Add JWT logout with server-side token revocation - #98
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds persistent JWT revocation. Issued tokens receive unique ChangesJWT revocation storage
JWT issuance and API logout
Admin session revocation
Documentation
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to If admin logout cannot store the revocation, the browser session is cleared but a copied token may still be usable until expiry despite documentation promising invalidation. Align the behavior or documentation before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant AuthMiddleware
participant handleLogout
participant Store
Client->>AuthMiddleware: POST /api/v1/auth/logout
AuthMiddleware->>Store: IsTokenRevoked(jti)
AuthMiddleware->>handleLogout: authenticated claims
handleLogout->>Store: RevokeToken(jti, userID, expiresAt)
Store-->>handleLogout: success
handleLogout-->>Client: 204 No Content
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diveshpatil9104
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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In `@migrations/000013_add_revoked_tokens.up.sql`:
- Line 3: The revoked-token schema must retain revocation records when users are
deleted: update the user_id column in
migrations/000013_add_revoked_tokens.up.sql:3 to allow NULL and use ON DELETE
SET NULL, then update the deletion test in store_revocation_test.go:136-140 to
assert the token remains revoked.
In `@README.md`:
- Around line 45-47: Qualify the logout guarantees to exclude legacy JWTs
without a jti, since handleLogout returns 204 without revoking them and
authentication still accepts them. Update README.md lines 45-47 and 243-244,
plus docs/development.md lines 92-95; do not attribute this limitation to
persistence-error handling.
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README.mdadmin_page_handlers.goadmin_page_handlers_test.goadmin_session.goadmin_session_test.goauth.goauth_test.godb/models.godb/query.sqldb/query.sql.godocs/development.mdmain.gomigrations/000013_add_revoked_tokens.down.sqlmigrations/000013_add_revoked_tokens.up.sqlroute_wiring_test.gostore_revocation.gostore_revocation_test.go
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Code reviewFound 1 issue:
vehicle-positions/migrations/000013_add_revoked_tokens.up.sql Lines 2 to 4 in 83abd0b 🤖 Generated with Claude Code - If this code review was useful, please react with 👍. Otherwise, react with 👎. |
revoked_tokens.user_id was NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
copying the shape of user_vehicles. That was the wrong lifetime to copy: an
assignment row is meaningless once its user is gone, but a revocation row is
most needed exactly then.
DELETE /api/v1/admin/users/{id} is a hard delete (DELETE FROM users WHERE
id = $1), so it cascaded away that user's revocation rows. Nothing in the
request path consults the users table -- requireAuth and adminClaimsFromCookie
decide on the blocklist alone -- so once the row went, an explicitly revoked
token was accepted again for the remainder of its 24h life, carrying its
original role claim. A revoked admin token regained every /api/v1/admin/*
route.
user_id is now nullable with ON DELETE SET NULL, so the row outlives the
account with its owner forgotten. The FK still rejects a revocation for a
user that never existed. Only the expiry-based cleanup job should ever remove
a row, which is what expires_at and its index are already there for.
TestStore_RevokeToken_CascadesOnUserDelete asserted the old behavior as
intended, so nothing would have caught this later. Replaced with
TestStore_RevokeToken_SurvivesUserDelete, which asserts the row remains, the
token still reads as revoked, and user_id is NULL rather than dangling.
Reported by @aaronbrethorst in review on OneBusAway#98.
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This is strong work and I want to be clear about that before the one blocker. The jti comes from crypto/rand, both token paths are covered — requireAuth for the header and its cookie fallback, and adminClaimsFromCookie for the admin UI — and the read path fails closed, with tests pinning that specifically. Logout can only revoke the caller's own jti, so no cross-user revocation. And you resisted adding a background cleanup goroutine when I asked for a comment instead, which means there's no ticker lifecycle to get wrong. The divergence-guard tests are the right instinct.
