fix(auth): remove KDF from pre-auth lookup, offload bcrypt, throttle /auth/* - #345
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Rahul Dass (rahuldass19) wants to merge 14 commits into
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fix(auth): remove KDF from pre-auth lookup, offload bcrypt, throttle /auth/*#345Rahul Dass (rahuldass19) wants to merge 14 commits into
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…/auth/* #333 — hash_api_key was PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 100k iterations (~67ms) used as a deterministic lookup index over 258-bit random keys, on the hottest unauthenticated path (hash-then-lookup for every x-api-key, valid or garbage). The KDF cost buys no brute-force resistance there, so it is replaced with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY (microsecond cost). No PBKDF2 fallback for legacy rows — that would re-introduce the bug; existing keys are re-issued via the rotation path (key_rotation.py uses the same function, so newly issued/rotated keys are HMAC digests). #334 — signup/signin ran bcrypt cost-12 (~269ms) synchronously on the event loop with no rate limiting on any /auth/* route: - both bcrypt calls offloaded via asyncio.to_thread - per-IP rate limiter for anonymous auth routes (QWED_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP, default 10/min, Retry-After on 429, IP table bounded against spoofed-IP floods; X-Forwarded-For honored as mitigation bucket, not identity) - signin burns one bcrypt verify on unknown emails so response timing no longer enumerates registered addresses - signup hashes the password BEFORE any row is written, so a hash failure cannot strand an orphaned Organization row Deferred (product decision, tracked via #226): email verification/approval before row creation. Tests: 10 new in tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py (lookup cost bound, determinism, per-IP limit/expiry/bounding/429, forwarded-for preference, timing equalizer). Full suite: 2062 passed, 102 skipped. Fixes #333 Fixes #334
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAuthentication now uses a required keyed API-key digest, bounded trusted-proxy IP rate limiting, asynchronous bcrypt operations, timing equalization, and transactional signup writes. ChangesAuthentication Security
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to This PR reduces unauthenticated lookup cost, moves bcrypt work off the event loop, and adds anonymous authentication throttling, but merge readiness remains moderate because many-source floods can still consume aggregate authentication capacity and a full limiter table can deny new clients; trusted-proxy configuration, secret separation, deterministic verification tests, and the legacy API-key reissuance rollout need remediation or explicit owner acceptance. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant AuthRoute as signup/signin
participant RateLimiter
participant Database
participant BcryptThread as bcrypt threadpool
Client->>AuthRoute: authentication request
AuthRoute->>RateLimiter: check client IP
RateLimiter-->>AuthRoute: allowance and reset time
AuthRoute->>Database: query authentication records
AuthRoute->>BcryptThread: hash or verify password
BcryptThread-->>AuthRoute: bcrypt result
AuthRoute->>Database: commit signup transaction
AuthRoute-->>Client: authentication response
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Description checkExplanation The description provides a detailed summary, validation results, security impact, deferred scope, and compliance context. It omits the template's explicit enforcement checklist and Notes heading, but the required information is otherwise substantially present. Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The changes address both linked issues. They remove PBKDF2 from API-key lookup without a legacy fallback, require key re-issuance, offload bcrypt, add bounded per-IP throttling with Retry-After, reduce timing enumeration, and make signup persistence transactional. Email verification remains explicitly deferred as allowed by issue Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 51.43% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 70 functions across 7 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 2📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Comment on lines
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| NOTE: not compatible with pre-v7.2 PBKDF2 key_hash rows. Existing keys | ||
| must be re-issued once via the rotation path (key_rotation.py uses this | ||
| same function, so newly issued/rotated keys are HMAC digests). Do NOT |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: The new digest rejects all pre-v7.2 rows, but rotation requires the old key for authentication, so affected users cannot reach rotation and lose access. [api mismatch]
Assessment: 🔴 Critical · 🔁 Occurrence: Sometimes
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** src/qwed_new/auth/security.py
**Line:** 85:87
**Comment:**
*Api Mismatch: The new digest rejects all pre-v7.2 rows, but rotation requires the old key for authentication, so affected users cannot reach rotation and lose access.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix
Comment on lines
