fix(security): bind release evidence to immutable image digests

Author: Test

.changeset/bind-release-security-evidence.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"hephaestus": patch
+---
+
+Releases now reject high and critical image vulnerabilities unless a disposition is bound to the exact image digest and platform, owned, evidence-backed, and expires within 90 days. Clean verification and recurring rescans authenticate and re-evaluate the same signed release lock.

.github/workflows/ci-docker-build.yml

@@ -36,11 +36,18 @@ on:
         description: "Whether an application-server image exists at this commit"
         value: ${{ jobs.application-server-build.outputs.manifest-digest != '' || jobs.tag-unchanged-images.outputs.application-server-published == 'true' }}
 
+permissions: {}
+
 jobs:
   webapp-build:
     name: "Webapp"
     if: inputs.should_skip != 'true' && inputs.webapp_changed == 'true'
     uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-docker-build.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      packages: write
+      id-token: write
+      attestations: write
     with:
       image-name: "ls1intum/hephaestus/webapp"
       docker-file: "./webapp/Dockerfile"
@@ -72,6 +79,11 @@ jobs:
       inputs.should_skip != 'true' &&
       (inputs.application_server_changed == 'true' || github.event_name != 'pull_request')
     uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-docker-build.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      packages: write
+      id-token: write
+      attestations: write
     with:
       image-name: "ls1intum/hephaestus/application-server"
       # Paketo Cloud Native Buildpacks via spring-boot:build-image, with Application CDS.
@@ -105,6 +117,11 @@ jobs:
     name: "Agent: Pi"
     if: inputs.should_skip != 'true' && inputs.agent_images_changed == 'true'
     uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-docker-build.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      packages: write
+      id-token: write
+      attestations: write
     with:
       image-name: "ls1intum/hephaestus/agent-pi"
       docker-file: "./docker/agents/pi/Dockerfile"
@@ -134,6 +151,11 @@ jobs:
       inputs.should_skip != 'true' &&
       (inputs.postgres_image_changed == 'true' || github.event_name != 'pull_request')
     uses: ./.github/workflows/reusable-docker-build.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      packages: write
+      id-token: write
+      attestations: write
     with:
       image-name: "ls1intum/hephaestus/postgres"
       docker-file: "./docker/postgres/Dockerfile"

.github/workflows/cicd.yml

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ concurrency:
   group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
 
+permissions: {}
+
 jobs:
   detect-changes:
     name: "Detect changes"
@@ -174,6 +176,9 @@ jobs:
         github.event_name != 'pull_request'
       )
     secrets: inherit
+    permissions:
+      checks: write
+      contents: read
     with:
       should_skip: ${{ needs.detect-changes.outputs.should_skip }}
       webapp_changed: ${{ (needs.detect-changes.outputs.webapp == 'true' || needs.detect-changes.outputs.ci-config == 'true' || github.event_name != 'pull_request') && 'true' || 'false' }}
@@ -190,6 +195,9 @@ jobs:
         github.event_name != 'pull_request'
       )
     secrets: inherit
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      security-events: write
     with:
       should_skip: ${{ needs.detect-changes.outputs.should_skip }}
 
@@ -203,6 +211,11 @@ jobs:
         github.event_name != 'pull_request'
       )
     secrets: inherit
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      checks: write
+      pull-requests: write
+      statuses: write
     with:
       should_skip: ${{ needs.detect-changes.outputs.should_skip }}
       webapp_changed: ${{ (needs.detect-changes.outputs.webapp == 'true' || needs.detect-changes.outputs.ci-config == 'true' || github.event_name != 'pull_request') && 'true' || 'false' }}
@@ -212,6 +225,8 @@ jobs:
   Changesets:
     if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
     uses: ./.github/workflows/verify-changesets.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
 
