Support for storing refresh token in a cookie.

This is best practice (and the default) when the application is browser based - an httponly
cookie.

Updated some docs that were missing some freshness and open redirect endpoint descriptions.

Author: jwag956

docs/configuration.rst

@@ -2046,13 +2046,13 @@ Refresh Tokens
     Default: ``"/refresh-token"``.
 .. py:data:: SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_MAX_AGE
 
-    Specifies a timedelta used to compute the tokens expiration date.
+    Specifies a timedelta used to compute the refresh tokens expiration date.
 
     Default: ``timedelta(days=90)``
 .. py:data:: SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_MAX_IDLE
 
     Specifies a timedelta used to compute the date the refresh token will
-    considered expired due to none use.
+    considered expired due to non-use.
 
     Default: ``timedelta(days=7)``
 .. py:data:: SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_CLEANUP_EXPIRED
@@ -2067,6 +2067,21 @@ Refresh Tokens
     whenever the user creates a new one (re-authenticates)
 
     Default: ``False``
+.. py:data:: SECURITY_REFRESH_COOKIE_NAME
+
+    If set then refresh tokens will be returned in a cookie rather than as
+    part of the JSON response. Upon logout, the cookie will be deleted.
+
+    Default: ``fs_refresh``
+
+.. py:data:: SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE
+
+    A dict that defines the parameters required to
+    set the refresh token cookie.
+    The complete set of parameters is described in Flask's `set_cookie`_ documentation.
+    ``"httponly"`` should ALWAYS be set.
+
+    Default: ``{"samesite": "Strict", "httponly": True, "secure": True}``
 
 Feature Flags
 -------------

docs/openapi.yaml

@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ paths:
       summary: Log out current user
       description: >
         If a refresh-token is supplied, it will be revoked as part
-        of logging the user out.
+        of logging the user out. If SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME is configured,
+        the refresh token will be deleted as part of logout.
       requestBody:
         required: false
         content:
@@ -2211,7 +2212,10 @@ paths:
               $ref: "#/components/schemas/RefreshToken"
       responses:
         200:
-          description: Refresh token response
+          description: >
+            Refresh token response. If SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME is configured,
+            the response will NOT include the refresh token. The refresh token will be
+            stored in a cookie.
           content:
             application/json:
               schema:

docs/patterns.rst

@@ -89,43 +89,40 @@ user's UserModel. By default that field is ``fs_uniquifier``. This means that
 if that field is changed (via :meth:`.UserDatastore.set_uniquifier`)
 then any existing authentication tokens will no longer be valid. This value is changed
 whenever a user changes their password. If this is not the desired behavior then you can add an additional
-attribute to the UserModel: ``fs_token_uniquifier`` and that will be used instead, thus
-isolating password changes from authentication tokens. That attribute can be changed via
-:meth:`.UserDatastore.set_token_uniquifier`. This attribute should have ``unique=True``.
+field to the UserModel: ``fs_token_uniquifier`` and that will be used instead, thus
+isolating password changes from authentication tokens. That field can be changed via
+:meth:`.UserDatastore.set_token_uniquifier`. This field should have ``unique=True``.
 Unlike ``fs_uniquifier``, it can be set to ``nullable`` - it will automatically be generated
-at first use if null.
+at first use if None.
 
-Authentication tokens have 2 options for specifying expiry time :data:`SECURITY_TOKEN_MAX_AGE`
+Authentication tokens have 2 options for specifying expiry time: :data:`SECURITY_TOKEN_MAX_AGE`
 is applied to ALL authentication tokens. Each authentication token can itself have an embedded
 expiry value (settable via the :data:`SECURITY_TOKEN_EXPIRE_TIMESTAMP` callable).
 
 Authentication tokens also convey freshness by recording the time the token was generated.
 This is used for endpoints protected with :func:`.auth_required` with a ``within``
 value set.
 
