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Decidim: JWT-backed authentication can be replayed across organizations

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 13, 2026 in decidim/decidim • Updated Jul 13, 2026

Package

bundler decidim (RubyGems)

Affected versions

< 0.31.5
>= 0.32.0.rc1, < 0.32.0

Patched versions

0.31.5
0.32.0

Description

Description

A JWT issued to an Org 1 account is accepted on the Org 2 API and can read the admin-only GraphQL participantDetails field for an Org 2 participant. The same trust-boundary problem also affects API-user authentication: an Org 1 API user can use a JWT on the Org 1 host and replay that JWT to the Org 2 API to read Org 2 participant personal data and reach Org 2's proposal.answer mutation path.

Technical description

The current host selects the Decidim organization context, but JWT-backed API authentication is not sufficiently bound to
that host organization. As a result, the API can process a request in Org 2's context while still trusting an authenticated
principal from Org 1.

Reproduction steps:

  1. Use an API key provided by the system administrator that is assigned to organization 1 to create the JWT token or
    get the JWT token shown in the response when logged in as the organization admin.

decidim-jwt-01

  1. When using this JWT token it is possible to retrieve details from other organisations. Notice the change of the host header in the request below to that of another tenant org2.localhost:3001

decidim-jwt-02

Note that using a participant-generated JWT did not allow showing these results.

Impact

A JWT issued for one organization can be replayed successfully against another organization's API and used to retrieve sensitive details from that organization.

Patches

See decidim/decidim#16673 and decidim/decidim#16756

Workarounds

Disable JWT credentials on system panel (/system)

References

OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control

Credits

This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.

References

@andreslucena andreslucena published to decidim/decidim Jul 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 13, 2026
Reviewed Jul 13, 2026
Last updated Jul 13, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(25th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Authentication

When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-45414

GHSA ID

GHSA-r3v7-5x4c-c69q

Source code

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