This project talks to a real bank and handles real authentication material. Please treat it accordingly.

Do not open a public issue for security problems. Report privately:

• GitHub → Security → Report a vulnerability (private advisory) on this repo, or
• open a minimal issue asking a maintainer to contact you, without any details.

Include what you can reproduce and the impact. We aim to respond within a few days.

The following are secrets — never paste them into an issue, PR, log, or screenshot:

• login, password, PIN, SMS/OTP codes, captcha answers;
• deviceprint / antifraud_deviceprint;
• cookies (UFS-SESSION, UFS-TOKEN, SWJSESSIONID, …);
• the contents of ~/.config/sber-mcp/ (credentials.json, profiles/*.json, inbox/);
• HAR captures of an authenticated session.

If you accidentally leak one: rotate it (log in again in the browser, change your password/PIN as appropriate) and tell a maintainer so the artifact can be purged.

• Secrets are never tool arguments or tool results in the MCP server; long-lived secrets are read from a 0600 config, transient ones via a single-use file inbox.
• ~/.config/sber-mcp/ files are written 0600; the directory is expected 0700.
• Nothing under it is inside the repository, and .gitignore blocks *.har, *.session.json, cookies*, *deviceprint*.txt, .env.
• See docs/mcp/README.en.md §8 for the full leak-prevention model.

This is an unofficial, reverse-engineered client. Using it may violate the target service's terms and can lead to account restrictions. See DISCLAIMER.md. Security reports about the SDK/server code are welcome; requests to add abusive capabilities (mass targeting, evasion, credential harvesting) are out of scope.