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| if len(self.ip_requests) > self.MAX_TRACKED_IPS: | ||
| cutoff = time.time() - self.PER_IP_WINDOW | ||
| self.ip_requests = defaultdict( | ||
| list, | ||
| { | ||
| ip: stamps | ||
| for ip, stamps in self.ip_requests.items() | ||
| if stamps and stamps[-1] > cutoff | ||
| }, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: Pruning runs only above the cap and removes only expired entries, so continuously fresh spoofed IPs make ip_requests grow indefinitely. [memory leak]
Assessment: 🔴 Critical · 🔁 Occurrence: Sometimes
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py
**Line:** 117:125
**Comment:**
*Memory Leak: Pruning runs only above the cap and removes only expired entries, so continuously fresh spoofed IPs make `ip_requests` grow indefinitely.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix| if not requests: | ||
| return 0 | ||
| oldest = min(requests) | ||
| return max(0, int(oldest + self.PER_IP_WINDOW - time.time())) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: Truncating the remaining window can produce Retry-After: 0 while the IP is still blocked, causing immediate repeated 429 responses. [logic error]
Assessment: 🟠 Major · 🔁 Occurrence: Sometimes
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py
**Line:** 146:146
**Comment:**
*Logic Error: Truncating the remaining window can produce `Retry-After: 0` while the IP is still blocked, causing immediate repeated 429 responses.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix
Comment on lines
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| forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "") | ||
| first_hop = forwarded.split(",")[0].strip() if forwarded else "" | ||
| if first_hop: | ||
| return first_hop |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: Clients can choose a different first X-Forwarded-For value on every request when the proxy does not strip it, bypassing the per-IP bcrypt throttle. [security]
Assessment: 🔴 Critical · 🔁 Occurrence: Sometimes
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py
**Line:** 218:221
**Comment:**
*Security: Clients can choose a different first `X-Forwarded-For` value on every request when the proxy does not strip it, bypassing the per-IP bcrypt throttle.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
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CodeAnt Nitpicks1 code suggestion1. Concurrent first unknown-email sign-ins can all observe
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Inline comments:
In `@src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py`:
- Around line 119-126: Update the IP-bucket creation path around
self.ip_requests and MAX_TRACKED_IPS so cleanup does not allow fresh buckets to
grow the table beyond the configured cap. Before inserting a previously unseen
client IP, evict an existing bucket or reject the new bucket when the table is
full, while preserving tracking for existing IPs.
- Around line 218-222: Update the client-IP resolution logic around the
forwarded-header handling to use request.client.host by default, and only honor
X-Forwarded-For when the direct peer is a configured trusted proxy that
validates and rewrites the header. Preserve the "unknown" fallback when no
direct client is available, and avoid allowing arbitrary callers to choose the
rate-limit key.
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src/qwed_new/auth/routes.pysrc/qwed_new/auth/security.pysrc/qwed_new/core/key_rotation.pysrc/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.pytests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py
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…ignup transaction Adjudication of the review bots on PR #345: - CodeAnt CRITICAL (lockout): REFUTED as stated — rotate_key works by key ID and portal key minting is JWT-only, so no old raw key is needed and pre-v7.2 users can self-re-issue. Docstring now states both re-issue paths precisely. - CodeAnt/CodeRabbit (IP table growth): VALID — a full cap of fresh buckets now evicts the least-recently-active bucket before adding a new IP, so ip_requests is hard-bounded at MAX_TRACKED_IPS. - CodeAnt (Retry-After: 0 while blocked): VALID — get_ip_reset_time now rounds up (math.ceil), so a blocked IP always gets >= 1s. - CodeAnt CRITICAL + CodeRabbit MAJOR (X-Forwarded-For spoofing): VALID — the header is now honored only when the direct peer is in QWED_AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES (CIDR list, default empty = direct peer only), and the RIGHTMOST hop is used since the trusted proxy appends the real client after client-supplied entries. A client can no longer choose its bucket key. - Sentry MEDIUM (orphaned Organization): VALID — org+user now commit in one transaction (flush assigns the org PK pre-commit); user-creation failure rolls back both, and the 500 no longer echoes the raw exception string. - CodeAnt nitpick (dummy-hash memo race): WONTFIX with rationale in comment — one-time, throttle-bounded CPU, cheaper than serializing every unknown-email signin. Tests: +4 (hard-cap eviction, Retry-After ceil, trusted/untrusted XFF, signup rollback); limiter tests updated to hard-cap semantics. Full suite: 2077 passed, 102 skipped. QWED pattern detector: 0 findings on all changed files.
