Summary

A russh server can be driven to unbounded heap growth (process OOM / kill) by
a peer that speaks only standard SSH messages, in the default configuration.

The peer starts a key re-exchange (sends SSH_MSG_KEXINIT) but never sends the
follow-up SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, leaving the server's kex state machine in
SessionKexState::InProgress indefinitely. While a rekey is in progress the
server's three message-drain paths are all gated off (if !self.kex.active()),
but the network-read path stays active, so every SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN the peer
sends is processed inline and appends one reply to an unbounded internal
queue (priority_receiver, an UnboundedReceiver) that is not dequeued until
the rekey completes. Because the peer decides whether the rekey ever completes,
the queue — and the server's memory — grows without bound.

This is reproducible end-to-end against a real russh server over a real
encrypted transport; see "Proof of concept". A one-line negative control (same
flood, no rekey) keeps memory flat, isolating the rekey window as the sole
trigger.

Impact

• Availability / DoS. Server RSS climbs at roughly 3.3 KB per
  CHANNEL_OPEN, driven entirely by the peer, until the process is OOM-killed.
  In the reproduction one connection pushed the server from ~4 MB to 2.57 GB
  (and past 4.8 GB against the stock echoserver example) and it was still
  climbing when the flood was stopped.
• Reached with standard messages, no special configuration. Any handler is
  affected, including one that rejects every channel (the reply enqueued on
  rejection is exactly what accumulates). There is no per-connection cap on
  in-flight channel opens or on the queue, and the queue's sender has no
  backpressure.
• The peer keeps the connection alive simply by continuing to send, so the
  inactivity timer never fires.

Affected component

• russh/src/server/session.rs — Session::run tokio::select! loop. The
  network-read arm is ungated; the three drain paths are gated on
  !self.kex.active().
• russh/src/server/mod.rs — reply() routes a non-kex message received during
  a rekey straight to server_read_encrypted (inline processing).
• russh/src/lib_inner.rs — ChannelOpenHandleInner's accept/reject/Drop
  all send a reply on an UnboundedSender.

Verified on v0.63.1 (commit d3ae702), which is the latest release. The
gating logic predates it.

Details

Session::run (russh/src/server/session.rs:631) drives a tokio::select!
(:713). Three of its message-drain sites are gated on !self.kex.active():

• the pre-select! batch drain of priority_receiver/receiver
  (session.rs:680),
• the priority_receiver.recv() arm (session.rs:762),
• the receiver.recv() arm (session.rs:770, which also holds the only other
  priority_receiver drain at :777).

The fourth arm, r = &mut reading (session.rs:714), is ungated: it reads
and processes one incoming packet every loop iteration regardless of rekey
state, calling reply() (server/mod.rs:1128).

During a rekey, session.common.encrypted.is_some(), so the strict-kex
message-ordering guard (server/mod.rs:1143, which is additionally gated on
encrypted.is_none()) does not apply. A non-kex message therefore falls
through reply() to session.server_read_encrypted(handler, pkt)
(server/mod.rs:1232) and is handled inline. For SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN this
reaches the channel-open handling, which hands the application a
ChannelOpenHandle.

Whether the handler accepts or (the trait default) rejects, the handle's
accept / reject / Drop all send a Msg::ChannelOpenReply on an
UnboundedSender (russh/src/lib_inner.rs:560-603; Drop sends
AdministrativelyProhibited at :594-603). That sender feeds
priority_receiver, declared UnboundedReceiver<Msg> (session.rs:23) and
created with tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel() (session.rs:1522). Its
only drain sites are the three arms gated off during the rekey. So each
CHANNEL_OPEN processed during the rekey window appends one reply (carrying a
PendingChannelOpen = channel params + mpsc ChannelRef + ids, a few KB
retained in practice) to a queue that is never dequeued.

Two facts make this unbounded and remote:

1. The server enters InProgress the moment it receives the peer's KEXINIT
   (server/mod.rs:1153-1158, begin_rekey) and only leaves it upon receiving
   the peer's KEX_ECDH_INIT. The peer decides whether to ever send that,
   so the window is attacker-held.
2. There is no per-connection cap on channels or on the priority queue, and the
   sender is unbounded (no backpressure).

