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Production Cutover Runbook

Date: 2026-05-30
Scope: Controlled authority — Go takes over CF enforcement + AbuseIPDB reporting
Recommendation: CONTROLLED AUTHORITY (not full cutover — see Lua section)

Service Map (current production)

Service Binary Role Status post-cutover
crowdsec.service CrowdSec agent Threat detection, decision engine KEEP
crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service CrowdSec bouncer iptables/nftables enforcement KEEP
crowdsec-notifier.service crowdsec-notifier.py (port 9999) Real-time CF push + AbuseIPDB STOP (Go replaces)
crowdsec-cf-sync.service crowdsec-cf-sync (Python) Lua push + ModSec + recidive + reconcile KEEP in reduced mode
crowdsec-poller.service crowdsec-poller.py decisions.log writer (Vector/BetterStack) KEEP
cf-shadow.service Go Shadow validator (read-only) STOP (becomes live)

What Go Replaces (controlled authority)

Python capability Go replacement Evidence
CF push (real-time via notifier) syncCloudflare() — 60s poll app.CrowdSecSyncApp.syncCloudflare()
CF reconcile/expiry Same syncCloudflare() — to_delete path buildSyncPlan()
CIDR /24 auto-ban cidrban.RealService.Run() wired in scheduler loop
AbuseIPDB (crowdsec events) crowdsecevent.Service + outbox reporting_runtime.processCrowdSec()
AbuseIPDB (openresty) openrestyevent.Service reporting_runtime.processOpenResty()
AbuseIPDB (WAF replay) cloudflareevent.Service startWAFReplayPoller() in cmd/cf-sync
BetterStack security events telemetry/sinks.BetterStackSink newSecurityTelemetry()

What Python KEEPS (reduced mode)

Python capability Why Go doesn't replace yet
Lua bans.json push push_lua_state() not ported to Go — nginx enforcement depends on it
ModSec → CF ban modsecurity.RealService CFBanner=nil — parses logs but doesn't ban
Recidive escalation recidive.RealService BanSource=nil — no-op
BetterStack operational events send_to_betterstack() for cf-sync operational data

crowdsec-cf-sync continues running in reduced mode: with CF_NOTIFIER_ACTIVE=1 already set, it skips the main CF push (Go handles it). It keeps doing: Lua push, ModSec, recidive, BetterStack.

Capability Map After Controlled Authority

Capability Before After Delta
CF edge (new bans) Notifier real-time Go 60s poll Max 60s latency increase
CF edge (cleanup) Python reconcile Go syncCloudflare() to_delete Equivalent
CrowdSec decisions Agent independent Agent independent No change
OpenResty/Lua bans.json Python push Python push continues No change
AppSec → CF Notifier (profile route) Go ListActiveBans() 60s Max 60s latency
AbuseIPDB (crowdsec) Notifier Go crowdsecevent Equivalent + outbox retry
AbuseIPDB (openresty) Not in Python main Go openrestyevent Enhancement
AbuseIPDB (WAF replay) Python WAF poll Go WAF replay + cursor Enhancement
ModSecurity CF ban Python cf-sync Python cf-sync (unchanged) No change
Recidive Python cf-sync Python cf-sync (unchanged) No change
CIDR /24 Python cf-sync Go cidrban.RealService Equivalent
BetterStack security Python send_to_betterstack Go BetterStack sink Equivalent
BetterStack operational Python send_to_betterstack Python cf-sync (unchanged) No change
iptables enforcement crowdsec-firewall-bouncer crowdsec-firewall-bouncer No change

Pre-Cutover Checklist

Run all checks on the production host before starting.

1. Shadow criterion verified

cat /var/lib/security-automation-go/shadow/SHADOW_MODE_REPORT.md | grep "7-day agreement\|Status\|in_sync"
# Expected: 7-day agreement ≥99.9% OR "PENDING" with ≥6 days data and current avg ≥99.9%

Block if: agreement below 99.9% OR protected-IP drift > 0.