   Docker:
     uses: ./.github/workflows/ci-docker-build.yml
@@ -230,6 +245,11 @@ jobs:
         needs.detect-changes.outputs.ci-config == 'true'
       )
     secrets: inherit
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      packages: write
+      id-token: write
+      attestations: write
     with:
       should_skip: ${{ needs.detect-changes.outputs.should_skip }}
       webapp_changed: ${{ (needs.detect-changes.outputs.webapp-image == 'true' || needs.detect-changes.outputs.docker-config == 'true' || github.event_name != 'pull_request') && 'true' || 'false' }}

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -274,9 +274,15 @@ jobs:
                 "evidence/$image-$suffix.syft.json" \
                 "evidence/$image-$suffix.spdx.json" \
                 "evidence/$image-$suffix.cdx.json" \
-                "$platform_digest" "$platform" "evidence/$image-$suffix.sbom-summary.json"
+                "$platform_digest" "$platform" "evidence/$image-$suffix.sbom-validation.json"
               trivy image --scanners vuln --format json --output "evidence/$image-$suffix.trivy.json" "$platform_ref"
-              bun scripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.ts "$image" "evidence/$image-$suffix.trivy.json" security/vulnerability-policy.json "evidence/$image-$suffix.policy.json"
+              trivy image --scanners license --format json --output "evidence/$image-$suffix.license.json" "$platform_ref"
+              jq -e --arg ref "$platform_ref" \
+                '.ArtifactName == $ref and (.Results | type == "array")' \
+                "evidence/$image-$suffix.license.json" >/dev/null
+              bun scripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.ts "$image" "$platform" "$platform_digest" "$repository" \
+                "evidence/$image-$suffix.trivy.json" security/vulnerability-policy.json \
+                "evidence/$image-$suffix.policy.json"
               if [ "$provenance" = first-party ]; then
                 cosign attest --yes --type spdxjson --predicate "evidence/$image-$suffix.spdx.json" "$platform_ref"
               fi
@@ -463,11 +469,18 @@ jobs:
               "evidence/$image-$suffix.syft.json" \
               "evidence/$image-$suffix.spdx.json" \
               "evidence/$image-$suffix.cdx.json" \
-              "$digest" "$platform" /tmp/sbom-summary.json
-            cmp "evidence/$image-$suffix.sbom-summary.json" /tmp/sbom-summary.json
+              "$digest" "$platform" /tmp/sbom-validation.json
+            cmp "evidence/$image-$suffix.sbom-validation.json" /tmp/sbom-validation.json
             for kind in trivy policy; do
               test -s "evidence/$image-$suffix.$kind.json"
             done
+            jq -e --arg ref "$repository@$digest" \
+              '.ArtifactName == $ref and (.Results | type == "array")' \
+              "evidence/$image-$suffix.license.json" >/dev/null
+            bun scripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.ts "$image" "$platform" "$digest" "$repository" \
+              "evidence/$image-$suffix.trivy.json" evidence/vulnerability-policy.json \
+              /tmp/policy.json
+            cmp "evidence/$image-$suffix.policy.json" /tmp/policy.json
             if [ "$provenance" = first-party ]; then
               cosign verify-attestation --type spdxjson \
                 --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/heads/main' \

