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Security Policy

Supported Versions

Sift is under active development. Security fixes land on the latest release and the main branch.

Version Supported
0.2.x ✅
< 0.2 ❌

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities — that exposes the problem before a fix is available.

Instead, use either of these private channels:

  • GitHub Security Advisory (preferred) — open the Security tab and click Report a vulnerability. This keeps the discussion private until a fix ships.
  • Pull Request — if you already have a fix, open a PR and note that it addresses a security issue. We'll coordinate disclosure from there.

You don't need to email anyone.

What to include

  • A description of the vulnerability and its impact
  • Steps to reproduce (proof-of-concept, affected endpoint, or input)
  • Affected version or commit
  • Any suggested remediation, if you have one

What to expect

  • Acknowledgement within 3 business days
  • An assessment and severity rating once we've reproduced the issue
  • Regular updates as we work on a fix
  • Credit in the release notes once the fix ships, unless you'd prefer to stay anonymous

Deployment Hardening

Sift ships safe-by-default for local, single-user use. If you expose it on a network, configure these first:

  • API_KEY — set it to require an X-API-Key header on every request. With no key set, the API is open to anyone who can reach it. The Docker Compose setup now requires API_KEY because the container binds 0.0.0.0.
  • ENCRYPTION_KEY — set it so stored third-party API keys are encrypted at rest with a strong key. Without it, Sift falls back to a predictable key and logs a warning on startup.
  • TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET — required if you run the Telegram bot in webhook mode; incoming updates are rejected without a matching secret.
  • TLS — terminate HTTPS at a reverse proxy. The app emits HSTS and a restrictive Content-Security-Policy, but does not terminate TLS itself.

Threat Model & Scope

Sift ingests media from user-supplied URLs, runs local and remote AI models, and exposes a FastAPI backend plus a Tauri desktop shell. Areas especially worth scrutiny:

  • SSRF — any path that fetches a user- or feed-supplied URL. Outbound fetches are routed through an allowlist-validating helper that re-checks every redirect hop; report any sink that bypasses it.
  • The API surface (/api/*) — authentication, input validation, injection.
  • URL/media handling — path traversal, command injection via downloaders or FFmpeg, unsafe filename handling.
  • Secrets handling for third-party AI providers and API keys.
  • The Tauri desktop backend — the embedded localhost server, its CORS policy, and IPC commands.
  • Webhook and Telegram bot endpoints.

Out of Scope

  • Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies — please report those upstream (we'll still bump the dependency once a patch is available).
  • Issues that require physical access to a user's machine.
  • Self-inflicted misconfiguration (e.g. exposing the backend on 0.0.0.0 without an API_KEY).

Thanks for helping keep Sift and its users safe.