The blocker: ON DELETE CASCADE on revoked_tokens.user_id lets a user deletion resurrect a revoked token.
migrations/000013 declares user_id BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, and DeleteUser is a genuine hard delete. So the sequence "revoke the token, then delete the user" drops the revocation row, and the token works again for the remainder of its 24-hour life carrying its original role claim. That's the natural order an admin would do those two operations in, and the schema quietly undoes the first step.
TestStore_RevokeToken_CascadesOnUserDelete currently asserts this as desired behavior, so it would cement the bug rather than catch it — that test needs to flip along with the schema.
The fix is small: keep the revocation rows when the user goes away. They self-expire via expires_at, so there's no cleanup argument for cascading. Dropping the FK, or making user_id nullable with ON DELETE SET NULL, both work.
I want to be precise about the severity, because it's narrower than it first looks: requireAuth never consults the users table at all, so a deleted user's tokens already stay valid until expiry regardless of this PR. The cascade doesn't create that gap. What it does is specifically undo an explicit revocation, which is worse than never having recorded one — an admin who revokes and then deletes ends up in a worse position than one who only deletes. That's what makes it worth fixing here.
The broader "hard-deleted users keep working tokens" problem is real but predates this PR and shouldn't be loaded onto it. I'll open a separate issue for it.
Non-blocking, for whenever you touch this again:
POST /admin/logoutfails open on the write — a store error is logged, the cookie is cleared, and the user is redirected to the login page believing they logged out while the token stays live. You commented it as best-effort by design and I follow the reasoning, but it's inconsistent with the API path's 500 and it's invisible to the person affected.- The legacy no-
jtipath returns 204 while revoking nothing. It's the compat shim I asked for, so this is just a reminder to delete it after one token lifetime, per your TODO. TestRevokeSessionCookie/"store error still returns"asserts onlyassert.NotPanics, which would pass under nearly any implementation.
On numbering: #93 landed with 000011 and #97 is taking 000012, so 000013 is yours — no renumbering needed. Note that #93 also added a migration uniqueness guard, so CI will catch collisions from here on.
Session JWTs carried no unique identifier, so there was nothing to key a revocation list on: the only way to invalidate a single token was to rotate JWT_SECRET, which logs out every user at once. Add a jti claim to every issued token. generateJWT is the sole issuing path -- both the JSON API login and the admin UI's form login (OneBusAway#92) call it -- so no token can escape without one. The identifier is 128 bits from crypto/rand rather than a counter: a guessable jti would let an attacker pre-emptively revoke other users' tokens. parseSessionToken now also requires an exp claim. generateJWT always sets one, and the revocation list that follows records each token's expiry, so a token without exp is not one this server issued. No behavior change for clients yet -- this is the claim the blocklist needs.
The blocklist the jti claim is keyed on. jti is the primary key, so there is no separate index on it -- the PK already creates one. The user_id foreign key cascades on delete, matching user_vehicles (000008). Inserts are ON CONFLICT (jti) DO NOTHING so a repeat logout cannot error. TokenRevoker and TokenChecker are kept as two minimal interfaces so the logout handler depends only on the write and the auth middleware only on the read. expires_at is recorded for a periodic cleanup job that does not exist yet; the column is inert in this change and the comment on RevokeToken says so. The index on it exists for that job rather than for any query here. Migration number: main is at 000010, PRs OneBusAway#93 and OneBusAway#94 both claim 000011, and -- those versions are spoken for, and golang-migrate tolerates gaps (000007 is already missing).
parseSessionToken stays pure -- it is signature and claims validation with no
I/O, and threading a store through it would force a database into every caller
including tests. Revocation is a separate checkRevoked step that both token
paths invoke: requireAuth (the Authorization header and its vp_session cookie
fallback) and adminClaimsFromCookie (the admin UI's pages).
The comment on parseSessionToken warns that the two paths must not diverge,
but a comment cannot fail CI, so TestAdminCookiePath_RejectsRevokedToken and
TestRequireAuthCookiePath_RejectsRevokedToken pin it instead.
