| SB-1 — privilege escalation, host escape, or resource exhaustion | Apply non-privileged execution, dropped capabilities, `no-new-privileges`, private cgroup/IPC namespaces, seccomp, CPU/memory/PID/file limits, disabled core dumps, and bounded `nosuid,nodev` tmpfs mounts with `noexec` where compatible. | [`ContainerSecurityPolicy`](https://github.com/ls1intum/Hephaestus/blob/main/server/application/src/main/java/de/tum/cit/aet/hephaestus/agent/sandbox/docker/ContainerSecurityPolicy.java) | [`SandboxArchitectureTest`](https://github.com/ls1intum/Hephaestus/blob/main/server/application/src/test/java/de/tum/cit/aet/hephaestus/agent/sandbox/SandboxArchitectureTest.java), [`DockerSandboxAdapterTest`](https://github.com/ls1intum/Hephaestus/blob/main/server/application/src/test/java/de/tum/cit/aet/hephaestus/agent/sandbox/docker/DockerSandboxAdapterTest.java), [`DockerSandboxLiveTest`](https://github.com/ls1intum/Hephaestus/blob/main/server/application/src/test/java/de/tum/cit/aet/hephaestus/agent/sandbox/docker/DockerSandboxLiveTest.java) | The root filesystem is writable and standard Docker shares the host kernel and daemon. Use gVisor and dedicated, patched worker hosts for hostile multi-tenant workloads. Never mount the Docker socket or secret-bearing host paths into a sandbox. |
0 commit comments