docs(adr-002): record OpenAI provenance check go-live decision #38
Workflow file for this run
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| name: AI Review | |
| on: | |
| pull_request: | |
| types: [opened, synchronize, reopened] | |
| jobs: | |
| claude-review: | |
| name: Claude security & logic review | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: write | |
| issues: write | |
| id-token: write | |
| steps: | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@v4 | |
| with: | |
| fetch-depth: 0 | |
| - name: Claude Code review | |
| uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 | |
| with: | |
| claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }} | |
| show_full_output: "true" | |
| prompt: | | |
| You are reviewing a pull request for Asmita, a safety-critical | |
| NCII (non-consensual intimate imagery) takedown platform. Review | |
| the PR diff (use `gh pr diff ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}`) | |
| and the surrounding code as needed. | |
| FOCUS ON (in priority order): | |
| 1. Safety invariants of this codebase: any code path that could | |
| fetch, store, render, or log submitted URLs/media; Aadhaar | |
| storage; bypass of ENABLE_HASH_UPLOAD / ENABLE_PLATFORM_API | |
| gates; unverified notice recipients; PII in notice bodies, | |
| logs, or tests. | |
| 2. Security: SQL injection, authz bypass (IDOR, missing | |
| requireAdminPermission), CSRF gaps, secrets in code, broken | |
| encryption usage, rate-limit bypass. | |
| 3. Business-logic correctness: case lifecycle state errors, | |
| idempotency breaks in notice/hash dispatch, escalation timer | |
| bugs, unhandled edge cases. | |
| 4. Data integrity: audit-chain breaks, N+1 queries, missing | |
| transactions where multi-row writes must be atomic, anything | |
| touching auth, account deletion, or outbound email dispatch. | |
| IGNORE: style preferences, formatting, naming, comment density, | |
| test coverage gaps in untouched code. Do not comment on anything | |
| a linter would catch. | |
| For each finding, post an inline comment on the PR at the | |
| relevant line using: | |
| gh api repos/${{ github.repository }}/pulls/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/comments \ | |
| -f body="..." -f commit_id="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}" \ | |
| -f path="..." -F line=N -f side=RIGHT | |
| Prefix each comment with its severity: "CRITICAL:" (must fix | |
| before merge — exploitable, breaks a safety invariant, or | |
| corrupts data) or "WARNING:" (informational, author's call). | |
| Finally post ONE summary comment on the PR | |
| (gh pr comment ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} --body "..."). | |
| Your very last output line must be exactly one of: | |
| Verdict: **PASS** (no critical issues) | |
| Verdict: **BLOCK** (one or more CRITICAL issues) | |
| claude_args: '--allowed-tools "Bash(gh pr diff:*),Bash(gh pr comment:*),Bash(gh api:*),Bash(echo:*),Bash(cat:*),Read,Grep,Glob"' | |
| env: | |
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | |
| - name: Enforce severity threshold | |
| run: | | |
| out=/home/runner/work/_temp/claude-execution-output.json | |
| if jq -r '.[] | select(.type=="result") | .result' "$out" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'Verdict:.*BLOCK'; then | |
| echo "::error::AI review verdict is BLOCK. Merge blocked." | |
| exit 1 | |
| else | |
| echo "AI review verdict: PASS (no explicit BLOCK found)" | |
| fi |