-.. note::
-    While every Flask-Security endpoint will accept an authentication token header,
-    there are some endpoints that require session information (e.g. a session cookie).
-    This includes entering in a second factor and handling of :ref:`CSRF<csrf_topic>`.
-    As of release 5.5.0, authentication tokens by default carry freshness information.
-
 The refresh token feature consists of:
 
   - a DB model - :ref:`FsRefreshTracker <refresh_tracker_model>` to keep track of each refresh token family
   - a view :py:data:`SECURITY_REFRESH_TOKEN_URL` that issues a new authentication
     token given a valid refresh token
   - refresh token rotation
   - built-in re-use protection
+  - return refresh token as a cookie (default) OR in the JSON response
   - revoke refresh token/tracker on logout
 
 The refresh token (when enabled) is returned along with the authentication token from any
-authentication endpoint. Each new refresh token is tracked in the DB with a FsRefreshTracker entry.
+authentication endpoint. By default, it is returned as a cookie (http-only).
+Each new refresh token is tracked in the DB with a FsRefreshTracker entry.
 Each time a new authentication_token is requested (via the .refresh_token endpoint) the generation
 number of the refresh tracker entry is incremented, and a new refresh token is generated and returned.
 This effectively makes refresh tokens single use.
 
 The ``.logout`` endpoint takes a ``refresh_token`` as an optional item - if supplied - that refresh token
-and the associated tracker will be revoked - this should be the best practice for any application.
+and the associated tracker will be revoked - this should be the best practice for any application. If the
+refresh token is being managed via a cookie, the cookie will be deleted.
 
 .. _freshness_topic:
 
@@ -154,6 +151,8 @@ Flask-Security itself uses this as part of securing the following endpoints:
     - .us_setup ("/us-setup")
     - .mf_recovery_codes ("/mf-recovery-codes")
     - .change_email ("/change-email")
+    - .change_username ("/change-username")
+    - .change_password ("/change")
 
 using the :py:data:`SECURITY_FRESHNESS` and :py:data:`SECURITY_FRESHNESS_GRACE_PERIOD` configuration variables.
 
@@ -184,6 +183,8 @@ The following endpoints accept a ``next`` parameter:
     - .wan_signin_response ("/wan-signin")
     - .us_signin ("/us-signin")
     - .us_verify ("/us-verify")
+    - .oauthstart ("/oauthstart")
+    - .oauth_verify_start ("/oauth-verify-start")
 
 Flask-Security always quotes the path portion of a user supplied URL.
 This `link <https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-32618>`_ provides background of why simple parsing of URLs isn't enough.
@@ -285,6 +286,11 @@ and the application endpoints (protected with Flask-Security decorators such as
 If your application just uses forms that are derived from ``Flask-WTF::Flaskform`` - you are done.
 Note that all of Flask-Security's endpoints are form based (regardless of how the request was made).
 
+.. note::
+  The logout endpoint has never been form-based and has never had CSRF protection. With the addition
+  of the refresh token feature, logout now accepts form/json input - but still does not support
+  CSRF protection.
+
 Behind-The-Scenes
 ++++++++++++++++++
 Depending on configuration, there are 3 places CSRF tokens can be checked:
@@ -371,7 +377,7 @@ the csrf-token, and if it can't, it will check if the request has a header that
 Be aware that if you enable this it will ONLY work if you send the session cookie on each request.
 
 .. note::
-    It is IMPORTANT that you initialize/call ``CSRFProtect`` PRIOR to initializing Flask_Security.
+    It is IMPORTANT that you initialize/call ``CSRFProtect`` PRIOR to initializing Flask-Security.
 
 .. note::
     Calling CSRFProtect(app) will setup a @before_request handler to verify CSRF - this occurs BEFORE any Flask-Security decorators

flask_security/core.py

@@ -302,6 +302,12 @@
     "REFRESH_TOKEN_CLEANUP_EXPIRED": True,
     "REFRESH_TOKEN_CLEANUP_REVOKED": False,
     "REFRESH_TOKEN_URL": "/refresh-token",
+    "REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME": "fs_refresh",
+    "REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE": {
+        "samesite": "Strict",
+        "httponly": True,
+        "secure": True,
+    },
     "CONFIRM_SALT": "confirm-salt",
     "RESET_SALT": "reset-salt",
     "LOGIN_SALT": "login-salt",

flask_security/forms.py

@@ -669,6 +669,13 @@ class LogoutForm(Form):
     refresh_errors: RefreshTokenErrors | None = None
     refresh_tracker: RefreshTrackerMixin | None = None
 
+    def __init__(self, *args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        # If cookie name set - then use that - NOT from the form
+        if request and cv("REFRESH_TOKEN") and cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"):
+            token = request.cookies.get(cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"), default=None)
+            self.refresh_token.data = token
+
     def validate(self, **kwargs: t.Any) -> bool:
         from .tokens import verify_refresh_token
 

flask_security/tokens.py

@@ -14,22 +14,25 @@
 
 TODO
  - add ability for app to add/verify additional stuff in refresh_token
- - add support for HTTP-only cookie (watch for CSRF issue)
+ - add endpoint to user can revoke refresh token?
  - change TOKEN_MAX_AGE to accept timedelta and change default to 30minutes or so.
- - implment rotation overlap period:
+ - implment rotation overlap period?:
    https://auth0.com/docs/secure/tokens/refresh-tokens/configure-refresh-token-rotation
 
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+from copy import copy
 from enum import Enum, auto
 import typing as t
+from functools import partial
 
-from flask import abort, request, after_this_request, current_app
+from flask import abort, request, after_this_request, current_app, Response
 from itsdangerous import BadSignature
 from wtforms import StringField
 
+from .decorators import unauth_csrf
 from .forms import (
     Form,
     RequiredLocalize,
@@ -40,7 +43,13 @@
 )
 from .proxies import _security, _datastore
 from .signals import refresh_tracker_revoked, refresh_tracker_created
-from .utils import config_value as cv, _, view_commit, get_message, base_render_json
+from .utils import (
+    config_value as cv,
+    _,
+    view_commit,
+    get_message,
+    base_render_json,
+)
 
 if t.TYPE_CHECKING:  # pragma: no cover
     from flask.typing import ResponseValue
@@ -73,7 +82,10 @@ def response_tokens(user: UserMixin, payload: dict[str, t.Any]) -> None:
     if _security.refresh_token:
         after_this_request(view_commit)
         refresh_tracker, refresh_token = new_refresh_tracker(user, name="default")
-        payload["user"]["refresh_token"] = refresh_token
+        if cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"):
+            after_this_request(partial(set_refresh_token_cookie, token=refresh_token))
+        else:
+            payload["user"]["refresh_token"] = refresh_token
 
 
 def new_refresh_tracker(user: UserMixin, name: str) -> tuple[RefreshTrackerMixin, str]:
@@ -122,6 +134,7 @@ def get_refresh_token(refresh_tracker: RefreshTrackerMixin, user: UserMixin) ->
         "ver": str(1),
         "uid": getattr(user, _datastore.get_token_uniquifier_name()),
         "expires_at": refresh_tracker.expires_at.timestamp(),
+        "last_used_at": refresh_tracker.last_used_at.timestamp(),
         "name": refresh_tracker.name,
         "family": refresh_tracker.refresh_family,
         "gen": refresh_tracker.gen,
@@ -195,6 +208,13 @@ class RefreshTokenForm(Form):
     refresh_tracker: RefreshTrackerMixin | None = None
     user: UserMixin | None = None
 
+    def __init__(self, *args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        # If cookie name set - then use that - NOT anything in the form
+        if request and cv("REFRESH_TOKEN") and cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"):
+            token = request.cookies.get(cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"), default=None)
+            self.refresh_token.data = token
+
     def validate(self, **kwargs: t.Any) -> bool:
         if not super().validate(**kwargs):  # pragma: no cover
             return False
@@ -222,6 +242,7 @@ def validate(self, **kwargs: t.Any) -> bool:
         return True
 
 
+@unauth_csrf()
 def refresh() -> ResponseValue:
     if not request.is_json:
         abort(400)
@@ -238,9 +259,12 @@ def refresh() -> ResponseValue:
         payload = dict()
         payload["user"] = form.user.get_security_payload()
         payload["user"]["authentication_token"] = form.user.get_auth_token()
-        payload["user"]["refresh_token"] = get_refresh_token(
-            form.refresh_tracker, form.user
-        )
+
+        refresh_token = get_refresh_token(form.refresh_tracker, form.user)
+        if cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"):
+            after_this_request(partial(set_refresh_token_cookie, token=refresh_token))
+        else:
+            payload["user"]["refresh_token"] = refresh_token
         return _security._render_json(payload, 200, None, form.user)
 
     # Failed validation - if it was a GEN_MISMATCH this could be a hack and we should
@@ -249,3 +273,21 @@ def refresh() -> ResponseValue:
         assert form.refresh_tracker
         _revoke_refresh_tracker(form.refresh_tracker, form.refresh_errors, form.user)
     return base_render_json(form, include_user=False)
+
+
+def set_refresh_token_cookie(response: Response, token: str) -> Response:
+    cookie_kwargs = copy(cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE"))
+    response.set_cookie(cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"), value=token, **cookie_kwargs)
+    # This is likely overkill since so far we only return this on a POST which is
+    # unlikely to be cached.
+    response.vary.add("Cookie")
+    return response
+
+
+def clear_refresh_token_cookie(response: Response) -> Response:
+    cookie_kwargs = copy(cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE"))
+    # Alas delete_cookie only accepts some of the keywords set_cookie does
+    allowed = ["path", "domain", "secure", "httponly", "samesite", "partitioned"]
+    args = {k: cookie_kwargs.get(k) for k in allowed if k in cookie_kwargs}
+    response.delete_cookie(cv("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"), **args)
+    return response

flask_security/utils.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 Flask-Security utils module
 
 :copyright: (c) 2012-2019 by Matt Wright.
-:copyright: (c) 2019-2025 by J. Christopher Wagner (jwag).
+:copyright: (c) 2019-2026 by J. Christopher Wagner (jwag).
 :license: MIT, see LICENSE for more details.
 """
 
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
     render_template,
     session,
     url_for,
+    after_this_request,
 )
 from flask_login import login_user as _login_user
 from flask_login import logout_user as _logout_user
@@ -284,6 +285,10 @@ def logout_user() -> None:
         # in 'g'. Be sure to clear both. This affects at least /confirm
         g.pop(csrf_field_name, None)
     session["fs_cc"] = "clear"
+    if config_value("REFRESH_TOKEN") and config_value("REFRESH_TOKEN_COOKIE_NAME"):
+        from .tokens import clear_refresh_token_cookie
+
+        after_this_request(partial(clear_refresh_token_cookie))
     identity_changed.send(
         current_app._get_current_object(),  # type: ignore
         _async_wrapper=current_app.ensure_sync,

flask_security/views.py

@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@
     url_for_security,
     view_commit,
     allowed_auth_token,
+    set_request_attr,
 )
 from .webauthn import (
     has_webauthn,
@@ -275,10 +276,19 @@ def verify():
 
 
 def logout():
-    """View function which handles a logout request."""
+    """View function which handles a logout request.
+    logout has never been CSRF protected.
+    As part of the refresh_token feature, logout now has a form defined
+    which a client can pass a refresh token that will be revoked as part of logout
+    (if the refresh token is managed with a cookie, the value will be set into the
+    form).
+    The cookie AND refresh tracker/token will be revoked.
+    """
     tf_clean_session()
 
     if is_user_authenticated(current_user):
+        # Until we implement logout CSRF - shouldn't logout but NOT revoke refresh token
+        set_request_attr("csrf_valid", True)
         form = t.cast(
             LogoutForm, build_form_from_request("logout_form", user=current_user)
         )