values.yaml

image:
  repository: pagedrop-host
  tag: "0.1.0"
  pullPolicy: IfNotPresent

# Write-API bearer token. Either set `value` (chart creates a Secret) or point
# `existingSecret`/`existingSecretKey` at a Secret you manage.
token:
  value: ""
  existingSecret: ""
  existingSecretKey: token

storage:
  size: 1Gi
  # storageClassName: ""   # uncomment to pin a class; PVC is ReadWriteOnce.

# Write-API request-body cap (bytes). Must be >= the largest inlined-image page
# the MCP server may send: the core inlines up to ~24 MB of image data, which is
# ~32 MB once base64-encoded into the HTML. Empty = the host default (40 MiB).
# If you also enable the API ingress, raise its proxy-body-size to match
# (nginx defaults to 1 MB) — see apiIngress.annotations below.
limits:
  maxBodyBytes: ""

# Artifact lifecycle (self-hosted features).
lifecycle:
  # Default TTL for artifacts published without an explicit ttlSeconds.
  # Empty = never expire by default. A publish may still opt out with ttlSeconds: 0.
  defaultTtlSeconds: ""
  # How often the background reaper deletes expired artifacts from disk (seconds).
  reaperIntervalSeconds: 300

# Per-page password protection (self-hosted feature).
protection:
  # When true, every publish WITHOUT an explicit password gets an auto-generated
  # memorable passphrase (four EFF words + separators). Intended for public /
  # no-SSO installations. REQUIRES a cookieSecret below (the chart will refuse to
  # render otherwise).
  defaultProtect: false
  # Whether the page-unlock cookie carries the `Secure` attribute (HTTPS-only).
  # Leave true whenever TLS terminates in front of the view server. Set false
  # ONLY for HTTP-only deployments (no TLS anywhere) — otherwise the browser
  # drops the Secure cookie and the unlock form loops forever.
  cookieSecure: true
  # Secret used to HMAC-sign page-unlock cookies. STRONGLY RECOMMENDED whenever
  # passwords are used and MANDATORY when defaultProtect is true — otherwise the
  # host falls back to a random per-process secret and unlock sessions break on
  # restart and across replicas (including the brief two-pod overlap of a rolling
  # update). Set `value` (chart creates a Secret) or point existingSecret at one.
  cookieSecret:
    value: ""
    existingSecret: ""
    existingSecretKey: cookieSecret

resources:
  requests:
    cpu: 50m
    memory: 64Mi
  limits:
    cpu: 250m
    memory: 128Mi

# Viewing ingress — PLACE THIS BEHIND YOUR SSO PROXY via annotations.
# Disabled by default: enabling it without SSO-proxy annotations would expose
# published pages to the internet unauthenticated. Enable it explicitly
# together with your proxy annotations (see README.md).
viewIngress:
  enabled: false
  className: ""
  host: pagedrop.internal.example.com
  annotations: {}   # <-- inject your SSO proxy (oauth2-proxy/Pomerium/etc.) annotations here
  tls: []

# API ingress — token-gated; the MCP server reaches it.
# WARNING: this bypasses the SSO proxy. It MUST be internal-only. Prefer
# leaving it disabled and reaching the Service in-cluster, or restrict it with
# the NetworkPolicy below and an internal load balancer.
apiIngress:
  enabled: false
  className: ""
  host: pagedrop-api.internal.example.com
  # If inlined-image publishes may exceed 1 MB, raise the proxy body-size limit
  # to match `limits.maxBodyBytes`, e.g. for the nginx ingress:
  #   nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: "40m"
  annotations: {}
  tls: []

# NetworkPolicy restricting who can reach the write-API port (8081).
# The write API is DENY-BY-DEFAULT: with both allow-lists below empty, no
# ingress rule for port 8081 is rendered at all, so it is unreachable. You
# MUST set allowedCIDRs and/or allowedPodSelectors to permit your MCP
# client's source (or set networkPolicy.enabled=false to disable the policy
# entirely and rely on other network controls).
networkPolicy:
  enabled: true
  # CIDRs allowed to reach the API port (e.g. your MCP host / VPN range).
  allowedCIDRs: []
  # Pod selectors (namespace-local) allowed to reach the API port.
  allowedPodSelectors: []
  # Optional restriction on who can reach the viewing port (8080) directly.
  # Leaving both of these empty leaves port 8080 reachable by ANY in-cluster
  # pod: SSO only fronts the ingress, it does not gate pod-to-pod traffic.
  # Set one or both to restrict direct access to your SSO proxy's source.
  viewAllowedCIDRs: []
  viewAllowedPodSelectors: []