If you discover a security vulnerability in Quick Access for Pass, please do not open a public issue.

Instead, report it privately via GitHub Security Advisories.

Please include:

• a clear description of the issue
• steps to reproduce
• affected component or subsystem
• expected vs. actual behavior
• potential impact
• any proof-of-concept details or logs that help reproduce the problem

You should receive an acknowledgment within 48 hours. We will investigate the report, work with you to validate it, and coordinate a fix before public disclosure when appropriate.

This policy covers the Quick Access for Pass application, including:

• the main menu-bar app and its handling of secrets, credentials, and biometric authorization
• the Quick Access search panel, detail views, and clipboard flows
• the SSH agent proxy (SSHAgentProxy) and Pass CLI daemon integration
• SSH BatchMode notification handling and remembered decisions
• the Run Proxy (RunProxy) and the bundled qa-run helper
• local socket authentication and peer verification (PeerVerifier)
• database encryption and Keychain usage
• health checks, recovery logic, and local service lifecycle handling

Quick Access for Pass is designed around a few core invariants:

• No secrets in the database — only metadata is persisted locally
• Secrets are never persisted locally; sync may temporarily load full item content from pass-cli to derive metadata, and selected actions fetch current values on demand
• Database encryption is mandatory — the local cache is encrypted using GRDB/SQLCipher with a Keychain-backed passphrase
• Optional Proton Pass CLI personal access tokens stay in Keychain — PATs use kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly and are never written to UserDefaults, SQLite, logs, notifications, or captured CLI output
• Local proxies are permission constrained — sockets are created with strict owner-only permissions
• Run proxy peers are verified — unverified local clients are rejected; trusted helper handling is explicit
• Authorization is contextual — remembered decisions are scoped to app identity and command/profile context rather than globally
• Clipboard exposure is reduced — copied secrets are marked with org.nspasteboard.ConcealedType and auto-cleared on a timer

The most security-sensitive parts of the codebase are:

• PassCLIService and CLIRunner
• DatabaseManager and Keychain integration
• Services/SSHAgent/*
• Services/RunProxy/*
• Services/Security/PeerVerifier.swift
• authorization dialogs and remembered-decision flows

The following are generally out of scope unless they directly enable a meaningful security impact in this project:

• issues in Proton Pass itself or pass-cli
• problems requiring physical access to an already-unlocked machine without a project-specific exploit path
• local-only denial of service with no data exposure or privilege consequence
• missing best-practice hardening that does not currently create an exploitable condition
• social engineering, phishing, or third-party account compromise unrelated to this codebase

Please give us a reasonable opportunity to investigate and fix the issue before public disclosure. Coordinated disclosure is appreciated.

• README.md — user-facing security design summary
• AGENTS.md — repository constraints contributors and coding agents should preserve