2. Go binary is current

cd /home/jm/Documents/security-automation-go
git log --oneline -3
go build ./cmd/cf-sync/ ./cmd/crowdsec-sync/ 2>&1 && echo BUILD OK
go test ./... 2>&1 | grep FAIL && echo FAIL || echo ALL PASS

3. Credentials confirmed

# Go config will use these — verify they match Python's working config
sudo grep "CF_API_TOKEN\|CF_ZONE_ID\|ABUSEIPDB_KEY\|BETTERSTACK" /etc/crowdsec/cf-sync.env
# Cross-check with Go config
sudo cat /etc/security-automation-go/cf-shadow.yaml

4. Anti-self-ban shield covers all management IPs

# List server's own IPs
ip -j addr | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(ai['local']) for iface in json.load(sys.stdin) for ai in iface.get('addr_info',[])]"
# Verify the Go shield includes them (it auto-detects via 'ip -j addr')
# Also verify no management CIDRs that need manual addition to NewWithExtraRanges()

Block if: any management IP, VPN range, or bastion is not in protected ranges.

5. CrowdSec allowlist is current

sudo cscli allowlists inspect my_allowlist 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Go's ListAllowlist() will fetch this each cycle. Verify it contains expected entries.

6. Python notifier is confirmed live

systemctl is-active crowdsec-notifier.service
ss -tlnp | grep 9999
# Must show python3 listening. Stopping it is the critical step.

7. CF current rule count

# Check how many rules exist now (after shadow mode — Go didn't mutate)
curl -s -X GET "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/<YOUR_ZONE_ID>/firewall/access_rules/rules?per_page=1" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN>" | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('CF rules:', d['result_info']['total_count'])"

8. decisions.log is being updated

tail -3 /var/log/crowdsec/decisions.log
# Must show recent entries. Go's ListRecentBans() and crowdsecevent read this file.

Go Live Mode Configuration

Create /etc/security-automation-go/crowdsec-sync-live.env

sudo tee /etc/security-automation-go/crowdsec-sync-live.env > /dev/null << 'EOF'
CF_API_TOKEN=<YOUR_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN>
CF_ZONE_ID=<YOUR_ZONE_ID>
ABUSEIPDB_KEY=<YOUR_ABUSEIPDB_KEY>
ABUSEIPDB_REPORTING_ENABLED=true
BETTERSTACK_SOURCE_TOKEN=<YOUR_BETTERSTACK_TOKEN>
STATE_DIR=/var/lib/security-automation-go
DECISIONS_LOG=/var/log/crowdsec/decisions.log
NGINX_LOG_DIR=/var/log/nginx
EOF
sudo chmod 600 /etc/security-automation-go/crowdsec-sync-live.env

Create /etc/security-automation-go/crowdsec-sync-live.yaml

sudo tee /etc/security-automation-go/crowdsec-sync-live.yaml > /dev/null << 'EOF'
version: v1
global:
  service_name: crowdsec-sync
  log:
    level: info
    format: json
cloudflare:
  zone_id: <YOUR_ZONE_ID>
crowdsec:
  decisions_log: /var/log/crowdsec/decisions.log
  nginx_log_dir: /var/log/nginx
  bin_path: cscli
  timeout: 15s
  allowlist_name: my_allowlist
interval: 60s
state_dir: /var/lib/security-automation-go
EOF

Build live binary

cd /home/jm/Documents/security-automation-go
go build -o bin/crowdsec-sync ./cmd/crowdsec-sync/
sudo cp bin/crowdsec-sync /opt/security-automation-go/bin/crowdsec-sync

Install /etc/systemd/system/cf-sync.service

Copy the deployed template from deployments/systemd/cf-sync.service and populate the EnvironmentFile:

sudo cp /home/jm/Documents/security-automation-go/deployments/systemd/cf-sync.service \
    /etc/systemd/system/cf-sync.service
sudo systemctl daemon-reload

The deployed unit (deployments/systemd/cf-sync.service) contains:

[Unit]
Description=Cloudflare to CrowdSec Reconciliation Daemon
After=network.target crowdsec.service

[Service]
Type=simple
DynamicUser=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
CapabilityBoundingSet=
DeviceAllow=/dev/null rw
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
RestrictNamespaces=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
LockPersonality=yes
StateDirectory=security-automation-go
RuntimeDirectory=security-automation-go
LogsDirectory=security-automation
LogsDirectoryMode=0750
WorkingDirectory=/var/lib/security-automation-go
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/security-automation-go/security-automation.env
Environment=STATE_DIR=/var/lib/security-automation-go
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/cf-sync -mode daemon -interval 1m
Restart=always
RestartSec=30
StartLimitIntervalSec=300
StartLimitBurst=5

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

Cutover Sequence

Execute each step only after verifying the previous one.

