feat: SSO foundations, login seams, and remove OSS Admin Page (#14276)

* feat: add enterprise feature flag and custom admin menu item

- Introduced ENABLE_ENTERPRISE feature flag to control the visibility of the CustomAdminPageMenuItem in the AccountMenu.
- Implemented CustomAdminPageMenuItem component for enterprise navigation.
- Updated tests to reflect the new feature flag and ensure proper rendering behavior.

* feat(sso): implement multi-identity support for users and enhance SSO client secret management

* feat(sso): enhance SSO identity management and secure client secret handling

* feat(auth): refresh login and signup pages

* refactor(LoginPage): update layout and accessibility of login options, enhance styling, and remove unused tooltip component

* feat(port): enhance port configuration by prioritizing LANGFLOW_PORT from the environment, and update backend kill command to use the configured port. Additionally, introduce a legacy admin page toggle in the account menu for OSS.

* feat(auth): introduce customizable login components and enhance authentication flow

* fix(alembic): resolve duplicate e8f1a2b3c4d5 revision after release merge

SSO multi-identity reused the model-provider revision id; give it a unique
id and merge with the catalog-policy head so upgrades target a single head.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* clean up

* clean up 2

* fix superuser test

* fix a11y test

* codeRabbit fixes

* erics suggestions

* Implement SSO client secret migration and validation checks

* fixed playwright tests

* fix migration

* fixed db migrations

* fix playwright tests

* refactor: enhance accessibility and structure of login and signup pages

- Removed deprecated admin route from a11y_routes.json.
- Updated LoginPage to include aria-labelledby for better accessibility.
- Added a test for naming the login form region in LoginPage accessibility tests.
- Refactored SignUpPage to improve link structure and accessibility.
- Introduced mobile viewport tests for login and signup pages in a11y tests.

* fix: address SSO review findings

* fix: allow SSO expand schema drift

* fix: address SSO review follow-ups

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Eric Hare <ericrhare@gmail.com>

Author: 3 people

.secrets.baseline

@@ -124,11 +124,6 @@
     }
   ],
   "gated": [
-    {
-      "path": "/admin",
-      "surface": "Admin page",
-      "currentBehavior": "Redirects to /flows for current user/session. Scan with an admin user."
-    },
     {
       "path": "/login",
       "surface": "Login page",

scripts/a11y/a11y_routes.json

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 - user.store_api_key: Langflow Store API keys
 - variable.value: All encrypted variable values
 - folder.auth_settings: MCP oauth_client_secret and api_key fields
+- sso_config.client_secret_encrypted: SSO/OIDC client secrets
 
 Usage:
     uv run python scripts/migrate_secret_key.py --help
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@
 
 import argparse
 import base64
+import binascii
 import json
 import os
 import platform
@@ -29,14 +31,27 @@
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
 
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
 from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
 from platformdirs import user_cache_dir
-from sqlalchemy import create_engine, text
+from sqlalchemy import create_engine, inspect, text
 
 MINIMUM_KEY_LENGTH = 32
 SENSITIVE_AUTH_FIELDS = ["oauth_client_secret", "api_key"]
 # Must match langflow.services.variable.constants.CREDENTIAL_TYPE
 CREDENTIAL_TYPE = "Credential"
+SSO_ENVELOPE_HEADER = "lf-sso:v1:hkdf-sha256-v1:aes-256-gcm"
+SSO_AAD = SSO_ENVELOPE_HEADER.encode()
+SSO_HKDF_SALT = b"langflow/sso/client-secret/hkdf-salt/v1"
+SSO_HKDF_INFO = b"langflow/sso/client-secret/encryption"
+SSO_NONCE_BYTES = 12
+SSO_TAG_BYTES = 16
+SSO_ENVELOPE_PARTS = 6
+SSO_HEADER_PARTS = 4
+SSO_BASE64URL_ALPHABET = frozenset("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_")
 
 
 def get_default_config_dir() -> Path:
@@ -140,6 +155,62 @@ def migrate_value(encrypted: str, old_key: str, new_key: str) -> str | None:
         return None
 
