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Changelog

All notable CipherBoard changes are documented in this file. The project uses Semantic Versioning from version 0.1.0. Pre-1.0 releases may contain compatibility changes that require re-pairing.

0.4.0 - 2026-07-14

Added

  • Three receiver-auto-detected message presentations: compact CB1, Russian words, and English words. The choice is a local setting for future sends and is not negotiated or stored per contact.
  • A versioned CBW1 Base4096 wrapper over complete ordered canonical CB1 parts. Its tag-first checksum rejects accidental edits before reconstruction; canonical envelope validation and Olm/AEAD remain the security boundary.
  • Pinned 4096-word Russian and English dictionaries generated from the hermitdave/FrequencyWords 2018 lists, with committed byte hashes, invariant tests, filtering documentation, and CC-BY-SA-4.0 attribution.
  • Parser/property/JNI/fuzz coverage for both word alphabets, mutations, truncation, extra or unknown words, wrong header fields, padding, limits, canonical-part recovery, and receiver-independent settings behavior.

Changed

  • Every new message uses the universal 16-KiB core fragmentation profile. The confusing SMS compact selector has been removed from the UI and send path.
  • Receive continues to accept legacy canonical CB1 messages produced by both former fragmentation profiles. Compact 0.4 output remains interoperable with older CipherBoard versions; word presentation requires 0.4 or newer on both devices.
  • Presentation parsing is bounded to a 48-KiB decoded word wrapper, 32,768 tokens, and a 384-Ki UTF-16 Android input boundary.

Security Notes

  • Word presentation does not change message keys, Double Ratchet, AEAD, integrity, replay protection, forward secrecy, or authenticated metadata.
  • The CBW1 checksum is unkeyed and is not authentication. An attacker can recognize and re-encode the public word format; it is camouflage from casual inspection, not natural language, steganography, or plausible deniability.
  • Word messages are substantially longer and more fragile under autocorrect, translation, truncation, and token edits. They do not hide messenger account, sender/recipient relationship, timing, or approximate-size metadata.
  • Exact-release paired-device messenger testing on physical GrapheneOS and an independent applied-cryptography/Android security audit remain outstanding.

0.3.0 - 2026-07-14

Added

  • An Encrypt / Decrypt mode selector inside the shield panel. The primary receive flow is now: copy a complete CB1: message from any transport, open the shield panel, select Decrypt, and tap Paste and decrypt.
  • Embedded, drawing-only plaintext display inside the FLAG_SECURE IME window.
  • Obscured-touch filtering across the embedded secure panel to reject overlay tapjacking attempts on encryption, decryption, reply and Vault actions. The surface is non-focusable and non-selectable and is excluded from Accessibility text, autofill, content capture, and saved state.
  • Reply securely in the embedded decrypt view. It clears the received plaintext, returns to Encrypt, and selects the same local contact without placing a contact identifier or plaintext in an Intent.
  • A process-local one-shot token handoff for the non-exported Vault unlock activity. The handoff must activate and complete exactly once before the IME accepts the narrowly scoped host-connection rebind.
  • First-draw acknowledgement for pending displays. The encrypted recovery record is marked displayed only after an allowed plaintext draw; a bounded render timeout fails closed if that acknowledgement never occurs.
  • Race-safe ownership for parser/decrypt worker results. Lifecycle cancellation drains queued results and wipes any plaintext before removing callbacks.

Changed

  • Clipboard access is explicit and ciphertext-only. CipherBoard reads exactly one bounded item after Paste and decrypt, validates it as CB1:, and leaves the original ciphertext clip unchanged.
  • Ordinary keyboard keys are hidden in Decrypt mode. This prevents the receive surface from looking editable and removes an accidental host-input affordance while plaintext is visible.
  • The embedded panel uses constrained landscape and large-font layouts, a scrollable plaintext region, and bounded text lines. Release QA now includes portrait/landscape checks at font scales 1.0, 1.3, and 2.0 in English and Russian.
  • ACTION_PROCESS_TEXT and the separate protected viewer remain supported as an alternative where the transport exposes Android text actions; they are no longer required for the common copied-ciphertext flow.
  • The protected Activity viewer now cancels in-flight parsing/decryption on background and rechecks the current Vault lock policy immediately before its first plaintext draw.
  • Android 6-10 device-credential confirmation keeps its non-exported unlock host alive only for the controlled system credential transition.

