Conformance: BlindOracle credential issuer — L1 Core Crypto + VC structural (issuer surface)

[craigmbrown]

Implementation name and version
BlindOracle credential issuer (Python) — LEV-10, 2026-06-06. Issuer
did:web:craigmbrown.com; agent did:web:craigmbrown.com/blindoracle/
(KnowThat.ai-registered).

Compliance level claimed
L1 — Core Crypto: PASS (issuer/credential surface), + W3C VC structural
conformance for the credential it issues.
Honest scope: L2 (MCP session server) and L3 (delegation-graph server /
StatusList2021) are NOT claimed — BlindOracle is a credential issuer/attester,
not the MCP gateway. The credential it issues is an AgentSecurityAuditCredential
(an attestation answering "can this be trusted?", scoped to the Responsible Party),
deliberately distinct from a DelegationCredential.

Test results

1. Reference suite (this repo, @kya-os/mcp v1.6.0), run locally:
   npm run build && npm test → Test Files 81 passed (81); Tests 1152 passed (1152).

2. BlindOracle-side conformance harness (tests/test_kyaos_conformance.py),
   each test mapped to a spec ID — 6 passed:

   Spec	Check	Result
   §4.3 / L1.1	Ed25519 did:key (0xed01 + base58btc + z), pubkey round-trip	PASS
   L1.2	SHA-256 over RFC 8785 JCS (deterministic, 64-hex, whole-float norm)	PASS
   L1.9	base58btc Multikey encode/decode round-trip	PASS
   §4.4	did:web doc exposes Ed25519VerificationKey2020 + publicKeyJwk (OKP/Ed25519)	PASS
   L3.1/L3.5	VC v1 context + issuer + issuanceDate + credentialSubject + proof	PASS
   L1.3/L1.4	EdDSA sign + verify (eddsa-jcs-2022 DataIntegrityProof); tamper rejected	PASS

3. Live end-to-end: a BlindOracle credential's eddsa-jcs-2022 proof verifies
   against the published https://craigmbrown.com/.well-known/did.json JWK
   (issuer) and https://craigmbrown.com/blindoracle/did.json JWK (agent) — the
   foreign-verifier path, no private key.

Implementation repo/package
scripts/bo_vc_transformer.py (VC + MCP-I envelope + sign/verify),
scripts/bo_did_keygen.py (did:web/did:key + DID document). Live DIDs above.

Notes / proposal for the KYA-OS Task Force
Add a first-class attestation/reputation evidence type (distinct from
DelegationCredential) with an optional on-chain anchor field, so
"can this be trusted?" answers carry independently-verifiable provenance.
BlindOracle issues exactly this today (ProofOfAuditReport + 3-witness Merkle anchor)
and is happy to contribute the spec text + a reference issuer.