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Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories for cxdy/grain.

Do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities that could enable host compromise, unauthenticated remote control of the daemon, or token/credential theft.

We will acknowledge reports as soon as practical and coordinate disclosure after a fix is available.

In scope

  • Daemon HTTP/unix-socket API (auth bypass, unsafe binds, privilege issues in control-plane handlers)
  • Guest agent protocol and host-side agent proxy paths (host escape, unexpected host FS access)
  • Install script (scripts/install.sh) — supply chain / install-path issues
  • Remote API auth (api_token / GRAIN_TOKEN, non-loopback bind rules)

Out of scope

  • Guest workload compromise without host escape. The expected isolation boundary is the microVM (QEMU/HVF or Firecracker/KVM). Code running as root inside a guest that cannot reach the host is not a grain host vulnerability by itself.
  • Multi-tenant hard isolation for untrusted co-tenants on one host without additional hardening (see Security model).
  • Issues solely in third-party guests, base cloud images, or tools you run inside sandboxes (for example act, Docker, k3s), unless grain misconfigures them in a way that breaks the host boundary.

Safe defaults (operators)

Never open the API on 0.0.0.0 (or any non-loopback address) without api_token. The daemon refuses insecure open binds; do not bypass this with custom builds or reverse proxies that strip auth.

  • Prefer api: 127.0.0.1:7474 plus SSH tunnel or TLS reverse proxy.
  • Firewall control-plane and egress-proxy ports on shared hosts.
  • Full team-box setup: Remote sandbox host (docs/guides/remote-host.md).

Further reading