Security Notes

  • Only ciphertext may remain in Android's clipboard. CipherBoard never writes decrypted plaintext there, but the transport and clipboard provider can still observe or retain the copied ciphertext.
  • Ratchet, replay marker, and encrypted pending-display plaintext are committed before the embedded surface receives plaintext. Abandoning before first draw preserves the encrypted pending display for exact recovery; closing after an acknowledged draw removes it under the no-history policy.
  • Reply securely wipes any hidden outbound draft before selecting the decrypted message's contact, preventing a draft from another recipient from being reused accidentally.
  • Responsive source controls and automated surface tests do not replace visual QA on the exact release APK or physical GrapheneOS testing.
  • The complete product has not received an independent applied-cryptography or Android security audit.

0.2.0 - 2026-07-14

Added

  • Embedded Private mode panel above the keyboard keys, opened and closed by the shield action without navigating away from the host application.
  • A bounded, RAM-only local draft connection for on-screen key input, with contact selection, Vault status, transport mode, size estimate, clear, close, and encrypt controls inside the IME.
  • Exact InputBinding.connectionToken scoping for the host field, with one explicitly bounded rebind after the Vault unlock activity returns.
  • Durable outbound delivery phases. A pending operation changes from READY to COMMIT_UNCERTAIN before host commitText() and is never automatically retried after the host acknowledgement boundary becomes ambiguous.
  • Legacy pending sends from 0.1.x migrate as COMMIT_UNCERTAIN, because the old record format cannot prove whether the host already accepted them.

Changed

  • Private plaintext remains visible in the embedded panel after ciphertext was inserted, allowing the sender to check it. It is cleared on explicit clear or close, when the host field changes, or when the secure lifecycle ends.
  • Software keys, text actions, gestures, and IME edit commands route to the local Private draft. Personalized learning and clipboard-history paths remain disabled while Private mode is active.
  • Inherited detailed HeliBoard input diagnostics are suppressed for the Private editor even when debug mode is enabled, so words and n-gram context are not written to logcat.
  • The IME window uses FLAG_SECURE in Private mode. The separate protected viewer and read-only ACTION_PROCESS_TEXT decryption flow remain activities.
  • Stable update guidance continues to use an external installer such as Obtainium. CipherBoard has no in-app updater and requests neither Internet nor package-install permission.

Security Notes

  • Android can deliver a physical keyboard directly to the focused host application. Hardware keyboards must not be used to enter a Private draft; use CipherBoard's on-screen keys.
  • Mutable buffers and UI text are wiped on a best-effort basis. Android views, Binder, JNI, and the JVM may create copies, so complete RAM erasure cannot be guaranteed.
  • The complete product has not received an independent applied-cryptography or Android security audit.

0.1.1 - 2026-07-13

Fixed

  • Restored readable text and controls in native CipherBoard screens on Android 12 and later by making light/dark platform-theme colors explicit across resource qualifiers.

Changed

  • Documented stable, install-in-place updates through Obtainium while CipherBoard itself remains offline and has no Internet permission.
  • Added a GrapheneOS installation and update guide with signing-certificate continuity, data-preservation, and Android confirmation guidance.

Security Notes

  • This update does not change the application ID, signing certificate, Vault format, or messaging protocol. Install it over 0.1.0; uninstalling first destroys local identity and ratchet state and requires pairing again.
  • Obtainium is an external networked installer and a separate trust boundary. CipherBoard does not contact GitHub and does not install its own updates.

0.1.0 - 2026-07-13

Added

  • HeliBoard-based Android IME with English, Russian, emoji, symbols, themes, layouts, and ordinary keyboard settings retained.
  • Local identities and an authenticated encrypted Vault backed by Android Keystore, with StrongBox-first generation and verified TEE fallback.
  • Physical two-way QR pairing, local contact names, fingerprints, Safety Numbers, explicit verification, key-change handling, and re-pairing.
  • Pinned vodozemac 0.10.0 Olm version 2 sessions, bounded replay state, canonical CB1: envelopes, multipart transport, and crash-safe ratchet transactions.
  • Secure Composer that keeps plaintext out of the host editor and commits only ciphertext after an explicit user action.
  • Read-only Android ACTION_PROCESS_TEXT decryption, selected-ciphertext handling from the IME, and a protected viewer with secure reply.
  • English and Russian application UI, offline license viewer, threat model, security checklist, SBOM generation, vulnerability scanning, and signed APK policy gates.

Security Notes

  • CipherBoard has no runtime network feature and the release policy rejects android.permission.INTERNET and other forbidden permissions.
  • Plaintext history is disabled by default; message keys are not retained for convenient re-reading.
  • The complete product has not received an independent applied-cryptography or Android security audit. Physical GrapheneOS, StrongBox, TEE-only, live-camera pairing, and hostile-device validation remain necessary before high-risk use.