Summary
The ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools restrict their server_url argument to dati.gov.it via a regular expression. The regex is anchored only at the start and places no boundary after the host, so any URL whose host merely begins with dati.gov.it — or that uses dati.gov.it as URL userinfo before an @ — passes validation while actually targeting an attacker-controlled host.
Affected code
// src/tools/quality.ts
const ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS = [
/^https?:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it/i // <-- no end anchor / host boundary
];
export function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl: string): boolean {
return ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS.some(pattern => pattern.test(serverUrl));
}All of the following return true:
| URL |
Real host |
https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x |
dati.gov.it.attacker.com (attacker) |
http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api |
dati.gov.it.evil.example (attacker) |
https://dati.gov.it@attacker.com/x |
attacker.com (userinfo trick) |
After passing this check, server_url flows into getMqaQuality/getMqaQualityDetails, which call makeCkanRequest(serverUrl, "package_show", { id }). The server therefore issues a request to the attacker-controlled host and returns its (parsed) response to the caller.
Impact
- The intended "dati.gov.it only" trust boundary for the MQA tools is defeated; they can be driven against arbitrary external hosts.
- The attacker host receives the request (including the
dataset_id) and controls the response body that is surfaced back to the model/user — enabling response spoofing and, in an agentic setting, indirect prompt-injection content delivered under the guise of a trusted-portal tool.
- Contributes to SSRF surface: while
makeCkanRequest blocks private/internal IPs, this bypass removes the domain restriction that the code intends to enforce for these tools.
The @-userinfo variant is the most severe form because validation passes on a string whose actual host is fully attacker-chosen.
Proof of concept
poc/mqa-allowlist-poc.mjs runs the verbatim regex over benign and malicious URLs:
accepted expected_legit url
true true https://dati.gov.it/opendata <- legit
true false https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x <- BYPASS
true false http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api <- BYPASS
true false https://dati.gov.it@attacker.com/x <- BYPASS
Remediation
Validate the parsed host, not the raw string. For example:
function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl) {
let u; try { u = new URL(serverUrl); } catch { return false; }
if (u.protocol !== "https:") return false;
const h = u.hostname.toLowerCase();
return h === "dati.gov.it" || h === "www.dati.gov.it";
// or: h === "dati.gov.it" || h.endsWith(".dati.gov.it")
}Anchoring the regex end-to-end (/^https:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it(\/|$)/i) also closes the suffix trick, but URL-parsing + exact host comparison is the robust fix and also neutralizes the @-userinfo variant.
References
Gal3m Reporter
mrostamipoor Reporter
Summary
The
ckan_get_mqa_qualityandckan_get_mqa_quality_detailstools restrict theirserver_urlargument todati.gov.itvia a regular expression. The regex is anchored only at the start and places no boundary after the host, so any URL whose host merely begins withdati.gov.it— or that usesdati.gov.itas URL userinfo before an@— passes validation while actually targeting an attacker-controlled host.Affected code
All of the following return
true:https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/xdati.gov.it.attacker.com(attacker)http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/apidati.gov.it.evil.example(attacker)https://dati.gov.it@attacker.com/xattacker.com(userinfo trick)After passing this check,
server_urlflows intogetMqaQuality/getMqaQualityDetails, which callmakeCkanRequest(serverUrl, "package_show", { id }). The server therefore issues a request to the attacker-controlled host and returns its (parsed) response to the caller.Impact
dataset_id) and controls the response body that is surfaced back to the model/user — enabling response spoofing and, in an agentic setting, indirect prompt-injection content delivered under the guise of a trusted-portal tool.makeCkanRequestblocks private/internal IPs, this bypass removes the domain restriction that the code intends to enforce for these tools.The
@-userinfo variant is the most severe form because validation passes on a string whose actual host is fully attacker-chosen.Proof of concept
poc/mqa-allowlist-poc.mjsruns the verbatim regex over benign and malicious URLs:Remediation
Validate the parsed host, not the raw string. For example:
Anchoring the regex end-to-end (
/^https:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it(\/|$)/i) also closes the suffix trick, but URL-parsing + exact host comparison is the robust fix and also neutralizes the@-userinfo variant.References