.github/workflows/rescan-release-images.yml

@@ -22,13 +22,16 @@ jobs:
       - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-release-security-tools
         with:
           install-syft: "false"
+      - name: Install cosign
+        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@6f9f17788090df1f26f669e9d70d6ae9567deba6 # v4.1.2
       - name: Download and verify latest supported release evidence
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
+          tag=$(gh release view --repo "${{ github.repository }}" --json tagName --jq .tagName)
           mkdir release-evidence
-          gh release download --repo "${{ github.repository }}" --dir release-evidence
+          gh release download "$tag" --repo "${{ github.repository }}" --dir release-evidence
           (cd release-evidence && sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS)
           for file in manifest.json release-images.json tool-versions.json trivy-db.json vulnerability-policy.json; do
             test -s "release-evidence/$file"
@@ -46,16 +49,31 @@ jobs:
               "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.syft.json" \
               "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.spdx.json" \
               "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.cdx.json" \
-              "$digest" "$platform" /tmp/sbom-summary.json
-            cmp "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.sbom-summary.json" /tmp/sbom-summary.json
+              "$digest" "$platform" /tmp/sbom-validation.json
+            cmp "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.sbom-validation.json" /tmp/sbom-validation.json
             for kind in trivy policy; do
               test -s "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.$kind.json"
             done
+            jq -e --arg ref "$repository@$digest" \
+              '.ArtifactName == $ref and (.Results | type == "array")' \
+              "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.license.json" >/dev/null
+            bun scripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.ts "$image" "$platform" "$digest" "$repository" \
+              "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.trivy.json" \
+              release-evidence/vulnerability-policy.json /tmp/policy.json
+            cmp "release-evidence/$image-$suffix.policy.json" /tmp/policy.json
             architecture=${platform#*/}
             docker buildx imagetools inspect "$repository@$index_digest" --raw |
               jq -e --arg architecture "$architecture" --arg digest "$digest" \
                 'any(.manifests[]; .platform.os == "linux" and .platform.architecture == $architecture and .digest == $digest)' >/dev/null
           done
+          lock="release-$tag.json"
+          cosign verify-blob \
+            --bundle "release-evidence/$lock.sigstore.json" \
+            --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/ls1intum/Hephaestus/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/heads/main' \
+            --certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com' \
+            "release-evidence/$lock"
+          bun scripts/release-image-lock.ts "release-evidence/$lock" \
+            release-evidence/manifest.json "$tag" /tmp/release-lock.env
       - name: Rescan immutable subjects
         env:
           TRIVY_USERNAME: ${{ github.actor }}
@@ -73,7 +91,9 @@ jobs:
           while IFS=$'\t' read -r image platform digest repository; do
             suffix=${platform//\//-}
             trivy image --scanners vuln --format json --output "reports/$image-$suffix.json" "$repository@$digest"
-            bun scripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.ts "$image" "reports/$image-$suffix.json" security/vulnerability-policy.json "reports/$image-$suffix.policy.json"
+            bun scripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.ts "$image" "$platform" "$digest" "$repository" \
+              "reports/$image-$suffix.json" security/vulnerability-policy.json \
+              "reports/$image-$suffix.policy.json"
           done
       - name: Upload diagnostic reports
         if: always()

bun.lock

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ digests. It generates a lossless Syft inventory plus SPDX and CycloneDX SBOMs fo
 The gate proves that the Syft source metadata identifies the exact digest and architecture, checks that
 every discovered package survives both standard-format conversions, and records packages whose license
 could not be detected. It also scans each platform manifest with Trivy, signs its SPDX predicate as an OCI
-attestation, and verifies the image signature and build provenance. The SBOMs, license summaries, scan
+attestation, and verifies the image signature and build provenance. The SBOMs, license reports, scan
 reports, applied policy, checksums, and `manifest.json` are GitHub Release assets, so they outlive Actions
 artifact retention. Publication requires every artifact to be present, well formed, and bound to its
 recorded digest.
@@ -77,9 +77,10 @@ Compose topology. They receive the same per-platform SBOM, license, vulnerabilit
 evidence as first-party images. Hephaestus requires its own signatures and build provenance only for
 images it builds; it does not misrepresent observed upstream images as Hephaestus-built artifacts.
 
-The version-controlled policy rejects new fixable HIGH or CRITICAL findings. Baselines use exact
-image/CVE/package/installed-version fingerprints. Exceptions use the same scope and require an owner,
-justification, and future expiry.
+The version-controlled policy rejects every HIGH or CRITICAL finding. A residual finding requires an
+exception scoped to its image, vulnerability, package, and installed version, with an owner, justification,
+evidence URL, and expiry no more than 90 days away. Each exception and policy report records the scanned
+platform and digest.
 
 The latest release is rescanned weekly. A policy violation or scan failure is reported on
 [the vulnerability response issue](https://github.com/ls1intum/Hephaestus/issues/1369); scanner failure