The Tetcore Governance Constitution defines:
- The validator governance model
- The proposal lifecycle
- Voting mechanics
- Emergency procedures
- Upgrade procedures
- Economic policy modification rules
- Contract capability governance
- Constitutional invariants
This constitution governs protocol evolution while preserving deterministic execution and safety.
Governance is embedded into the protocol state machine.
All governance actions must be:
- Represented as transactions
- Executed by the Protocol Kernel
- Deterministic
- Replay-stable
No off-chain governance has authority unless ratified on-chain.
Tetcore governance is independent from external chains or token voting systems.
Authority derives solely from protocol-defined governance participants.
Governance authority is divided into:
- Validator Council
- Model Owner Council
- Emergency Committee (optional configuration)
Networks may configure governance structure, but must preserve core invariants.
Validators:
- Participate in BFT consensus
- Vote on protocol proposals
- Ratify upgrades
- Approve policy changes
Validator membership is governed through protocol rules.
Active model owners (of active versions) may have governance weight depending on configuration.
Weight function example:
[ Weight(owner) = ActiveModelsOwned ]
Networks may configure weight formula.
A limited authority body able to:
- Pause specific modules
- Freeze contracts
- Trigger emergency halts
Emergency actions are temporary and must be ratified by Validator Council within defined window.
Governance proposals are typed.
- AddValidator
- RemoveValidator
- UpdatePricingPolicy
- UpdateRevenuePolicy
- ModifyVaultRules
- ContractCapabilityChange
- ParameterChange
- ProtocolUpgrade
- EmergencyPause
- ResumeOperation
Each proposal type maps to deterministic state changes.
State machine:
Proposed → Voting → Timelocked → Executed → Finalized
Or:
Proposed → Voting → Rejected
Transaction:
GovernancePropose {
proposalType,
payload,
executeAfterHeight
}
Requirements:
- proposer must meet governance eligibility
- deposit required (optional)
- payload must pass validation
Voting window defined:
[ VotingEnd = ProposalHeight + VotingPeriod ]
Votes recorded:
GovernanceVote {
proposalId,
support: bool
}
Let:
[ TotalWeight = \sum weights ]
A proposal passes if:
[ VotesFor ≥ QuorumThreshold ]
Where:
[ QuorumThreshold = q · TotalWeight ]
Default q = 2/3 for critical proposals.
All successful proposals enter timelock.
[ ExecuteHeight ≥ ProposalHeight + TimelockPeriod ]
Timelock ensures:
- auditability
- dispute window
- client upgrade window
Emergency proposals may reduce timelock but require higher quorum.
Protocol upgrades modify:
- VM version
- Instruction set
- Gas schedule
- Runtime modules
- State schema
Upgrade proposals must include:
- new protocol version identifier
- migration function hash
- activation height
Upgrade execution requires:
[ ≥ 2/3 ValidatorWeight ]
Parameters subject to governance:
- Gas cost schedule
- Challenge window length
- Default pricing coefficients
- Maximum vault allocation
- Maximum contract size
- Relay reward parameters
Parameter changes must preserve safety invariants.
Contracts rely on capabilities.
Governance may:
- Add new capability types
- Revoke capability types
- Restrict capability to specific contracts
- Modify capability gas costs
Capability changes cannot retroactively invalidate executed transactions.
EmergencyPause may:
- Halt new prompt submissions
- Halt contract deployments
- Freeze specific modules
Must be ratified by Validator Council within:
[ EmergencyWindow ]
Otherwise auto-expire.
Full chain halt requires:
[ ≥ 3/4 ValidatorWeight ]
Used only for catastrophic failure.
Invariant 1: Protocol upgrades must not violate deterministic execution.
Invariant 2: Governance cannot mint tokens beyond defined supply rules.
Invariant 3: Revenue routing sums must remain equal to 100%.
Invariant 4: Model root commitments cannot be altered by governance.
Invariant 5: Governance cannot modify historical blocks.
On-chain object:
GovernanceState =
(
proposals,
votes,
parameters,
validatorSet,
emergencyStatus,
protocolVersion
)
All transitions occur via deterministic application of governance transactions.
Validators may be penalized for:
- Double signing
- Invalid block proposal
- Failure to participate (optional configuration)
Slashing rules must be explicitly defined in parameter governance.
The Governance Constitution itself may be amended via:
- Supermajority vote (≥ 3/4)
- Extended timelock
- Explicit “ConstitutionAmendment” proposal type
Amendments must preserve:
- Determinism
- Safety invariants
- Identity scheme
Governance exists to:
- Maintain protocol stability
- Enable safe upgrades
- Preserve economic fairness
- Protect model ownership rights
- Protect vault participant rights
It must not:
- Centralize intelligence control
- Override deterministic execution
- Confiscate assets without defined slashing rule
Assuming:
- ≥ 2/3 honest validator weight
- Functional network connectivity
Then:
- Valid proposals eventually resolve
- Passed proposals eventually execute
The Tetcore Governance Constitution establishes a deterministic, sovereign, protocol-native governance system.
It ensures:
- Upgrade safety
- Economic integrity
- Capability control
- Validator accountability
- Long-term infrastructure stability
Governance is not external to the protocol.
It is part of the state machine.