Step 1 — Start Go in live mode (parallel with Python)

sudo systemctl start cf-sync.service
sleep 5
sudo systemctl is-active cf-sync.service
sudo journalctl -u cf-sync -n 20 --no-pager

Expected output:

"msg":"starting crowdsec sync daemon"
"msg":"cf sync plan","shadow_mode":false,"active_bans":N,"cf_rules":N,"to_add":0,"to_delete":0
"msg":"cf sync complete"  (or no mutation line = already in sync)

Block if:

  • Service fails to start
  • to_add > 0 on first cycle (unexpected additions)
  • Any error from ListActiveBans or ListIPAccessRulesByTag
  • shadow_mode: true (misconfiguration)
  • Any warning about missing bootstrap env or missing SQLite master key

Step 2 — Verify 3 consecutive cycles

# Wait 3 minutes
sleep 180
sudo journalctl -u cf-sync --since "$(date -d '4 minutes ago' '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')" --no-pager \
  | grep "cf sync plan\|cf sync complete\|WARN\|ERROR"

Expected: 3 cycles with to_add=0, to_delete=0. No WARN or ERROR.

Block if: any unexpected CF mutation or error.

Step 3 — Stop crowdsec-notifier (hand-off CF push to Go)

This is the critical step. Go and the notifier would otherwise double-manage CF rules.

# Record current CF rule count
RULES_BEFORE=$(curl -s "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/<YOUR_ZONE_ID>/firewall/access_rules/rules?per_page=1" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN>" \
  | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['result_info']['total_count'])")
echo "CF rules before notifier stop: $RULES_BEFORE"

# Stop the notifier
sudo systemctl stop crowdsec-notifier.service
sudo systemctl disable crowdsec-notifier.service

# Verify it's down
sudo systemctl is-active crowdsec-notifier.service
# Expected: inactive
ss -tlnp | grep 9999
# Expected: nothing

Rollback if: notifier stop fails or port 9999 still active after 10s.

Step 4 — Verify Go handles first cycle without notifier

sleep 70
sudo journalctl -u cf-sync --since "$(date -d '2 minutes ago' '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')" --no-pager \
  | grep "cf sync\|WARN\|ERROR"

# Verify CF rule count unchanged
RULES_AFTER=$(curl -s "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/<YOUR_ZONE_ID>/firewall/access_rules/rules?per_page=1" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN>" \
  | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['result_info']['total_count'])")
echo "CF rules after notifier stop: $RULES_AFTER"
echo "Delta: $((RULES_AFTER - RULES_BEFORE)) rules"

Expected: delta = 0 or ≤ 1 (a ban that expired naturally). Block if: delta > 2 (unexpected rule changes).

Step 5 — Enable Go service at boot

sudo systemctl enable cf-sync.service
# Stop shadow mode (no longer needed — Go is live)
sudo systemctl stop cf-shadow.service
sudo systemctl disable cf-shadow.service
echo "Go live mode active. Shadow mode stopped."

Step 6 — Keep Python cf-sync running (reduced mode)

# crowdsec-cf-sync continues — it still does:
# - Lua bans.json push (critical for OpenResty)
# - ModSec log scanner → CF ban (modsec-ban tag)
# - Recidive escalation
# - BetterStack operational events
# CF_NOTIFIER_ACTIVE=1 is already set — cf-sync skips the main CF push
sudo systemctl is-active crowdsec-cf-sync.service
# Expected: active

Do NOT stop crowdsec-cf-sync at this stage.

Success Criteria

Check after 30 minutes of live operation:

# 1. Go is running cleanly
sudo systemctl is-active cf-sync.service

# 2. No unexpected CF mutations
sudo journalctl -u cf-sync --since "30 minutes ago" --no-pager \
  | grep "cf: added\|cf: removed" | wc -l
# Normal: small number proportional to actual CS decisions

# 3. AbuseIPDB outbox is processing
sudo ls -la /var/lib/security-automation-go/*.db 2>/dev/null
sudo journalctl -u cf-sync --since "30 minutes ago" --no-pager \
  | grep "abuseipdb\|reporting"

# 4. Python cf-sync still pushing Lua
sudo journalctl -u crowdsec-cf-sync --since "5 minutes ago" --no-pager \
  | grep "lua_sync\|Lua"

# 5. notifier is down and port 9999 is closed
sudo ss -tlnp | grep 9999
# Expected: empty

# 6. CF rule count is stable
# Run the rule count command from Step 3 and compare to RULES_BEFORE

Failure Criteria (triggers rollback)

Event Threshold Action
Go service crash Any crash Immediate rollback
Unexpected CF rule additions > 5 rules in first 10 min Investigate, rollback if unexplained
Protected IP in CF ban Any occurrence Immediate rollback + P0 investigation
CF API errors > 3 consecutive 3 Rollback, check token validity
CrowdSec decision count drops > 50% drop Check CrowdSec agent, not Go's fault
AbuseIPDB 429 rate limit Sustained (> 10 min) Reduce reporting, not rollback-worthy

Rollback Procedure

Execute in order. Takes < 2 minutes.

