Summary
@dicebear/core builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric rotate option is interpolated into an SVG transform attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup.
This is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options backgroundColor, fontFamily, and textColor but did not cover rotate. @dicebear/initials has the same gap in its numeric fontSize and fontWeight options.
Impact
Cross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via innerHTML) or served as image/svg+xml and opened directly, injected markup such as an <image onerror> handler runs script in the page's origin.
Exploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options:
rotate (@dicebear/core)fontSize, fontWeight (@dicebear/initials)
In most integrations these options are set by the developer and only seed is user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applications that use trusted, hardcoded values for these options are not at risk.
Patches
Fixed in @dicebear/core 9.4.3 and @dicebear/initials 9.4.3: the values are now XML-escaped before being written into the SVG, matching the CVE-2026-33311 fix. Upgrade to 9.4.3 or later.
The 5.x through 8.x lines share the same flaw but are end-of-life and will not receive a backport; upgrade to 9.4.3. The 10.x line is not affected.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, coerce the affected options to a number before passing them to createAvatar:
rotate: Number(userInput) || 0,
Credits
Reported by @rz1027.
References
rz1027 Reporter
Summary
@dicebear/corebuilds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numericrotateoption is interpolated into an SVGtransformattribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup.This is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options
backgroundColor,fontFamily, andtextColorbut did not coverrotate.@dicebear/initialshas the same gap in its numericfontSizeandfontWeightoptions.Impact
Cross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via
innerHTML) or served asimage/svg+xmland opened directly, injected markup such as an<image onerror>handler runs script in the page's origin.Exploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options:
rotate(@dicebear/core)fontSize,fontWeight(@dicebear/initials)In most integrations these options are set by the developer and only
seedis user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applications that use trusted, hardcoded values for these options are not at risk.Patches
Fixed in
@dicebear/core9.4.3 and@dicebear/initials9.4.3: the values are now XML-escaped before being written into the SVG, matching the CVE-2026-33311 fix. Upgrade to 9.4.3 or later.The 5.x through 8.x lines share the same flaw but are end-of-life and will not receive a backport; upgrade to 9.4.3. The 10.x line is not affected.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, coerce the affected options to a number before passing them to
createAvatar:Credits
Reported by @rz1027.
References