 
+def _derive_sso_key(master_key: str) -> bytes:
+    return HKDF(
+        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
+        length=32,
+        salt=SSO_HKDF_SALT,
+        info=SSO_HKDF_INFO,
+    ).derive(master_key.encode())
+
+
+def _decode_sso_envelope(envelope: str) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
+    parts = envelope.split(":")
+    if len(parts) != SSO_ENVELOPE_PARTS or ":".join(parts[:SSO_HEADER_PARTS]) != SSO_ENVELOPE_HEADER:
+        msg = "Unsupported SSO client-secret envelope"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+    decoded_payloads: list[bytes] = []
+    for value in parts[4:]:
+        if not value or any(character not in SSO_BASE64URL_ALPHABET for character in value):
+            msg = "Invalid base64url data in SSO client-secret envelope"
+            raise ValueError(msg)
+        try:
+            decoded_payloads.append(base64.b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4), altchars=b"-_", validate=True))
+        except (binascii.Error, ValueError) as exc:
+            msg = "Invalid base64url data in SSO client-secret envelope"
+            raise ValueError(msg) from exc
+    nonce, ciphertext = decoded_payloads
+    if len(nonce) != SSO_NONCE_BYTES or len(ciphertext) < SSO_TAG_BYTES:
+        msg = "Invalid SSO client-secret envelope payload"
+        raise ValueError(msg)
+    return nonce, ciphertext
+
+
+def decrypt_sso_secret_with_key(envelope: str, key: str) -> str:
+    """Decrypt an SSO client-secret envelope with an explicit master key."""
+    nonce, ciphertext = _decode_sso_envelope(envelope)
+    plaintext = AESGCM(_derive_sso_key(key)).decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, SSO_AAD)
+    return plaintext.decode()
+
+
+def encrypt_sso_secret_with_key(plaintext: str, key: str) -> str:
+    """Encrypt an SSO client secret using the application's current envelope format."""
+    nonce = os.urandom(SSO_NONCE_BYTES)
+    ciphertext = AESGCM(_derive_sso_key(key)).encrypt(nonce, plaintext.encode(), SSO_AAD)
+    encoded_nonce = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(nonce).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+    encoded_ciphertext = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(ciphertext).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+    return f"{SSO_ENVELOPE_HEADER}:{encoded_nonce}:{encoded_ciphertext}"
+
+
+def migrate_sso_secret(envelope: str, old_key: str, new_key: str) -> str | None:
+    """Rewrap an SSO client-secret envelope under a replacement master key."""
+    try:
+        plaintext = decrypt_sso_secret_with_key(envelope, old_key)
+        return encrypt_sso_secret_with_key(plaintext, new_key)
+    except (InvalidTag, UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
 def migrate_auth_settings(auth_settings: dict, old_key: str, new_key: str) -> tuple[dict, list[str]]:
     """Re-encrypt sensitive fields in auth_settings dict.
 
@@ -208,6 +279,17 @@ def verify_migration(conn, new_key: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
         except (InvalidToken, json.JSONDecodeError):
             failed += 1
 
+    if inspect(conn).has_table("sso_config"):
+        configs = conn.execute(
+            text("SELECT id, client_secret_encrypted FROM sso_config WHERE client_secret_encrypted IS NOT NULL LIMIT 3")
+        ).fetchall()
+        for _, encrypted_secret in configs:
+            try:
+                decrypt_sso_secret_with_key(encrypted_secret, new_key)
+                verified += 1
+            except (InvalidTag, UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError):
+                failed += 1
+
     return verified, failed
 
 
@@ -364,9 +446,38 @@ def migrate(
         total_migrated += migrated
         total_failed += failed
 
+        # Migrate sso_config.client_secret_encrypted when the optional SSO schema exists.
+        print("\n4. Migrating SSO client secrets...")
+        migrated, failed = 0, 0
+        if inspect(conn).has_table("sso_config"):
+            configs = conn.execute(
+                text("SELECT id, client_secret_encrypted FROM sso_config WHERE client_secret_encrypted IS NOT NULL")
+            ).fetchall()
+            for config_id, encrypted_secret in configs:
+                new_encrypted = migrate_sso_secret(encrypted_secret, old_key, new_key)
+                if new_encrypted:
+                    if not dry_run:
+                        conn.execute(
+                            text("UPDATE sso_config SET client_secret_encrypted = :secret WHERE id = :id"),
+                            {"secret": new_encrypted, "id": config_id},
+                        )
+                    migrated += 1
+                else:
+                    failed += 1
+                    print(f"   Warning: Could not decrypt SSO config {config_id}")
+        print(f"   {'Would migrate' if dry_run else 'Migrated'}: {migrated}, Failed: {failed}")
+        total_migrated += migrated
+        total_failed += failed
+
+        if total_failed > 0 and not dry_run:
+            print(f"\nERROR: {total_failed} values could not be migrated.")
+            print("Rolling back all database changes; the secret key was not changed.")
+            conn.rollback()
+            sys.exit(1)
+
         # Verify migrated data can be decrypted with new key
         if total_migrated > 0:
-            print("\n4. Verifying migration...")
+            print("\n5. Verifying migration...")
             verified, verify_failed = verify_migration(conn, new_key)
             if verify_failed > 0:
                 print(f"   ERROR: {verify_failed} records failed verification!")
@@ -386,12 +497,12 @@ def migrate(
     if not dry_run:
         backup_file = config_dir / f"secret_key.backup.{datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime('%Y%m%d_%H%M%S')}"
         write_secret_key_to_file(config_dir, old_key, backup_file.name)
-        print(f"\n5. Backed up old key to: {backup_file}")
+        print(f"\n6. Backed up old key to: {backup_file}")
         write_secret_key_to_file(config_dir, new_key)
-        print(f"6. Saved new secret key to: {config_dir / 'secret_key'}")
+        print(f"7. Saved new secret key to: {config_dir / 'secret_key'}")
     else:
-        print("\n5. [DRY RUN] Would backup old key")
-        print(f"6. [DRY RUN] Would save new key to: {config_dir / 'secret_key'}")
+        print("\n6. [DRY RUN] Would backup old key")
+        print(f"7. [DRY RUN] Would save new key to: {config_dir / 'secret_key'}")
 