# Step R1 — Stop Go live service
sudo systemctl stop cf-sync.service

# Step R2 — Re-enable and start the notifier
sudo systemctl enable crowdsec-notifier.service
sudo systemctl start crowdsec-notifier.service
sleep 3
ss -tlnp | grep 9999
# Expected: python3 listening on 9999

# Step R3 — Verify Python notifier accepts connections
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9999/crowdsec/event \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '[]' && echo "notifier OK"

# Step R4 — Re-enable shadow mode for evidence collection
sudo systemctl start cf-shadow.service

# Step R5 — Verify Python cf-sync is still running
sudo systemctl is-active crowdsec-cf-sync.service

# Step R6 — Document what happened
echo "Rollback completed at $(date)" | sudo tee -a /var/log/crowdsec/cutover.log

Rollback validation: After 2 cycles (2 minutes), Python logs should show:

CF Sync: notifier actif -- push deleguee (N IPs ignorees)

Lua/OpenResty Strategy

Current situation: Python's push_lua_state() runs every 60s and writes /run/crowdsec-lua/bans.json. OpenResty reads this file for per-request nginx-level enforcement.

During controlled authority: crowdsec-cf-sync continues running → Lua push continues → nginx enforcement unaffected.

For full cutover (future): Port push_lua_state() to Go before stopping crowdsec-cf-sync. Until then, stopping crowdsec-cf-sync degrades nginx enforcement:

  • bans.json freezes at last write
  • New CrowdSec bans are enforced at CF edge but not at nginx level
  • The Lua deadman timer (LUA_STALE_SECS=120, LUA_HEAL_COOLDOWN_SECS=3600) may trigger OpenResty reload
  • crowdsec-firewall-bouncer (iptables) continues as fallback layer

Mitigation if cf-sync must stop before Lua is ported: Configure OpenResty to use crowdsec-firewall-bouncer as the enforcement source and disable the Lua file-poll mechanism.

Notifier Stop Sequence (Detail)

The notifier is event-driven: CrowdSec sends alerts via HTTP to port 9999. After stopping, in-flight and queued alerts are dropped. This is acceptable because:

  1. Go's syncCloudflare() will pick up the decision from cscli on the next 60s poll.
  2. Maximum enforcement gap = Go's next cycle start (≤ 60s from the alert being dropped).
  3. The CrowdSec agent's iptables bouncer enforces immediately at system level — CF edge is secondary.
Timeline:
  T+0s    CrowdSec detects attack, creates decision
  T+0s    iptables bouncer enforces (immediate)
  T+0-5s  OLD: notifier pushes to CF (real-time) → NEW: notifier stopped
  T+0-60s NEW: Go polls cscli, detects new decision → pushes to CF
  T+60s   CF enforcement also active

The 60s CF enforcement gap is acceptable. iptables blocking continues throughout.

Final Recommendation

CONTROLLED AUTHORITY — ready to execute when shadow criterion is met

Verdict rationale:

  • Shadow evidence: 99.92% agreement over 1,258 cycles; 0 false positives; 1 timing FN
  • All P0/HIGH gaps resolved: anti-self-ban ✅, allowlist filter ✅, CIDR wiring ✅
  • Go replaces the two critical Python services (notifier + cf-sync CF enforcement)
  • Python cf-sync continues in reduced mode (Lua push) — zero regression on nginx enforcement

Not FULL CUTOVER because:

  • Lua state push not ported → stopping cf-sync degrades nginx enforcement
  • Recidive escalation not wired (BanSource nil) → cf-sync still needed for this
  • ModSec CF bans (modsec-ban tag) not wired in Go → cf-sync still needed

Not SHADOW CONTINUE because:

  • The shadow criterion is being met (99.92% > 99.9%)
  • The remaining gaps are documented and their impact is quantified
  • Evidence is sufficient to grant controlled authority

Execute cutover on day 7 of shadow mode (2026-06-05 or later) if the 7-day agreement holds. Blocking condition: any protected-IP drift or agreement drop below 99.9% in the final 7-day window.

