Problem
PentAGI runs automated penetration testing with AI agents. Security assessments produce findings that need to be demonstrably authentic and tamper-proof — a modified pentest report could hide vulnerabilities or fabricate findings. Currently, there is no cryptographic evidence chain proving what tools were run, what was discovered, and that the results are unmodified.
Proposal
Integrate Ed25519 receipt signing into PentAGI's tool execution pipeline. Each pentest tool invocation would produce a signed receipt creating a verifiable evidence chain:
Recon (receipt_001) → Port Scan (receipt_002) → Exploit Attempt (receipt_003) → Report (receipt_004)
This transforms pentest results from "trust me" reports into cryptographically verifiable evidence packages.
Reference
protect-mcp (MIT, v0.5.3). Receipt format: IETF Internet-Draft. The receipt chain/DAG visualization is built-in via npx protect-mcp trace <id>.
Happy to discuss and contribute.
Problem
PentAGI runs automated penetration testing with AI agents. Security assessments produce findings that need to be demonstrably authentic and tamper-proof — a modified pentest report could hide vulnerabilities or fabricate findings. Currently, there is no cryptographic evidence chain proving what tools were run, what was discovered, and that the results are unmodified.
Proposal
Integrate Ed25519 receipt signing into PentAGI's tool execution pipeline. Each pentest tool invocation would produce a signed receipt creating a verifiable evidence chain:
This transforms pentest results from "trust me" reports into cryptographically verifiable evidence packages.
Reference
protect-mcp (MIT, v0.5.3). Receipt format: IETF Internet-Draft. The receipt chain/DAG visualization is built-in via
npx protect-mcp trace <id>.Happy to discuss and contribute.