The check fails closed. If the store cannot answer, the request is rejected
rather than allowed through -- the opposite of the rate limiter's
fail-open-at-capacity rule, and deliberately so: a limiter failing open costs
some unthrottled requests, an auth check failing open costs an accepted
logged-out token.
A revoked token returns the existing 401 {"error": "invalid token"}, identical
to a malformed one, so the client learns the token is unusable without
learning it was specifically revoked. Every rejection is logged.
Tokens issued before this change have no jti and cannot be revoked. They are
still accepted, so deploying does not sign everyone out, and each acceptance
logs a warning. Tokens live 24h and every new token carries a jti, so that
warning should stop appearing within a day of deploy; a TODO marks where the
shim gets removed.
Authenticated but not admin-gated: every user logs themselves out, and can only revoke their own token, read from the context claims requireAuth already set. The sub claim is a string rather than a number (JSON number precision), so it is parsed back with strconv rather than asserted as a float. Returns 204 No Content. PR OneBusAway#58 returned 200 with a message body; logout is a void operation with nothing useful to say, per the review suggestion there. POST /admin/logout previously only cleared the cookie, leaving the JWT live for anyone who had copied its value -- the same gap this change exists to close, on the admin surface. It now revokes the token first. That is best-effort by design: the route is deliberately unauthenticated so an expired session can still sign out, and a failed revocation still clears the cookie and redirects rather than stranding the user on an error page. Because both surfaces carry the same JWT, logging out through the API also ends an admin browser session, and vice versa.
Adds POST /api/v1/auth/logout to the endpoint table and the Milestone 2 deliverables, plus a section covering its status codes, the fail-closed behavior, the shared cookie/API session, and the pre-jti compatibility window. Updates the deactivation-window note in both README.md and docs/development.md: a session can now be ended on demand, but deactivating a user still does not auto-revoke their existing tokens. That needs a per-user cutoff rather than the per-token blocklist added here, and is called out as a follow-up so the note does not overstate what landed. Status codes verified against the handlers rather than assumed.
revoked_tokens.user_id was NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
copying the shape of user_vehicles. That was the wrong lifetime to copy: an
assignment row is meaningless once its user is gone, but a revocation row is
most needed exactly then.
DELETE /api/v1/admin/users/{id} is a hard delete (DELETE FROM users WHERE
id = $1), so it cascaded away that user's revocation rows. Nothing in the
request path consults the users table -- requireAuth and adminClaimsFromCookie
decide on the blocklist alone -- so once the row went, an explicitly revoked
token was accepted again for the remainder of its 24h life, carrying its
original role claim. A revoked admin token regained every /api/v1/admin/*
route.
user_id is now nullable with ON DELETE SET NULL, so the row outlives the
account with its owner forgotten. The FK still rejects a revocation for a
user that never existed. Only the expiry-based cleanup job should ever remove
a row, which is what expires_at and its index are already there for.
TestStore_RevokeToken_CascadesOnUserDelete asserted the old behavior as
intended, so nothing would have caught this later. Replaced with
TestStore_RevokeToken_SurvivesUserDelete, which asserts the row remains, the
token still reads as revoked, and user_id is NULL rather than dangling.
Reported by @aaronbrethorst in review on OneBusAway#98.