Root cause

The intended design was to buffer packets received during a rekey and replay
them afterwards: the fields pending_reads: Vec<Vec<u8>> and pending_len: u32
(session.rs:26-27) exist and are drained at kex completion
(server/mod.rs:1194-1198). But nothing ever pushes to pending_reads or
increments pending_len (they are dead — confirmed by grep across
russh/src/). Instead of being buffered, channel messages received during a
rekey are processed inline, and their replies pile up in the unbounded
priority_receiver. The missing piece is a bound on — or bounded deferral of —
channel processing while kex.active().

Proof of concept

Everything runs inside a container; nothing touches the host.

Lab. poc/Dockerfile builds russh-lab:head from Eugeny/russh @ d3ae702
(v0.63.1), default features (rust 1.91). A raw-SSH-client PoC
(poc/poc_rekey_dos.rs) implements curve25519-sha256 / ssh-ed25519 /
aes256-ctr / hmac-sha2-256 by hand, completes the handshake and a publickey
auth, then:

1. sends SSH_MSG_KEXINIT (server enters kex.active()),
2. never sends KEX_ECDH_INIT (rekey stalls, attacker-held),
3. floods SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN.

A minimal server (poc/poc_server.rs) uses the trait-default
channel_open_session (which rejects by dropping the handle), so the measured
growth is purely the undrained priority queue, not accepted-channel state.

poc/run.sh runs the attack leg and an identical negative control with no
rekey. Fresh run inside the lab, N = 800,000 opens
(results/rerun-2026-08-29.log):

=== ATTACK (rekey stall) === (poc_server baseline_RSS=4208KB, N=800000)
  t=2s  server_RSS=667760KB
  t=4s  server_RSS=1599600KB
  t=6s  server_RSS=2556016KB
  t=8s  server_RSS=2566256KB   (flood done; memory retained)
=== CONTROL (no rekey) === (poc_server baseline_RSS=4208KB, N=800000)
  t=2s..t=12s  server_RSS=4208KB   (flat throughout)

• ATTACK: RSS 4,208 KB → 2,566,256 KB (~2.57 GB) and retained after the
  flood ends — ~3.3 KB per CHANNEL_OPEN, attacker-driven. (An earlier canonical
  run reached 2.7 GB at 800k opens, and past 4.8 GB against the stock
  echoserver example at 1.5 M opens — see results/canonical-run.log.)
• CONTROL: RSS flat at 4,208 KB. Without the rekey window the replies are
  drained normally; TCP backpressure (the client never reads the failure
  replies) even throttles the flood.

The control isolates the rekey window as the sole trigger. Both legs exercise
the real server entry point (Session::run → reply → server_read_encrypted)
over a real encrypted transport.

Reproduce: C=russh-lab N=800000 ./poc/run.sh (see poc/POC-README.md).

Remediation

The priority queue carries locally generated channel-open replies, which are
non-kex messages the server must not send during a rekey anyway (RFC 4253
§7.1). So the fix is to bound how much channel work is done during a rekey, not
to drain the queue mid-rekey. Any of:

• (recommended, minimal) cap the number of non-kex messages processed while a
  rekey is in progress and disconnect a peer that exceeds it. A stalled/abusive
  rekey is then torn down after a small constant instead of growing memory
  without bound. See patch/rekey-message-cap.patch (a ~10-line change local to
  Session::run, validated in the lab — the attack leg is disconnected after the
  cap and RSS stays flat; a normal rekey, which completes in one round trip, is
  unaffected).
• bound / deferred-buffer channel messages during a rekey using the existing
  (currently dead) pending_reads/pending_len machinery, with a hard cap.
• bound the number of in-flight channel opens per connection and reject beyond it.

OpenSSH does not service new channels mid-kex; matching that intent closes the
whole family.

References

• CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
• CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
• Fix: patch/rekey-message-cap.patch
• PoC: poc/poc_rekey_dos.rs, poc/poc_server.rs, poc/run.sh; evidence
  results/rerun-2026-08-29.log, results/canonical-run.log
• Not a duplicate of CVE-2024-43410 (single oversized allocation, fixed 0.44.1),
  CVE-2026-48110 / GHSA-4r3c-5hpg-58qr (allocation-first field parsing, fixed
  0.61.0), or the channel-window-overflow advisory (fixed with saturating_add).
  All three are already patched in v0.63.1; this is a distinct root cause.

Attached

russh-001-attachments.zip