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Review-bot adjudication — round 2 (all addressed in 2c2e1f3)
Note on the previous round's CodeQL high alert (HMAC-SHA256 on "sensitive data"): intentionally suppressed inline with justification — a keyed MAC for equality lookup of 258-bit random tokens is not password hashing, and the audit explicitly forbids a KDF on this path. Verification: full suite 2077 passed, 102 skipped; QWED pattern detector re-run on all changed files → 0 findings. |
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| fake_hash.return_value = "$2b$12$fakehash" | ||
| response = client.post("/auth/signup", json={ | ||
| "email": "owner@example.com", | ||
| "password": "correct horse battery staple", |
| _with_session(FakeSession([SimpleNamespace(email="x"), None])) | ||
| response = client.post("/auth/signup", json={ | ||
| "email": "owner@example.com", | ||
| "password": "correct horse battery staple", |
| _with_session(FakeSession([None, SimpleNamespace(name="Acme")])) | ||
| response = client.post("/auth/signup", json={ | ||
| "email": "owner@example.com", | ||
| "password": "correct horse battery staple", |
| fake_hash.return_value = "$2b$12$fakehash" | ||
| response = client.post("/auth/signup", json={ | ||
| "email": "owner@example.com", | ||
| "password": "correct horse battery staple", |
| _with_session(session) | ||
| return client.post("/auth/signin", json={ | ||
| "email": "owner@example.com", | ||
| "password": "whatever", |
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Inline comments:
In `@src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py`:
- Line 165: Inject an integer-tick or Decimal clock into RateLimiter and use it
consistently when storing, expiring, and reporting timestamps in
check_ip_limit() and get_ip_reset_time(), avoiding direct time.time() calls.
Update src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py:165-165 and adjust the affected tests
in tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py:37-39 and 105-109, plus
tests/security/test_auth_routes.py:137-137 and 210-210, so the two route tests
and test_retry_after_never_zero_while_blocked() use the injected clock.
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src/qwed_new/auth/routes.pysrc/qwed_new/auth/security.pysrc/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.pytests/security/test_auth_hot_path.pytests/security/test_auth_routes.py
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…iene Round-3 review adjudication on PR #345: - CodeRabbit MAJOR (clock injection): RateLimiter now takes an optional clock (default time.time) used consistently by _clean_old_requests, the per-IP buckets, and the pre-existing per-key/global buckets — rate-limit tests are deterministic instead of wall-clock-dependent. test_retry_after_never_zero_while_blocked drives fractional-window resets through the injected clock; the two route tests freeze the global limiter's clock. - Sentry MEDIUM (port in X-Forwarded-For): VALID — with trusted proxies configured, a port-suffixed hop (1.2.3.4:8080) became the bucket key, so port rotation minted fresh quotas. Hops now normalize through ipaddress (host:port and [v6]:port forms); unparseable hops share one bucket rather than escaping throttling. Covered for v4, v4:port, and bracketed v6. - Sonar S3415: unified assertion argument order (expected first) in tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py. Full suite: 2077 passed, 102 skipped.
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Review-bot adjudication — round 3 (all in the latest commit)
Also note from the previous round: the CodeQL high alert's inline suppression previously targeted the wrong query id; it now uses the exact id ( |
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Inline comments:
In `@src/qwed_new/auth/security.py`:
- Around line 85-96: Update the API-key lookup secret initialization around
QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET and SECRET_KEY so the dedicated secret is required at
startup and absence fails closed; remove the warning and JWT-secret fallback
entirely, while preserving encoding of the configured dedicated secret.
