Summary
Manually modifying chat history allows setting the embeds property on a response message, the content of which is loaded into an iFrame with a sandbox that has allow-scripts and allow-same-origin set, ignoring the "iframe Sandbox Allow Same Origin" configuration. This enables stored XSS on the affected chat. This also triggers when the chat is in the shared format. The result is a shareable link containing the payload that can be distributed to any other users on the instance.
Details
The flaw stems from how iFrames are constructed here:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/6f1486ffd0cb288d0e21f41845361924e0d742b3/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/ResponseMessage.svelte#L689-L703
messages.embeds is a user controlled property and so can be arbitrarily set by the user to a payload of their choosing. Since allowScripts and allowSameOrigin are harcoded as true here the sandboxing offers essentially no protection.
PoC
Create an arbitrary chat:
Edit the model response:
Before saving, configure the browser to use an HTTP proxy tool (Burp/Caido/ZAP) and intercept the save request. Find the object within the history and then messages objects (not the messages array) that corresponds to the edited text.
On this object, add an embeds key and list value as shown below, forward the request and refresh the page.
This results in XSS via the controlled content getting rendered in the iFrame. Note the bold text is just to aid demonstration. console.log is used to prove JS execution because the lack of allow-modals on the iFrame sandbox prevents alerts.
The same payload triggers when the chat is shared.
Impact
Any user can create a weaponised chat that can be shared and subsequently used to target other users.
Low privilege users are at risk of having their session taken over by a payload that reads their token from local storage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server.
Admins are at risk of exposing the server to RCE via same chain described in GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch.
References
gg0h Reporter
Summary
Manually modifying chat history allows setting the
embedsproperty on a response message, the content of which is loaded into an iFrame with a sandbox that hasallow-scriptsandallow-same-originset, ignoring the "iframe Sandbox Allow Same Origin" configuration. This enables stored XSS on the affected chat. This also triggers when the chat is in the shared format. The result is a shareable link containing the payload that can be distributed to any other users on the instance.Details
The flaw stems from how iFrames are constructed here:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/6f1486ffd0cb288d0e21f41845361924e0d742b3/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/ResponseMessage.svelte#L689-L703
messages.embedsis a user controlled property and so can be arbitrarily set by the user to a payload of their choosing. SinceallowScriptsandallowSameOriginare harcoded as true here the sandboxing offers essentially no protection.PoC
Create an arbitrary chat:
Edit the model response:
Before saving, configure the browser to use an HTTP proxy tool (Burp/Caido/ZAP) and intercept the save request. Find the object within the
historyand thenmessagesobjects (not themessagesarray) that corresponds to the edited text.On this object, add an
embedskey and list value as shown below, forward the request and refresh the page.This results in XSS via the controlled content getting rendered in the iFrame. Note the bold text is just to aid demonstration.
console.logis used to prove JS execution because the lack ofallow-modalson the iFrame sandbox prevents alerts.The same payload triggers when the chat is shared.
Impact
Any user can create a weaponised chat that can be shared and subsequently used to target other users.
Low privilege users are at risk of having their session taken over by a payload that reads their token from local storage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server.
Admins are at risk of exposing the server to RCE via same chain described in GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch.
References