Advisory / Disclosure
Network-AI — CVE-2026-46701 fix is incomplete: the "Empty Default Secret" unauth path survives
Target: Jovancoding/Network-AI (npm network-ai), latest v5.7.1
Status: the advisory ("Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty
Default Secret") named three flaws. The fix (5.4.5) closed the CORS flaw
(Access-Control-Allow-Origin is now set only for localhost origins), but left the
empty-default-secret flaw the title is about: the SSE MCP server still defaults to an
empty secret, _isAuthorized() still returns true when the secret is empty, and a
non-loopback bind only warns. So the server still runs fully unauthenticated by
default — any non-browser caller (curl, SSRF, or a 0.0.0.0 bind) can invoke all 22 MCP
tools (config_set, agent_spawn, blackboard_write, token_*) with no credentials.
Class: CWE-306/CWE-862 Missing Authentication — incomplete fix.
Methodology: M1 incomplete-fix audit (anchor = the 5.4.5 fix; sibling-walk on latest v5.7.1, executed).
Severity: High (matches parent; the browser amplifier is removed, so exploitation now
needs non-browser reach — SSRF or a non-loopback bind, which the fix only warns about).
What the fix did and didn't do (verified on latest v5.7.1)
| advisory flaw |
latest v5.7.1 |
wildcard CORS (ACAO: *) |
FIXED — lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts sets ACAO only when origin matches ^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$ |
| empty default secret |
NOT FIXED — bin/mcp-server.ts: secret: process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? '' |
_isAuthorized open on empty secret |
NOT FIXED — if (!this._opts.secret) return true; |
| require secret / refuse unauth bind |
NOT DONE — listen() only process.stderr.write('… WARNING …') on non-loopback bind, then listens anyway |
The advisory's remediation #1 ("Require a non-empty secret at startup … process.exit(1)")
was not implemented.
PoC (executed against the latest source, v5.7.1) — poc/legend-networkai-empty-secret.ts
Instantiates the real McpSseServer from the latest lib/ with a mock bridge and the
default (empty) secret, then issues requests (run-log poc/run-log.txt):
POST /mcp no-auth, no-origin (curl/SSRF) -> HTTP 200, dispatched=true
body: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"executed":true,"tool":"config_set"}}
POST /mcp Origin: evil.example.com -> ACAO=undefined (CORS half fixed)
The no-auth request passes _isAuthorized and reaches handleRPC (tool dispatched) — i.e.
unauthenticated tool invocation persists on the latest release; only the browser-CORS read
amplifier was removed.
Run: from a v5.7.1 checkout, npm i then
npx ts-node --transpile-only poc/legend-networkai-empty-secret.ts.
Recommended fix
Implement the advisory's remediation #1: refuse to start SSE mode with an empty secret
(unless --stdio), and/or change _isAuthorized to fail closed (an empty configured
secret should mean "deny", not "allow"). The CORS allowlist alone does not authenticate
non-browser callers.
Precondition / honesty
With CORS now localhost-only, the drive-by browser attack is mitigated. The residual
requires a non-browser path to the port: an SSRF on the host, or the operator binding to a
non-loopback address (Docker/remote), which the fix only warns about. The empty secret
remains the shipped default and _isAuthorized still authorizes it.
Credits
@kai Aizen / @SnailSploit — https://snailsploit.com
SnailSploit Reporter
Advisory / Disclosure
Network-AI — CVE-2026-46701 fix is incomplete: the "Empty Default Secret" unauth path survives
Target: Jovancoding/Network-AI (npm
network-ai), latest v5.7.1Status: the advisory ("Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty
Default Secret") named three flaws. The fix (5.4.5) closed the CORS flaw
(
Access-Control-Allow-Originis now set only for localhost origins), but left theempty-default-secret flaw the title is about: the SSE MCP server still defaults to an
empty secret,
_isAuthorized()still returnstruewhen the secret is empty, and anon-loopback bind only warns. So the server still runs fully unauthenticated by
default — any non-browser caller (curl, SSRF, or a
0.0.0.0bind) can invoke all 22 MCPtools (
config_set,agent_spawn,blackboard_write,token_*) with no credentials.Class: CWE-306/CWE-862 Missing Authentication — incomplete fix.
Methodology: M1 incomplete-fix audit (anchor = the 5.4.5 fix; sibling-walk on latest v5.7.1, executed).
Severity: High (matches parent; the browser amplifier is removed, so exploitation now
needs non-browser reach — SSRF or a non-loopback bind, which the fix only warns about).
What the fix did and didn't do (verified on latest v5.7.1)
ACAO: *)lib/mcp-transport-sse.tssetsACAOonly whenoriginmatches^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$bin/mcp-server.ts:secret: process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? ''_isAuthorizedopen on empty secretif (!this._opts.secret) return true;listen()onlyprocess.stderr.write('… WARNING …')on non-loopback bind, then listens anywayThe advisory's remediation #1 ("Require a non-empty secret at startup …
process.exit(1)")was not implemented.
PoC (executed against the latest source, v5.7.1) —
poc/legend-networkai-empty-secret.tsInstantiates the real
McpSseServerfrom the latestlib/with a mock bridge and thedefault (empty) secret, then issues requests (run-log
poc/run-log.txt):The no-auth request passes
_isAuthorizedand reacheshandleRPC(tool dispatched) — i.e.unauthenticated tool invocation persists on the latest release; only the browser-CORS read
amplifier was removed.
Run: from a v5.7.1 checkout,
npm ithennpx ts-node --transpile-only poc/legend-networkai-empty-secret.ts.Recommended fix
Implement the advisory's remediation #1: refuse to start SSE mode with an empty secret
(unless
--stdio), and/or change_isAuthorizedto fail closed (an empty configuredsecret should mean "deny", not "allow"). The CORS allowlist alone does not authenticate
non-browser callers.
Precondition / honesty
With CORS now localhost-only, the drive-by browser attack is mitigated. The residual
requires a non-browser path to the port: an SSRF on the host, or the operator binding to a
non-loopback address (Docker/remote), which the fix only warns about. The empty secret
remains the shipped default and
_isAuthorizedstill authorizes it.Credits
@kai Aizen / @SnailSploit — https://snailsploit.com