In `@src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py`:
- Line 161: Validate QWED_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP during rate limiter initialization,
requiring a value of at least 1 and raising a clear configuration error before
request processing begins. Keep the existing per-IP request logic, including
min(self.ip_requests[client_ip]), unchanged for valid configurations.
In `@tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py`:
- Around line 195-200: Make the lookup-secret tests deterministic by clearing
QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET before computing baseline at
tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py lines 195-200, and before computing both
baseline and fallback at lines 208-213. Keep the existing hash_api_key
assertions and dedicated-secret checks unchanged.
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PR #345 review round 2 (Sentry, Greptile, CodeRabbit) plus CodeQL/Sonar gate fixes: - security.py: replace the per-call JWT-secret fallback with a REQUIRED QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET validated at import (fail closed). Removes the warn-on-every-call log spam (Sentry) and the JWT-rotation digest-invalidation hazard (CodeRabbit). Bare CodeQL suppression directive kept directly above the HMAC line. - rate_limiter.py: at the IP-table cap, evict the first-inserted bucket only when its window has fully expired; otherwise reject the new address with a bounded Retry-After — live buckets no longer lose their budget (Greptile P1). Validate QWED_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP >= 1 at construction instead of min()-of-empty-bucket HTTP 500s (CodeRabbit). - tests: deterministic lookup-secret tests with no ambient-env dependence; new fail-closed, eviction and construction-validation coverage; unified assertEqual argument order (SonarQube S5977). - conftest/CI: wire the required lookup secret for pytest and the uvicorn smoke step.
QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY and QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET are both required at startup (fail closed) but were missing from the template; also drop the stale PBKDF2 wording on API_KEY_SECRET.
| @@ -81,6 +84,7 @@ jobs: | |||
| QWED_CORS_ORIGINS: "http://localhost:3000" | |||
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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
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Inline comments:
In @.env.example:
- Around line 52-54: Update the startup validation in the security configuration
around QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET to reject it when its value equals
QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY, while preserving the existing presence check and raising
the established configuration error.
In `@src/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.py`:
- Line 176: Update the rate-limit capacity rejection logic to capture a single
timestamp before the live-bucket condition and reuse it for both the
bucket-deadline check and reset_after calculation, preventing a rejected request
from producing Retry-After: 0. Add a regression test using an injected clock
that crosses the deadline between calls, covering the relevant rate-limiter
method and check_auth_rate_limit() behavior.
In `@tests/conftest.py`:
- Line 13: Update TEST_LOOKUP_MATERIAL to use a fixed test-only value or an
explicitly injected deterministic input instead of _test_secret_material(),
which derives material from uuid4().hex; keep the change limited to
verification-test setup and preserve the existing lookup-material interface.
In `@tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py`:
- Line 80: Update the test helper _limiter and its callers to inject a
controllable integer-tick or Decimal clock into RateLimiter instead of using
ambient time.time; replace the expiry-boundary floating-point increments in the
affected tests with exact clock advancement, preserving the existing rate-limit
assertions.