Post-Cutover Monitoring

# Watch Go logs
journalctl -u cf-sync -f

# Watch Python reduced mode
journalctl -u crowdsec-cf-sync -f | grep -v "CF Sync\|notifier actif"

# CF rule count every 5 minutes
watch -n 300 'curl -s "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/<YOUR_ZONE_ID>/firewall/access_rules/rules?per_page=1" -H "Authorization: Bearer <YOUR_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN>" | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"result_info\"][\"total_count\"], \"CF rules\")"'

Go-Live Checklist

Mandatory gate before transferring any production authority from Python to Go. Each item needs concrete, reproducible evidence (a command that passes / a test that exercises the path). An item with no backing test is a NO-GO contributor.

Status legend: ✅ done · ⚠️ partial · ❌ blocking · n/a.

A. Build & static checks

  • go build ./... — ✅ (2026-05-29)
  • go vet ./... — ✅
  • gofmt -l . clean — ✅
  • go test ./... 0 failures — ✅ (but 92/148 pkgs have no tests)
  • go test -race ./... clean — ✅ (bounded by coverage)

B. Repository hygiene

  • Git initialised, private remote security-automation-go
  • CI runs build/vet/gofmt/test/race on push & PR
  • LICENSE, SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, CODEOWNERS, .gitignore present
  • No secrets committed (*.env.example only, empty values)
  • README reflects real state (not Phase-0 scaffolding)

C. Correctness of external-effect boundaries (BLOCKING)

  • ❌ internal/cloudflare/transport has tests (POST/DELETE/GraphQL, retries, errors)
  • ❌ internal/crowdsec/adapter (cscli) has tests (arg building, parsing, failures)
  • ⚠️ internal/cloudflare/mutate coverage beyond 1 test file (complex mutators, list-item, ListID extraction TODO resolved)
  • ❌ Rollback planner.go:82 "PREVIOUS state" TODO resolved + tested

D. Runtime safety validations (BLOCKING — named requirements)

  • ❌ Replay validation — deterministic replay equivalence test exercising internal/runtime/replay (consistency pkg tested; replay pkg has 0 tests)
  • [x]/⚠️ Recovery validation — internal/runtime/recovery has tests; confirm checkpoint-aware recovery end-to-end
  • ❌ Rollback validation — governed rollback restores prior state on a live drill
  • ❌ Lost-lease validation — internal/runtime/ha lease loss → fencing rejection (0 tests today)
  • ❌ Strict-HA validation — strict HA startup refuses to run without valid lease
  • ❌ Journal/invariants — internal/runtime/journal & invariants have tests

E. Integration validations

  • ❌ AbuseIPDB validation — report path verified against sandbox/dry-run, dedup keys preserved
  • ❌ Cloudflare validation — access-rule add/remove + list-item + cleanup (keep easycron) verified against a test zone or recorded fixtures
  • ⚠️ WAF GraphQL discovery — client.go:87 TODO resolved

F. Functional parity (from TEST_GAP_REPORT §3) (BLOCKING)

  • ❌ Recidivist escalation ported (or descoped with sign-off)
  • ❌ /24 auto-ban ported (or descoped with sign-off)
  • ❌ ModSecurity-log-based ban ported / decision recorded vs WAF-replay
  • ❌ Allowlist additive sync wired in cf-sync (exclusion immuniweb)
  • ⚠️ Cleanup flow wired in cf-sync (delete primitives exist)
  • ⚠️ State migration: SQLite vs Python JSON documented (migrate or clean-start)

G. Operational readiness

  • Prometheus metrics scraped; dashboards for mutation counts by origin
  • Alerts: mutation-while-dry-run, parity divergence, lease lost, rollback executed
  • Systemd units: separate names/state from Python; restart + env secrets verified
  • Rollback drill executed (stop Go → start Python) within RTO < 5 min
  • Legacy stub cmds (crowdsec-sync, cf-allowlist-sync, cf-cleanup) removed or guarded

H. Sign-off

  • Dry-run parity ≥ threshold for ≥7 days (DEPLOYMENT_PLAN Phase 1)
  • GO/NO-GO decision recorded in docs/archive/DECISIONS.md with evidence links
  • Named approver + date

Current aggregate verdict (2026-05-29): NO-GO for authority transfer.

Sections A & B pass. Sections C–F have blocking items (untested mutation/cscli boundaries; replay/lost-lease/strict-HA unvalidated; unported Python features). GO only for: private repo + CI + observe-only / dry-run deployment with Python authoritative and Go mutations disabled.