Security Enforcement for Trusted Registries: Only allow module restore from trusted registries#19395
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jiangmingzhe wants to merge 2 commits intoAzure:mainfrom
Open
Security Enforcement for Trusted Registries: Only allow module restore from trusted registries#19395jiangmingzhe wants to merge 2 commits intoAzure:mainfrom
jiangmingzhe wants to merge 2 commits intoAzure:mainfrom
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…e from truested registries
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Description: Block credential exfiltration via untrusted OCI registry restore
Problem
Opening an untrusted
.bicepfile triggers automatic OCI module restore, which sends Azure credentials to any referenced registry — including attacker-controlled ones — via the authenticate challenge. Simply opening a file is sufficient to exfiltrate credentials.Solution
A registry trust allowlist enforced before any network I/O. Restore is blocked entirely for registries not on the list — no connection, no credential challenge.
Built-in trusted registries (
*.azurecr.io,*.azurecr.cn,*.azurecr.us,mcr.microsoft.com,mcr.azure.cn,ghcr.io) are hardcoded. Users extend the list viasecurity.trustedRegistriesinbicepconfig.json.Two new diagnostics:
BCP446(registry not trusted) andBCP447(invalid pattern in config). Invalid patterns fail closed — all restore blocked until fixed.Trust is checked against the literal hostname string in the source file. No DNS resolution is performed, preventing DNS rebinding attacks.
Checklist
Microsoft Reviewers: Open in CodeFlow