🪄 Autofix
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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.env.example.github/workflows/ci.ymlsrc/qwed_new/auth/security.pysrc/qwed_new/core/rate_limiter.pytests/conftest.pytests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py
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- rate_limiter: expiry-deadline min-heap for capacity eviction — a live front bucket no longer blocks reclaiming expired later buckets (Greptile P1 round 3); one clock reading backs the live check and Retry-After (never 0); empty buckets reclaimed (CodeRabbit) - security: refuse to boot when QWED_API_KEY_LOOKUP_SECRET == QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY (CodeRabbit round 3) - tests: deterministic _TickClock injection, Decimal exact boundary arithmetic, subprocess test for equal-secret startup failure, fixed lookup material in conftest (no uuid nondeterminism) - ci: CodeQL query-filter for py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing (deliberate fast keyed MAC, not password storage; KDF = issue #333 DoS); restructure new CI env lines to satisfy QWED Security CI_CONFIG gate - docs: .env.example notes the enforced secret-difference rule
- rate_limiter: single pinned clock read across clean/limit/reset paths (Sentry: Retry-After could never be 0 on the over-limit path) - rate_limiter: bounded under-lock work at capacity — per-call repair budget (_MAX_HEAP_REPAIRS) + hard heap-record cap (_MAX_HEAP_RECORDS) + O(1) front-bucket fallback; stale-record repair can no longer grow unboundedly while holding the lock (Greptile P1 round 4) - rate_limiter: check_ip_limit_with_reset decomposed into _trim_stale_heap_heads/_reclaim_expired_slot/_fallback_admit_or_reject (Sonar cognitive complexity 26 -> within limit) - security: startup secret validation wrapped in _validate_secret_config() (in-process testable) - tests: subprocess removed from secret-equality test (QWED Security TEST_CODE advisory); +5 regression tests (single-clock-read, repair budget, heap cap, validator) - tests: verified Sonar S5977 assertion-order already clean in this file
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| # Per-client-IP request timestamps for anonymous auth routes: | ||
| # {ip: [timestamp1, timestamp2, ...]} | ||
| self.ip_requests: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
ip_requests exists only in the process-local RateLimiter instance, so each application worker grants an independent budget to the same source IP. With a two-request limit, one worker admitted two attempts and rejected the third, while two isolated workers admitted four attempts for the same IP. In a multi-worker deployment this multiplies anonymous signup and signin bcrypt work and password-guessing attempts by the worker count. Use a shared atomic rate-limit store for these routes, or explicitly constrain the deployment to one worker until shared coordination is available.
Artifacts
Deterministic isolated-worker reproduction source
- The executable spawns one or two independent Python processes, gives each the same client IP and fixed per-IP budget, and records the admission decisions; it directly exercises the process-local limiter state.
Single-worker anonymous auth budget execution
- A one-worker execution with a two-request per-IP budget allowed two requests and rejected the third for the fixed client IP; it establishes the intended single-worker budget.
Two-worker anonymous auth budget execution
- A two-worker execution with the same IP and two-request budget allowed two requests in each separate process, for four aggregate admissions; it proves the budget is multiplied by workers.
Existing auth limiter test collection blocker
- The existing auth hot-path test command was attempted but stopped during collection because `sqlmodel` is not installed in this environment; the direct limiter reproduction still executed successfully.
- The captured command output contains the complete generated deterministic reproduction source; it provides the executable validation method used for the observed runs.
- rate_limiter: count empty head pops against the repair budget; bounded insertion-order fallback scan (64) reclaims unindexed expired buckets when the capped heap is lossy — available capacity is never withheld behind a live front bucket (Greptile P1 round 5 x2) - rate_limiter: document process-local state / multi-worker budget multiplication in the class docstring (deployment note) - tests: drop unused os import (CodeQL/python-code-quality), swap the one remaining expected-first assertion (Sonar S5977), add 2 round-5 regression tests (31 tests total, all passing)
Greptile P1 round 7: the round-6 full-scan fallback traversed the whole IP table under the shared limiter lock when every sampled bucket was live - an attacker-controlled stall at the 50k cap. Replaced with an authoritative verdict: each IP's indexed deadline is a lower bound on its bucket's true deadline (buckets only grow), so a live heap head proves the whole table is live with zero reconciliation. Budget exhaustion rejects conservatively (bounded Retry-After) instead of scanning. Removed the now-dead _MAX_HEAP_RECORDS cap and _FALLBACK_SCAN_LIMIT. Also fixes the dangling _MAX_HEAP_RECORDS reference that would have AttributeError'd on first admission. Sonar S3776: _reclaim_expired_slot split into _head_record_state/_purge_head/_reindex_head helpers. Tests: deduped one-record-per-IP invariant, refresh-reindex visibility, budget-exhaustion conservative reject.
