Pebble is a single-user local tool with no server, no auth, and no remote attack surface. The only "supported" version is the latest commit on main. Older releases are not patched.

If you find a security issue (e.g. a way for a malicious clipboard payload to escape the renderer sandbox, an Ollama-host SSRF, a privilege escalation through the global shortcut, etc.), please do not open a public GitHub issue. Email me directly:

artimgashi.dev@gmail.com

Include:

1. A clear description of the issue.
2. Steps to reproduce, ideally with a minimal proof of concept.
3. Your assessment of impact (what an attacker could actually do).
4. Whether you'd like to be credited in the fix commit / changelog.

I'll acknowledge within a few days and aim to ship a fix or a documented workaround within two weeks for confirmed issues. For coordinated disclosure, please give me at least 30 days before going public.

Pebble runs entirely on the user's machine and talks only to:

• A local Ollama HTTP endpoint (default 127.0.0.1:11434).
• The system clipboard (read + write).
• The macOS / Windows / Linux notification system.

It does not make outbound network requests, sync state, or call cloud APIs. If you find code in main that contradicts this, treat it as a security issue and report it.

The most realistic attack surface is the Ollama endpoint itself: if OLLAMA_HOST is set to a remote address, clipboard contents will be sent there in plaintext. Don't do that unless you control the remote host. The default of 127.0.0.1 is safe.