chore(release): v9.6.1 — audit-search session_id filter fix (#433)

v9.6.1 is a patch on v9.6.0. It fixes a bug in the audit-search API where a session_id filter was silently ignored: the search endpoint accepted the request and returned 200 but dropped the filter, so drilling from a session-summary bucket into that session's individual records returned the tenant's records across every session in the time range instead of the one requested. Tenant isolation was never affected — the bug was confined to the session_id sub-filter, and the tenant scope every audit query enforces was always applied. It is a drop-in upgrade from v9.6.0, with no migration and no configuration change.

Highlights:
- The session_id filter on POST /api/v1/audit/search is now applied as a parameterized, tenant-scoped condition, so a search by session_id returns exactly that session's records. Aggregates from the session-summary endpoint itself were correct on v9.6.0 and are unchanged.

Migration: none. Full notes: https://docs.getaxonflow.com/docs/releases/v9-6-1

Signed-off-by: AxonFlow Team <bot@getaxonflow.com>
Co-authored-by: AxonFlow Team <bot@getaxonflow.com>

Author: saurabhjain1592

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ community mirror, **Enterprise** changes are EE-only.
 
 ---
 
+## [9.6.1] - 2026-07-08 (patch on 9.6.0: audit-search session_id drill-down)
+
+**Patch.** Fixes a correctness bug in the audit-search API surfaced while documenting the v9.6.0 session-summary reporting: a `session_id` filter was silently dropped, so the per-session drill-down returned the tenant's rows across all sessions instead of the one requested. Within-tenant only; tenant isolation was never affected. No migration.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`session_id` filter on `POST /api/v1/audit/search` is now applied.** *(Community)* The audit-search request handler's body-decode struct was missing the `session_id` field the query layer already supported, so a `session_id` filter was silently dropped and the session-summary "drill into this session" flow returned all of the tenant's rows across every session with a `200`. The filter now reaches the query as a parameterized, tenant-scoped condition, so drilling into a session bucket returns exactly that session's rows. Tenant scoping (from the trusted tenant header) was never affected. Pinned by a handler-level regression test and a runtime-e2e drill-down leg.
+
+---
+
 ## [9.6.0] - 2026-07-07 (session-summary reporting API + Claude Code usage dashboard)
 
 **Additive minor.** v9.6.0 turns the Claude Code and Cowork activity v9.5.0 began ingesting into reporting. A new session-summary API rolls governed activity into per-session (or per-user-day) buckets, additively enriched with the developer and session usage metrics when the OTLP ingest is wired; a new operator Grafana dashboard visualizes that usage; and the bundled Grafana datasources are provisioned with stable uids, closing a pre-existing bug that broke provisioned dashboards. One idempotent migration (`core/141`) auto-applies on deploy.

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-9.6.0
+9.6.1

docker-compose.yml

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ services:
       DEPLOYMENT_MODE: ${DEPLOYMENT_MODE:-community}
       AXONFLOW_INTEGRATIONS: ${AXONFLOW_INTEGRATIONS:-}
       AXONFLOW_LICENSE_KEY: ${AXONFLOW_LICENSE_KEY:-}
-      AXONFLOW_VERSION: "${AXONFLOW_VERSION:-9.6.0}"
+      AXONFLOW_VERSION: "${AXONFLOW_VERSION:-9.6.1}"
 
       # Anonymous platform startup telemetry — inherit the operator's
       # opt-out lever. CI / dev shells should export AXONFLOW_TELEMETRY=off
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ services:
       PORT: 8081
       DEPLOYMENT_MODE: ${DEPLOYMENT_MODE:-community}
       AXONFLOW_LICENSE_KEY: ${AXONFLOW_LICENSE_KEY:-}
-      AXONFLOW_VERSION: "${AXONFLOW_VERSION:-9.6.0}"
+      AXONFLOW_VERSION: "${AXONFLOW_VERSION:-9.6.1}"
 
       # Anonymous platform startup telemetry — inherit the operator's
       # opt-out lever. See agent service above for the full rationale.

platform/agent/Dockerfile

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ARG EDITION=community
 # — the SAME source as the io.opencontainer.image.version label below, so the
 # baked binary version and the image label never drift. Re-declared here in the
 # builder stage (ARG scope is per-stage); the final stage declares it again.
-ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.0
+ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.1
 
 # Install git for go modules
 RUN apk add --no-cache git ca-certificates tzdata
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ RUN set -e && \
 # Final stage - minimal runtime image
 FROM alpine:3.24
 
-ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.0
+ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.1
 ENV AXONFLOW_VERSION=${AXONFLOW_VERSION}
 
 # AWS Marketplace metadata

platform/orchestrator/Dockerfile

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ ARG EDITION=community
 # — the SAME source as the io.opencontainer.image.version label below, so the
 # baked binary version and the image label never drift. Re-declared here in the
 # builder stage (ARG scope is per-stage); the final stage declares it again.
-ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.0
+ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.1
 
 # Install git for go modules
 RUN apk add --no-cache git ca-certificates tzdata
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ RUN set -e && \
 # Final stage - minimal runtime image
 FROM alpine:3.24
 
-ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.0
+ARG AXONFLOW_VERSION=9.6.1
 ENV AXONFLOW_VERSION=${AXONFLOW_VERSION}
 
 # AWS Marketplace metadata

platform/orchestrator/run.go

@@ -2583,6 +2583,7 @@ func auditSearchHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		PolicyName string    `json:"policy_name,omitempty"` // ADR-043: filter by policy_name
 		OverrideID string    `json:"override_id,omitempty"` // ADR-044: filter by override_id in policy_details JSONB
 		Action     string    `json:"action,omitempty"`      // filter by policy_decision (e.g. "blocked", "approved")
+		SessionID  string    `json:"session_id,omitempty"`  // #2759: session-summary bucket drill-down against the first-class column
 		Limit      int       `json:"limit,omitempty"`
 		Offset     int       `json:"offset,omitempty"`
 	}

platform/orchestrator/run_test.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"axonflow/platform/orchestrator/rbi"
 	"axonflow/platform/orchestrator/sebi"
 
+	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
 	"github.com/gorilla/mux"
 )
 
@@ -1783,6 +1784,74 @@ func TestAuditSearchHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestAuditSearchHandler_SessionIDFilter pins the HTTP→SQL wiring of the
+// #2759 session-summary drill-down: a session_id in the POST body must reach
+// SearchAuditLogs as a criteria field and land in the SQL as a
+// session_id = $n filter. Regression it guards: the backend filter shipped
+// with #2759 (SearchAuditLogs + criteria adapter), but the handler's
+// body-decode struct never carried the field, so an HTTP caller's session_id
+// was silently dropped and the "drill into a session bucket" flow returned
+// the tenant's rows across ALL sessions with a 200 (#2857). The criteria
+// adapter reads whatever fields the caller's struct exposes, so this bug
+// class is invisible to SearchAuditLogs-level tests — it must be pinned at
+// the handler.
+func TestAuditSearchHandler_SessionIDFilter(t *testing.T) {
+	oldAuditLogger := auditLogger
+	defer func() { auditLogger = oldAuditLogger }()
+
+	db, mock, err := sqlmock.New()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Failed to create mock DB: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+	auditLogger = &AuditLogger{db: db}
+
+	rows := sqlmock.NewRows([]string{
+		"id", "request_id", "timestamp", "user_id", "user_email", "user_role",
+		"client_id", "tenant_id", "request_type", "query", "policy_decision",
+		"policy_details", "provider", "model", "response_time_ms", "tokens_used",
+		"cost", "redacted_fields", "error_message", "compliance_flags",
+		"response_sample", "session_id",
+		"total_count",
+	}).AddRow(
+		"audit_sess_001", "req_sess_001", time.Now(), 5, "user@example.com", "user",
+		"client_001", "tenant_001", "query", "session query", "allowed",
+		[]byte(`{}`), "openai", "gpt-4", 100, 80,
+		0.004, []byte(`[]`), "", []byte(`[]`),
+		"", "sess-1",
+		1,
+	)
+	// The tenant comes from the trusted header ($1), the session filter from
+	// the body ($2). WithArgs is the real assertion: it fails unless the
+	// handler actually forwarded session_id into the query.
+	mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT (.+) FROM audit_logs WHERE (.+) tenant_id = (.+) session_id = (.+) ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT").
+		WithArgs("tenant_001", "sess-1").
+		WillReturnRows(rows)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/v1/audit/search", strings.NewReader(`{"session_id":"sess-1","limit":50}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("X-Tenant-ID", "tenant_001")
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	auditSearchHandler(w, req)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("Expected status 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var resp struct {
+		Entries []*AuditEntry `json:"entries"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("response not JSON: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(resp.Entries) != 1 || resp.Entries[0].SessionID != "sess-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly the sess-1 entry back, got %+v", resp.Entries)
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Unfulfilled mock expectations: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestTenantAuditLogsHandler tests tenant-specific audit logs
 func TestTenantAuditLogsHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {