fix(adr): resolve duplicate ADR numbers + close ADR-080 security + ADR-154 M1 signal backlog (#1051)

* fix(signal): circular phase variance for ghost-tap guard (ADR-154 §7.4 #1)

`phase_variance` computed a LINEAR sample variance over phase angles that
wrap at ±π, so a tightly-clustered set straddling the branch cut reported
spuriously HIGH dispersion — false-tripping the `> TAU` ghost-tap guard on
real, tightly-clustered CIR taps.

Replace with Mardia's circular variance V = 1 − R̄, bounded [0,1] and
invariant to where the cluster sits on the circle. Re-derive the guard
against the bounded metric via a named const
`GHOST_TAP_CIRCULAR_VARIANCE_MAX` (the old TAU-scaled threshold is
meaningless on [0,1]).

Grade: metric fix MEASURED; threshold value DATA-GATED — a clean single-path
ramp also sweeps the circle, so V alone cannot separate clean from
unsanitized without labelled frames. Conservative default (0.99) errs toward
never false-rejecting, strictly more permissive at the wrap boundary than the
buggy linear guard.

Fails-on-old test: `phase_variance_circular_not_fooled_by_branch_cut` —
inlines the old linear variance to show it exceeds TAU on wrap-straddling
phases while circular V≈0 and the guard no longer trips. Plus
`phase_variance_circular_is_bounded_and_extremal` (V∈[0,1], V≈0 identical,
V≈1 uniform).

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --features cir --lib
→ 432 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(signal): pin Welford n=0/n=1 finiteness guard (ADR-154 §7.4 #10)

The shared `WelfordStats` (field_model.rs, used by longitudinal.rs and others)
relies on `count < 2` guards in `variance`/`sample_variance`/`std_dev`/
`z_score` to stay finite at the boundaries. The guards existed but the n=0
boundary was UNTESTED — exactly the §4 divide-by-(n−1) family the ADR groups
this with.

Add `welford_finite_at_n0_and_n1` asserting every statistic is finite and
returns the documented sentinel (0.0) at n=0 and n=1, plus load-bearing doc
comments on the two guards.

Fails-on-old proof: with the `sample_variance` guard removed, the test FAILS
with "attempt to subtract with overflow" at the `(self.count - 1)` underflow
(0usize − 1); `variance` would similarly yield 0.0/0.0 = NaN. The guard is
restored; the test pins it so a future regression is caught.

Grade: MEASURED (boundary finiteness is asserted; the guard is the §4-family
fix made testable).

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --lib field_model
→ 22 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* refactor(signal): de-magic adversarial thresholds + boundary tests (ADR-154 §7.4 #13)

Lift the bare numeric literals buried in `check`/`check_consistency` into
named, documented module consts (FIELD_MODEL_GINI_VIOLATION=0.8,
ENERGY_RATIO_HIGH_VIOLATION=2.0, ENERGY_RATIO_LOW_VIOLATION=0.1,
CONSISTENCY_ACTIVE_FRACTION_OF_MEAN=0.1, SCORE_W_* weights). VALUES UNCHANGED —
each const equals the original literal; only names + pinning tests are new.

Grade: DATA-GATED. The operating values stay empirical (defensible values need
labelled spoofed/clean CSI — Wi-Spoof, §6.2/§7.3). The de-magicking +
characterization tests are MEASURED: `tuning_consts_unchanged_from_literals`,
`energy_ratio_high_boundary`, `energy_ratio_low_boundary`,
`field_model_gini_boundary`, `consistency_active_fraction_boundary` pin the
decision boundaries at/just-below/just-above each threshold, so a future
data-driven retune is a visible, tested change.

Fails-on-change proof: bumping ENERGY_RATIO_HIGH_VIOLATION 2.0→3.0 makes
`energy_ratio_high_boundary` FAIL (restored). Operating values explicitly
NOT changed.

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --lib ruvsense::adversarial
→ 20 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* refactor(signal): de-magic coherence drift/gate thresholds (ADR-154 §7.4 #9)

Lift the bare detection literals in `coherence.rs::classify_drift`
(DRIFT_STABLE_SCORE=0.85, DRIFT_STEP_CHANGE_MAX_STALE=10) and the
`coherence_gate.rs` Default impl (DEFAULT_ACCEPT_THRESHOLD=0.85,
DEFAULT_REJECT_THRESHOLD=0.5, DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_FRAMES=200,
DEFAULT_PREDICT_ONLY_NOISE=3.0) into named, documented consts. VALUES
UNCHANGED. The gate already exposed these via GatePolicyConfig (config seam);
this names + pins the defaults.

Grade: DATA-GATED. Operating values stay empirical (defensible Z-score
thresholds need labelled stable/drifting coherence traces). De-magicking +
boundary tests are MEASURED: `classify_drift_stable_score_boundary`,
`classify_drift_stale_count_boundary` pin the at/just-below/just-above
decisions; `drift_consts_unchanged_from_literals` /
`gate_default_consts_unchanged_from_literals` pin the values. Operating values
explicitly NOT changed.

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --lib ruvsense::coherence
→ 40 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-154): mark §7.4 P1 backlog cleared — Milestone-1 (#1,#10 RESOLVED; #9,#13 DATA-GATED)

Update ADR-154 §7.4 backlog rows #1, #9, #10, #13 with commit refs + grades,
the §7.4 intro count (four P1 items cleared, ~41 P2/P3 remain), the
Horizon-ledger one-liner (Milestone-1 DONE), and the §8 honest-limits #1 line
(metric now correct; threshold still DATA-GATED). Add CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
entry.

Grades: #1 RESOLVED (MEASURED metric / DATA-GATED threshold), #10 RESOLVED
(MEASURED), #9 & #13 RESOLVED-PARTIAL (DATA-GATED — de-magicked + boundary
tested, operating values unchanged).

Validation: cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 2057 passed, 0
failed; wifi-densepose-signal lib → 442 passed (no-default + --features cir);
python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py → VERDICT: PASS, hash f8e76f21…46f7a
UNCHANGED (CIR ghost-tap guard is not on the deterministic proof path).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(sensing-server): stop leaking internal errors in HTTP responses (ADR-080 #2)

Six handlers in `main.rs` serialized the internal error `Display` straight
into the JSON response body, leaking server internals to any client (ADR-080
finding #2, CWE-209; reframed onto the Rust boundary by ADR-164 G11):

  - edge_registry_endpoint: a panicked spawn_blocking `JoinError`
    ("task … panicked") in a 500, and the raw upstream error in a 503
  - delete_model / delete_recording / start_recording: std::io::Error
    strings carrying OS detail / filesystem paths
  - calibration_start / calibration_stop: the FieldModel error chain

New `error_response` module: `internal_error` / `internal_error_json` /
`upstream_unavailable` log the full detail server-side only (tagged with a
correlation id) and return a generic body
(`{"error":"internal_error","correlation_id":…}`) — no `panicked`, no file
paths, no Debug chain. The correlation id lets an operator join a client
report to the exact server log line without ever shipping the detail.

Pinned by 5 error_response tests, incl. a leak-substring guard
(internal_error_body_does_not_leak_detail) verified to FAIL on the reverted
old body (returns the panic message / path / "os error"). The HOMECORE sweep
(ADR-161) covered homecore-server, not this crate.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* test(sensing-server): pin XFF-immunity + no-query-token (ADR-080 #1, #3)

Findings #1 (XFF-spoofing bypass) and #3 (JWT-in-URL, CWE-598) were logged
against the Python v1 API but are VERIFIED ABSENT on the current Rust
sensing-server, so they get regression tests rather than redundant fixes:

  - #1 XFF: there is no IP-based rate-limiter or IP-allowlist to bypass, and
    neither security middleware reads a forwarded header. Added
    bearer_auth::xff_header_never_affects_auth_decision (spoofed
    X-Forwarded-For never flips a 401<->200 decision) and
    host_validation::forwarded_headers_never_bypass_host_allowlist (spoofed
    X-Forwarded-Host: localhost never lets Host: evil.com past the allowlist).

  - #3 JWT-in-URL: require_bearer reads the token only from the Authorization
    header; WS handlers take no query token; the sole Query extractor
    (EdgeRegistryParams) is a non-secret refresh flag. Added
    bearer_auth::query_string_token_is_never_accepted — ?token= / ?access_token=
    in the URL never authenticates (stays 401) while the header path still 200s.
    Verified to FAIL when a query-token path is injected into require_bearer.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-080): mark P0 security findings #1-#3 RESOLVED; close ADR-164 G11

- ADR-080: Status note + per-finding closure (#1 XFF and #3 JWT-in-URL
  verified absent + regression-pinned; #2 leaked errors fixed via the
  error_response module). Records the v1-vs-Rust boundary distinction
  explicitly: v1 paths remain archived; this closure governs the shipped
  Rust sensing-server.
- ADR-164: Gap Register G11 and the Open/Gated Backlog entry marked
  RESOLVED with the fix + branch reference.
- CHANGELOG: [Unreleased] -> ### Security entry covering all three findings.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr): renumber 6 displaced ADRs to resolve duplicate-number collisions (ADR-164 G1)

Resolves the 5 duplicate ADR numbers (6 displaced files) flagged by ADR-164
Gap Register item G1. Canonical keeper per number = first file committed at
that number (date tie-broken by inbound cross-reference count / parent-appendix
relationship). Displaced files renumbered to the next free numbers (166-171):

  050 keeps provisioning-tool-enhancements (5 refs vs 1)
    -> ADR-166-quality-engineering-security-hardening
  052 keeps tauri-desktop-frontend (parent ADR)
    -> ADR-167-ddd-bounded-contexts (its appendix)
  147 keeps nvidia-cosmos/OccWorld (the actual ADR, has Status header)
    -> ADR-168-benchmark-proof (proof companion, no Status)
    -> ADR-169-adam-mode-light-theme (was untracked)
  148 keeps drone-swarm-control-system (committed #862)
    -> ADR-170-yoga-mode-pose-system (was untracked)
  149 keeps public-community-leaderboard-huggingface (committed 16:47 vs 17:38)
    -> ADR-171-swarm-benchmarking-evaluation-methodology

Updates in-file `# ADR-NNN` headers and intra-file self-references (yoga-modes

* docs(adr): repoint inbound cross-references to renumbered ADRs (166-171)

Follow-up to the ADR renumbering (ADR-164 G1). Updates every inbound reference
that pointed at a displaced ADR, disambiguating shared numbers by title/slug so
only references to the DISPLACED topic move and keeper references stay put.

ADR-168 (was 147 benchmark-proof): README, CHANGELOG, user-guide,
  proof-of-capabilities, research docs 00/03 — all path/label refs updated.
ADR-169 (was 147 adam-mode) / ADR-170 (was 148 yoga-mode): docs/adr/README index.
ADR-171 (was 149 swarm-benchmarking): all ruview-swarm eval code+docs
  (Cargo.toml, evals/, eval_swarm.rs, metrics/mod/report/runner.rs), research
  doc 03 (every §-ref matched ADR-171 sections, not AetherArena), 00-system-review,
  series README, CHANGELOG, and ADR-148's forward/"open issues" pointers.
ADR-166 (was 050 quality-engineering / security-hardening): disambiguated from the
  ADR-050 provisioning KEEPER by topic. The HMAC/secure_tdm, directory-traversal,
  bind-address, and OTA-PSK-auth references in code comments
  (wifi-densepose-hardware Cargo.toml + secure_tdm.rs, sensing-server main.rs) and
  in ADR-052-tauri / ADR-167 all describe the security-hardening ADR -> ADR-166.
ADR-167 (was 052 ddd-appendix): inbound appendix references.

Index/registry updates: docs/adr/README.md, gap-analysis/census.md (rows +
header count), gap-analysis/lens-findings.md (collision table marked RESOLVED),
and ADR-164 Gap Register G1 marked RESOLVED with the full renumber map.

Keeper references deliberately untouched: all ADR-147 OccWorld code, all ADR-148
drone-swarm code/docs, all ADR-149 AetherArena refs (incl. ADR-150's SSL/resampling
refs, which ADR-150 explicitly binds to the AetherArena benchmark), ADR-050
provisioning refs, ADR-052 tauri refs. The frozen GitHub blob URLs in
docs/adr/.issue-177-body.md (pinned to an old branch) are left as historical.

Comment-only code edits; no behavior change. wifi-densepose-hardware compiles
clean; the sensing-server build's sole blocker is the pre-existing upstream
midstreamer-temporal-compare@0.2.1 registry crate, unrelated to these edits.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

Author: ruvnet

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ The separate **17-keypoint pose-estimation model** is now published at [`ruvnet/
 | **Efficiency frontier** | [`docs/benchmarks/wifi-pose-efficiency-frontier.md`](docs/benchmarks/wifi-pose-efficiency-frontier.md) | SOTA-beating WiFi pose in a 20 KB int4 edge model |
 | **Pretrained encoder** | [`ruvnet/wifi-densepose-pretrained`](https://huggingface.co/ruvnet/wifi-densepose-pretrained) | 82.3% held-out temporal-triplet, 8 KB int4 |
 | **Reproducible proof (Trust Kill Switch)** | [`archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py`](archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py) + [`expected_features.sha256`](archive/v1/data/proof/expected_features.sha256) | one-command deterministic pipeline replay (SHA-256 of output vs published hash) |
-| **Benchmark-proof ADR** | [ADR-147](docs/adr/ADR-147-benchmark-proof.md) | how the numbers are produced and verified |
+| **Benchmark-proof ADR** | [ADR-168](docs/adr/ADR-168-benchmark-proof.md) | how the numbers are produced and verified |
 | **Witness attestation** | [`docs/WITNESS-LOG-028.md`](docs/WITNESS-LOG-028.md) | 33-row capability attestation matrix with per-claim evidence |
 
 ```bash

README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 | Status | Proposed |
 | Date | 2026-03-06 |
 | Deciders | ruv |
-| Depends on | ADR-012 (ESP32 CSI Mesh), ADR-039 (Edge Intelligence), ADR-040 (WASM Programmable Sensing), ADR-044 (Provisioning Enhancements), ADR-050 (Security Hardening), ADR-051 (Server Decomposition) |
+| Depends on | ADR-012 (ESP32 CSI Mesh), ADR-039 (Edge Intelligence), ADR-040 (WASM Programmable Sensing), ADR-044 (Provisioning Enhancements), ADR-166 (Security Hardening, renumbered from ADR-050), ADR-051 (Server Decomposition) |
 | Issue | [#177](https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/issues/177) |
 
 ## Context
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ pub struct FlashProgress {
 // commands/ota.rs
 
 /// Push firmware to a node via HTTP OTA (port 8032).
-/// Includes PSK authentication per ADR-050.
+/// Includes PSK authentication per ADR-166.
 #[tauri::command]
 async fn ota_update(
     node_ip: String,
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ Total estimated effort: ~11 weeks for a single developer.
 - ADR-039: ESP32 Edge Intelligence
 - ADR-040: WASM Programmable Sensing
 - ADR-044: Provisioning Tool Enhancements
-- ADR-050: Quality Engineering — Security Hardening
+- ADR-166: Quality Engineering — Security Hardening (renumbered from ADR-050)
 - ADR-051: Sensing Server Decomposition
 - `firmware/esp32-csi-node/` — ESP32 firmware source
 - `firmware/esp32-csi-node/provision.py` — Current provisioning script

docs/adr/ADR-052-tauri-desktop-frontend.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # ADR-080: QE Analysis Remediation Plan
 
-- **Status:** Proposed
+- **Status:** Proposed — P0 security findings #1–#3 **RESOLVED** on the shipped Rust sensing-server boundary (2026-06-13; closes ADR-164 G11)
 - **Date:** 2026-04-06
 - **Source:** [QE Analysis Gist (2026-04-05)](https://gist.github.com/proffesor-for-testing/a6b84d7a4e26b7bbef0cf12f932925b7)
 - **Full Reports:** [proffesor-for-testing/RuView `qe-reports` branch](https://github.com/proffesor-for-testing/RuView/tree/qe-reports/docs/qe-reports)
@@ -13,25 +13,38 @@ An 8-agent QE swarm analyzed ~305K lines across Rust, Python, C firmware, and Ty
 
 Address the 15 prioritized issues from the QE analysis in three waves: P0 (immediate), P1 (this sprint), P2 (this quarter).
 
+## Security P0 closure note (2026-06-13) — Rust sensing-server boundary
+
+The three P0 security findings below were logged against the **Python v1** API
+(`archive/v1/src/…`). ADR-164 G11 re-scoped them to the *shipped* boundary:
+`wifi-densepose-sensing-server` (Rust). They were verified against the current
+Rust crate and closed on branch `fix/adr-080-sensing-server-security`. Each fix
+(or already-fixed finding) is pinned by a test that fails on the old behavior.
+**The Python v1 paths remain as-is** — v1 is archived and not the shipped
+surface; this closure governs the live Rust server only.
+
 ## P0 — Fix Immediately
 
-### 1. Rate Limiter Bypass (Security HIGH)
+### 1. Rate Limiter Bypass / XFF spoofing (Security HIGH) — **RESOLVED (verified absent on Rust boundary)**
 
-- **Location:** `archive/v1/src/middleware/rate_limit.py:200-206`
+- **Original location (v1):** `archive/v1/src/middleware/rate_limit.py:200-206`
 - **Problem:** Trusts `X-Forwarded-For` without validation. Any client bypasses rate limits via header spoofing.
-- **Fix:** Validate forwarded headers against trusted proxy list, or use connection IP directly.
+- **Rust verification (2026-06-13):** The Rust sensing-server has **no XFF-trusting control to bypass** — there is no IP-based rate-limiter and no IP-allowlist, and neither security middleware reads a forwarded header. `bearer_auth.rs` authenticates on the token alone (`require_bearer` inspects only the `AUTHORIZATION` header); `host_validation.rs` decides on the `Host` header only. A repo-wide grep for `x-forwarded-for|forwarded|peer_addr|client_ip|real-ip` over `wifi-densepose-sensing-server` returns nothing. The only "rate limiter" is the MQTT *sample-rate* gate (`mqtt/state.rs`), a per-entity publish throttle with no IP/header input.
+- **Resolution:** No code change needed (no vulnerable surface). Regression tests pin the immunity: `bearer_auth::tests::xff_header_never_affects_auth_decision` (spoofed XFF never flips a 401↔200 decision) and `host_validation::tests::forwarded_headers_never_bypass_host_allowlist` (spoofed `X-Forwarded-Host: localhost` never lets a foreign `Host: evil.com` past the allowlist). Residual: if an IP-based control is ever added, it must derive the peer from the socket (`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`) and only honor XFF from an explicit `--trusted-proxy` CIDR — captured as guidance in the test docstrings.
 
-### 2. Exception Details Leaked in Responses (Security HIGH)
+### 2. Exception Details Leaked in Responses (Security HIGH, CWE-209) — **RESOLVED**
 
-- **Location:** `archive/v1/src/api/routers/pose.py:140`, `stream.py:297`, +5 endpoints
-- **Problem:** Stack traces visible regardless of environment.
-- **Fix:** Wrap with generic error responses in production; log details server-side only.
+- **Original location (v1):** `archive/v1/src/api/routers/pose.py:140`, `stream.py:297`, +5 endpoints
+- **Problem:** Internal error/stack-trace detail serialized into client responses.
+- **Rust finding (2026-06-13):** Six handlers in `wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs` serialized the internal error `Display` into the JSON body: `edge_registry_endpoint` returned a panicked `spawn_blocking` `JoinError` (`"task … panicked"`) in a `500` and the raw upstream error in a `503`; `delete_model`/`delete_recording`/`start_recording` returned `std::io::Error` strings (OS detail / path); `calibration_start`/`calibration_stop` returned the `FieldModel` error chain.
+- **Fix:** New `src/error_response.rs` module — `internal_error` / `internal_error_json` / `upstream_unavailable` log the full detail **server-side only** (tagged with a correlation id) and return a generic body (`{"error":"internal_error","correlation_id":…}`) with no `panicked`, no file paths, no Debug chain. All six call-sites rewired. Pinned by `error_response::tests::internal_error_body_does_not_leak_detail` (leak-substring guard, verified to fail on the reverted old body) + 4 sibling tests.
 
-### 3. WebSocket JWT in URL (Security HIGH, CWE-598)
+### 3. WebSocket JWT in URL (Security HIGH, CWE-598) — **RESOLVED (verified absent on Rust boundary)**
 
-- **Location:** `archive/v1/src/api/routers/stream.py:74`, `archive/v1/src/middleware/auth.py:243`
+- **Original location (v1):** `archive/v1/src/api/routers/stream.py:74`, `archive/v1/src/middleware/auth.py:243`
 - **Problem:** Tokens in query strings visible in logs/proxies/browser history.
-- **Fix:** Use WebSocket subprotocol or first-message auth pattern.
+- **Rust verification (2026-06-13):** The Rust sensing-server never reads a token from the URL. `require_bearer` (`bearer_auth.rs`) inspects only the `Authorization` header; the WebSocket handlers (`ws_sensing_handler`/`ws_introspection_handler`/`ws_pose_handler`) take a bare `WebSocketUpgrade` with no `Query` extractor; the single `Query` in the crate (`EdgeRegistryParams`) is a non-secret `refresh` flag.
+- **Resolution:** No code change needed (no query-token path exists). Regression test `bearer_auth::tests::query_string_token_is_never_accepted` proves `?token=`/`?access_token=` in the URL never authenticates (stays `401`) while the same token in the header succeeds (`200`) — verified to fail if a query-token path is re-introduced.
 
 ### 4. Rust Tests Not in CI
 

docs/adr/ADR-080-qe-remediation-plan.md

@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@
 | Relates to | ADR-134, ADR-136, ADR-139, ADR-140, ADR-143, ADR-144, ADR-146, ADR-147                |
 
 > **Scope note:** ADR-147 deferred Cosmos WFM to "ADR-148" as an offline data generator.
-> That item is promoted to ADR-149. This ADR takes 148 to address the broader drone swarm
-> control architecture, which is the first consumer of ADR-147's OccWorld occupancy output.
+> That item is promoted to ADR-171 (the swarm-benchmarking/evaluation companion to this ADR;
+> renumbered from ADR-149 to resolve the ADR-149 duplicate-number collision). This ADR takes
+> 148 to address the broader drone swarm control architecture, which is the first consumer of
+> ADR-147's OccWorld occupancy output.
 
 ---
 
@@ -874,9 +876,9 @@ validated; ITAR/EAR classification completed by export counsel.
 | GPS spoofing of full swarm simultaneously | Medium | Low | UWB mesh cross-check among all nodes; ≥ 3 nodes must agree on position to confirm |
 | 1000-UAV scale claims (not validated) | Low | High | SWARM+ demonstrated in simulation only; scale claims capped at 50 for production targets |
 
-### 12.3 Open Issues (Forward to ADR-149)
+### 12.3 Open Issues (Forward to ADR-171)
 
-- Cosmos WFM offline training data generation (deferred from ADR-147) — ADR-149
+- Cosmos WFM offline training data generation (deferred from ADR-147) — ADR-171
 - Fixed-wing hybrid platform support (endurance missions) — future ADR
 - Underwater-aerial cross-domain handoff protocol — future ADR
 - Quantum-enhanced task assignment (E6) — future ADR when hardware matures
@@ -998,4 +1000,4 @@ Implementation tracked at: https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/issues/861
 
 *ADR authored with research support from `ruflo-goals:deep-researcher` (2026-05-30).
  Implementation progress tracked by `ruflo-goals:horizon-tracker`.
- OccWorld integration basis: ADR-147. Next: ADR-149 (Cosmos WFM offline data generation).*
+ OccWorld integration basis: ADR-147. Next: ADR-171 (Cosmos WFM offline data generation; renumbered from ADR-149).*