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Picks up @Gitkbc's work in #58, closed 2026-07-31 with "closing for now. please fix and reopen when you're ready." The
jti+ database blocklist design is theirs; what's new is the rebase, enforcement on the admin UI's cookie path, and the review items from that PR addressed.Why
Nothing can retire a single JWT early. Deactivating a compromised driver blocks new logins but leaves their existing token posting locations and starting trips for up to 24 hours; a leaked token can only be killed by rotating
JWT_SECRET, which signs out every user at once; and "log out" is a client-side gesture the server never learns about.This is the gap #92 documented as deferred work:
What changed
jtion every issued token.generateJWTmints a 128-bitcrypto/randidentifier. It is the only issuing path — the JSON API login and Admin web UI v1: authenticated dashboard, live map, CRUD, trip history #92's admin form login both call it — so no token escapes without one. A counter ormath/randwould be guessable, letting an attacker pre-emptively revoke other users' tokens.revoked_tokenstable + store.jtiprimary key (no separate index — the PK already creates one),user_idFK cascading likeuser_vehicles, plusexpires_atandrevoked_at.TokenRevokerandTokenCheckerare kept separate so logout depends only on the write and the middleware only on the read.ON CONFLICT (jti) DO NOTHINGmakes a repeat logout safe.POST /api/v1/auth/logout. Authenticated but not admin-gated; revokes only the caller's own token, read from the context claimsrequireAuthalready set. Returns 204 No Content rather than feat(auth): implement JWT logout with token revocation #58's200 {"message": ...}, per the review suggestion there.parseSessionTokenstays pure — threading a store through it would force a database into every caller including tests. Revocation is a separatecheckRevokedstep invoked byrequireAuth(theAuthorizationheader and itsvp_sessioncookie fallback) and byadminClaimsFromCookie. Two tests pin that the paths cannot silently diverge.POST /admin/logoutpreviously only cleared the cookie, leaving the JWT live for anyone who had copied its value. Best-effort by design: the route is deliberately unauthenticated so an expired session can still sign out.Behavior changes
401 {"error": "invalid token"}, indistinguishable from a malformed one.parseSessionTokennow requires anexpclaim.generateJWThas always set one andrevoked_tokens.expires_atisNOT NULL, so this makes the invariant real instead of leaving an unreachable case to guess at.jtiand cannot be revoked. They are still accepted so deploying doesn't sign everyone out, and each acceptance logs a warning that should stop appearing within 24 h of deploy. ATODOmarks where the shim gets removed.Migration numbering: 000013
mainis at000010, but #93 and #94 both claim000011and #97 claims000012. Duplicate versions merge cleanly in git and then crash the server at startup, so nothing warns you.000013is the first number free of every open-PR claim; the gap is deliberate and matches the pre-existing one at000007. Verified against a clean database: migrations apply to version 13, the down migration drops the table, and re-applying works. Happy to renumber after whichever of #93/#94/#97 lands first.Out of scope
revoked_tokensrows — per the feat(auth): implement JWT logout with token revocation #58 review, a code comment rather than an implementation; it's onRevokeToken.expires_atand its index exist so that job has something to work with. Location history retention & background pruning #93'sLocationPruneris the obvious template.tokens_invalid_beforecompared againstiat, not a per-token blocklist. This is the foundation it builds on.jtitoo, or rider tokens are unrevokable.Testing
go fmt,go vet,go buildandgo testall clean;go mod tidyreports no dependency changes. The full suite was also run withDATABASE_URLset against a clean database, confirming the DB tests actually executed rather than silentlyt.Skip-ing.Store tests: revoke→check round-trip including the stored
expires_at, unknown jti, idempotent double-revoke leaving exactly one row, FK violation with a rollback assertion that no partial row remains, the empty-jtiCHECKconstraint, and cascade on user delete.Middleware and handler tests:
jtipresent and unique per token; revoked token rejected on the header path, the cookie fallback, and the admin page path; unrevoked token allowed with claims reaching the downstream handler; store error failing closed on both paths; the no-jticompatibility path accepted and logged; logout 204 with an empty body; logout revoking the caller's own jti with the right user ID and expiry; logout store error returning 500; andTestLoginLogoutRevokeFlowwalking login → authenticated call → logout → same token 401. The existing JWT invariant tests (expired token, wrong secret,alg:none) weren't duplicated.Manual check against a live server and database: login issues a token carrying
jti→ authenticated call 200 → same token asvp_sessionopens/admin/dashboard→ logout 204 → same token 401 → the admin cookie now redirects to/admin/login→ one row inrevoked_tokenswith the matching jti and a futureexpires_at.Summary by CodeRabbit
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