActorSelection` send -- or any send after a new incarnation's handshake lifts the quarantine -- re-materializes the stream on demand and can reach a restarted peer at the same address. | No action required -- this is a bug fix restoring the documented "no further communication" guarantee of quarantine and the documented new-incarnation piercing behavior; code that (incorrectly) depended on a quarantined peer's replies still arriving is unsupported. |
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| Planned | `fix/artery-daemonmsgcreate-control-stream` | `Akka.Remote` (Artery) | Behavior | Remote deployment's `DaemonMsgCreate` now travels over Artery's CONTROL stream (as a plain envelope, no delivery/ack sequencing) instead of the ordinary stream, ordering it ahead of the `Watch` that remote deployment sends immediately afterwards. Previously the two rode independent, unordered TCP connections and `Watch` systematically arrived first, so the receiver replied `DeathWatchNotification(existenceConfirmed: false)` for a not-yet-created actor and the deployer reaped the freshly-deployed routee before its `Supervise` registration landed, emptying cluster router pools. Additionally (Pekko parity), inbound ordinary messages addressed to a remote-deployed recipient that has not been created yet are no longer dead-lettered immediately: the resolve is retried on a bounded schedule (20 attempts x 50ms, buffered per recipient in FIFO order) so first messages that arrive ahead of the in-flight `DaemonMsgCreate` are delivered once the actor exists; paths that never resolve are banned and dead-letter as before. | No action required -- this is a bug fix restoring correct create-before-watch ordering; code that (incorrectly) depended on the old race is unsupported. |
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| Planned |`feature/artery-test-mode`|`Akka.Remote`| Behavior | System UID generation (`AddressUidExtension` / `AddressUid`) now uses a cryptographic RNG instead of the `Environment.TickCount`-seeded `ThreadLocalRandom`. Previously, multiple processes started within the same millisecond tick (e.g. every node of a multi-node test spawning at once) could draw IDENTICAL system UIDs, silently corrupting Artery's uid-keyed identity (handshakes, quarantine, association reverse index). UIDs remain nonzero and in the legacy `[1, int.MaxValue]` range at the default (`use-64bit-system-uids = off`). | Nothing required -- UIDs were always documented as random; only code depending on the (buggy) time-seeded determinism could observe a difference. |
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