Summary
Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the email_verified claim was only enforced when present as a boolean false so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified.
Impact
An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject.
Patches
The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults email_verified to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type.
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
Workarounds
Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens.
Resources
Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!
References
Summary
Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the
email_verifiedclaim was only enforced when present as a booleanfalseso an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified.Impact
An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject.
Patches
The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults
email_verifiedto false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type.The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
Workarounds
Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens.
Resources
Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!
References