…ptile P1 round 8)
| return | ||
| heapq.heappop(self._expiry_heap) | ||
| if self._indexed_deadline.get(head_ip) == head_deadline: | ||
| self._indexed_deadline.pop(head_ip, None) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Every admitted request appends an expiry record, while routine cleanup removes only four stale heap heads. After a bucket expires and is refreshed, a new address arriving at capacity can make this loop repair every remaining stale record while holding the shared limiter lock. Sustained authentication traffic can therefore create an arbitrarily long critical section that delays other rate-limit checks and grows memory use. Keep one authoritative expiry record per IP, or bound and defer stale-record repair during capacity admission.
| allowed, _ = self.check_ip_limit_with_reset(client_ip) | ||
| return allowed | ||
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| def _trim_stale_heap_heads(self, rounds: int = 4) -> None: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
- Bug
- A deterministic current-code harness filled the limiter table, emptied five indexed buckets, set MAXHEAPREPAIRS to zero, and performed one new-IP admission attempt. The admission returned False, 60 but performed four heap pops before capacity reclamation. This confirms that trimstaleheapheads performs stale-head work before reclaimexpiredslot applies the configured repair budget.
- Cause
- T-Rex reproduced this while running the changed behavior, but it did not return a separate root-cause sentence.
- Fix
- Update the changed code so this failing path is handled, then rerun the same T-Rex check to confirm it passes.
Artifacts
Current rate-limiter source showing separate stale-head trimming and repair budgeting
- Captured source excerpt from the executed repository command shows that stale-head trimming performs pops before capacity reclamation applies `_MAX_HEAP_REPAIRS`; the budget can be bypassed.
Current-code heap-head capacity-admission harness output with zero repair budget
- Executed Python harness filled the table, emptied each indexed bucket, set `_MAX_HEAP_REPAIRS` to zero, and recorded four heap pops during one denied admission; empty heads bypass the repair budget.
| self.api_key_requests: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list) | ||
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| # Per-client-IP request timestamps for anonymous auth routes: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
- Bug
- A focused runtime harness instantiated two independent current RateLimiter workers with QWEDRATELIMITPERIP=2 and sent requests from the same IP to both. Each worker admitted two requests and rejected its third, resulting in four aggregate admissions. The captured deployment configuration sets replicas: 2, confirming that the same source IP receives an independent authentication budget in each replica.
- Cause
- T-Rex reproduced this while running the changed behavior, but it did not return a separate root-cause sentence.
- Fix
- Update the changed code so this failing path is handled, then rerun the same T-Rex check to confirm it passes.
Artifacts
RateLimiter source and two-replica deployment configuration
- Captured the relevant source and Kubernetes configuration showing process-local rate-limit state and two replicas, establishing the condition for multiplied budgets.
Two independent RateLimiter workers admitting four same-IP requests at a limit of two
- Executed the focused same-IP harness with two current limiter instances and a per-IP limit of two; it shows four aggregate admissions, proving the budget is multiplied.
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| # NOTE (Greptile on PR #345 round 9): the in-memory rate limiter's state | ||
| # is PROCESS-LOCAL, so with replicas > 1 the per-IP / per-key budgets are | ||
| # effectively multiplied by the replica count (each pod admits its own | ||
| # budget to the same client). Keep this at 1 for exact limits, or move | ||
| # the limiter to a shared store (Redis) before scaling out. | ||
| replicas: 2 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Bug: The Kubernetes deployment is set to replicas: 2, which doubles the effective rate limit because the new rate limiter is process-local, weakening the intended brute-force protection.
Severity: HIGH
Suggested Fix
To ensure the rate limit is enforced as intended, either set replicas: 1 in deploy/kubernetes/deployment.yaml or implement a shared store (like Redis) for the rate limiter's state so that all replicas share a single, global limit count.
Prompt for AI Agent
Review the code at the location below. A potential bug has been identified by an AI
agent. Verify if this is a real issue. If it is, propose a fix; if not, explain why it's
not valid.
Location: deploy/kubernetes/deployment.yaml#L9-L14
Potential issue: The Kubernetes deployment configuration in
`deploy/kubernetes/deployment.yaml` is set to `replicas: 2`. However, the new per-IP
rate limiter is process-local and does not share state across replicas. This means each
pod enforces the limit independently. As a result, the effective rate limit for a given
IP is multiplied by the number of replicas (e.g., 20 requests/minute instead of the
intended 10). This undermines the effectiveness of the security fix for brute-force
attacks (CWE-307), as explicitly warned against in a comment added in the same file.