     # Summary
     print("\n" + "=" * 50)

scripts/migrate_secret_key.py

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 from sqlalchemy.exc import SAWarning
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_engine_from_config
 
+from langflow.alembic.expand_compat import filter_expand_revision_directives
 from langflow.services.database.service import SQLModel
 
 # this is the Alembic Config object, which provides
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ def run_migrations_offline() -> None:
         "literal_binds": True,
         "dialect_opts": {"paramstyle": "named"},
         "render_as_batch": True,
+        "process_revision_directives": filter_expand_revision_directives,
     }
 
     # Only add prepare_threshold for PostgreSQL
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ def _do_run_migrations(connection):
         "connection": connection,
         "target_metadata": target_metadata,
         "render_as_batch": True,
+        "process_revision_directives": filter_expand_revision_directives,
     }
 
     # Only add prepare_threshold for PostgreSQL

src/backend/base/langflow/alembic/env.py

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+"""Autogenerate compatibility rules for active EXPAND migration windows."""
+
+from alembic.operations import ops
+
+# ``sso_config`` is deliberately in an EXPAND window: released N-1 services
+# still need the scalar columns, while N reads the typed JSON representation.
+# Alembic therefore sees the retained DB-only columns and nullable typed columns
+# as a future CONTRACT migration. Keep this list exact and remove it with that
+# contract revision; rolling-compatibility migration tests assert that the
+# temporary physical schema remains present and synchronized.
+SSO_EXPAND_LEGACY_COLUMNS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "provider",
+        "provider_name",
+        "enforce_sso",
+        "client_id",
+        "discovery_url",
+        "redirect_uri",
+        "scopes",
+        "token_endpoint",
+        "authorization_endpoint",
+        "jwks_uri",
+        "issuer",
+    }
+)
+SSO_EXPAND_NULLABLE_COLUMNS = frozenset({"slug", "display_name", "protocol", "provider_settings"})
+_REMOVE_COLUMN_DIFF_LENGTH = 4
+_MODIFY_NULLABLE_DIFF_LENGTH = 7
+
+
+def filter_sso_expand_diffs(diffs: list) -> list:
+    """Suppress only schema diffs intentionally deferred to SSO CONTRACT."""
+    significant_diffs = []
+    for diff in diffs:
+        # Alembic can group multiple alter-column operations in a nested list.
+        if isinstance(diff, list):
+            filtered_group = filter_sso_expand_diffs(diff)
+            if filtered_group:
+                significant_diffs.append(filtered_group)
+            continue
+        if not isinstance(diff, tuple):
+            significant_diffs.append(diff)
+            continue
+
+        if (
+            len(diff) >= _REMOVE_COLUMN_DIFF_LENGTH
+            and diff[0] == "remove_column"
+            and diff[2] == "sso_config"
+            and getattr(diff[3], "name", None) in SSO_EXPAND_LEGACY_COLUMNS
+        ):
+            continue
+        if (
+            len(diff) >= _MODIFY_NULLABLE_DIFF_LENGTH
+            and diff[0] == "modify_nullable"
+            and diff[2] == "sso_config"
+            and diff[3] in SSO_EXPAND_NULLABLE_COLUMNS
+            and diff[5] is True
+            and diff[6] is False
+        ):
+            continue
+        significant_diffs.append(diff)
+
+    return significant_diffs
+
+
+def _filter_sso_expand_operations(container: ops.OpContainer) -> None:
+    filtered_operations = []
+    for operation in container.ops:
+        if isinstance(operation, ops.OpContainer):
+            _filter_sso_expand_operations(operation)
+            if operation.ops:
+                filtered_operations.append(operation)
+            continue
+
+        if (
+            isinstance(operation, ops.DropColumnOp)
+            and operation.table_name == "sso_config"
+            and operation.column_name in SSO_EXPAND_LEGACY_COLUMNS
+        ):
+            continue
+
+        if (
+            isinstance(operation, ops.AlterColumnOp)
+            and operation.table_name == "sso_config"
+            and operation.column_name in SSO_EXPAND_NULLABLE_COLUMNS
+            and operation.existing_nullable is True
+            and operation.modify_nullable is False
+        ):
+            # Preserve any type/default/comment change Alembic grouped with the
+            # expected nullable diff so real schema drift remains visible.
+            operation.modify_nullable = None
+            if not operation.has_changes():
+                continue
+
+        filtered_operations.append(operation)
+
+    container.ops[:] = filtered_operations
+
+
+def filter_expand_revision_directives(_context, _revision, directives: list[ops.MigrationScript]) -> None:
+    """Apply active EXPAND allowlists to Alembic autogenerate/check output."""
+    for directive in directives:
+        for upgrade_ops, downgrade_ops in zip(
+            directive.upgrade_ops_list,
+            directive.downgrade_ops_list,
+            strict=True,
+        ):
+            _filter_sso_expand_operations(upgrade_ops)
+            upgrade_ops.reverse_into(downgrade_ops)