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| if self._expiry_heap: | ||
| state, _deadline, evict_ip = self._head_record_state(now) | ||
| if state == "expired": | ||
| heapq.heappop(self._expiry_heap) | ||
| self._indexed_deadline.pop(evict_ip, None) | ||
| del self.ip_requests[evict_ip] | ||
| return True |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
After 64 early heap entries have been refreshed, _reclaim_expired_slot() only peeks at the next live-but-drifted entry and returns a conservative rejection without reaching a later expired bucket. A full table can therefore return HTTP 429 to a new anonymous authentication client even though an expired slot remains available.
Artifacts
Deterministic rate limiter capacity-reclaim harness source
- Authored harness creates 65 refreshed early buckets and one later expired bucket, then makes the capacity admission call; it is the executable reproduction.
Rate limiter full-capacity state before admission
- Executed before-phase harness output shows a 66/66 table with 65 refreshed buckets and the later expired bucket present; the failure precondition exists.
Rate limiter rejected admission while expired slot remained
- Executed after-phase harness output shows 65 live reclaim checks followed by `(False, 1)`, with the new IP absent and expired bucket still present; the finding is reproduced.
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User description
Fixes #333, fixes #334 (both CVSS 7.5, CWE-400 pre-auth DoS family from the OpenVuln audit; #334 also CWE-307/CWE-770).
#333 — the KDF was on the wrong path
hash_api_keywas PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 100k iterations (~67 ms) used purely as a deterministic lookup index over 258-bit random keys — on the hottest unauthenticated path: hash-then-lookup for everyx-api-key(valid or garbage) before the 401. ~15 req/s of garbage keys saturated the single-process service,/healthincluded. The KDF cost buys no brute-force resistance for equality lookup of 258-bit tokens.Fix: HMAC-SHA256 keyed by
QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEYwith a dedicated namespace (:qwed_api_key_lookup) — microsecond cost, deterministic across restarts like the old digest.Per the issue's explicit instruction, there is no PBKDF2 fallback for legacy rows — a fallback would keep 67 ms of work on the garbage-key path and re-introduce the bug. Existing API keys are re-issued once via the rotation path;
key_rotation.pyuses the samehash_api_key, so every newly issued or rotated key is an HMAC digest. This is a breaking change for pre-v7.2 API keys and should be called out in release notes.#334 — bcrypt off the loop + anonymous throttling
signup/signinoffload bcrypt (cost 12 kept — it protects stored hashes) viaasyncio.to_thread./auth/*routes:QWED_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP(default 10/min),Retry-Afteron 429, and a bounded IP table so spoofed-IP floods cannot grow memory.X-Forwarded-Forfirst hop is honored as a mitigation bucket, not an identity boundary.signinburns one bcrypt verify when the email is unknown, so response timing no longer enumerates registered addresses (the 269 ms vs ~0 ms oracle).signuphashes the password before any row is written, so a hash failure can no longer strand an orphaned Organization row (partial CWE-770).Deferred, flagged honestly: email verification/approval before row creation (item 3 of #334's suggested fix) is a product decision, not a DoS fix — tracked under the #226 auth-hardening umbrella.
Verification
tests/security/test_auth_hot_path.py(10 tests): lookup cost bound (1000 digests < 0.5 s — a PBKDF2 regression trips it immediately), determinism, per-IP limit/window-expiry/table-bounding/429 +Retry-After, forwarded-for preference, timing-equalizer burns real bcrypt on unknown email.run_in_threadpoolwrapper aroundhash_api_key— moving a KDF to the threadpool converts the event-loop surface into a thread-pool-exhaustion surface; the KDF is simply gone from the path.Summary by CodeRabbit
Security Improvements
Bug Fixes
Tests
CodeAnt-AI Description
Protect authentication from hot-path denial of service and timing attacks
What Changed
429with a usableRetry-After, and keep the tracking table bounded without evicting active clients.Impact
✅ Fewer unauthenticated denial-of-service requests✅ Fewer password-guessing and email-enumeration signals✅ No orphaned organizations after signup failures💡 Usage Guide
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