fix(docker): patch OS packages in digest-pinned images - #1709
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Digest-pinned base images cannot receive operating-system security updates by any path this repository has: Renovate bumps a digest only when upstream publishes a new one, and `nginx:stable-alpine` keeps resolving to the same digest even after Alpine ships fixed packages. So the packages inside every pinned image were frozen at whatever the base image was built with. Upgrade OS packages in the same layer that already installs them, in the webapp image (apk), the Pi agent image and the Postgres image (apt). `apk add` / `apt-get install` are already unversioned against the live index, so no build reproducibility is lost. Closes #1702 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughContainer builds now upgrade operating-system packages from current package indexes before installing image-specific packages. The changeset records a patch release for these image updates. ChangesContainer OS security updates
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The agent and PostgreSQL image upgrade steps can reuse stale build-cache layers without a changing input, leaving released images with outdated OS packages and defeating the intended security-update behavior. This should be addressed or explicitly accepted before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The PR satisfies the linked issue objectives [ Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (4 skipped: 4 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In `@docker/agents/pi/Dockerfile`:
- Line 8: Cache-bust the OS package upgrade layers by adding a changing build
argument before the upgrade command or otherwise disabling cache for release
builds. Apply the change to docker/agents/pi/Dockerfile lines 8-8 and
docker/postgres/Dockerfile lines 14-14; webapp/Dockerfile lines 33-33 already
receives SOURCE_COMMIT and requires no direct change.
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The reusable Docker builder imports the `cache-main` registry cache and never sets --no-cache or --pull. The upgrade layers added for the Pi agent and Postgres images had no per-build input, so BuildKit could replay a stale package layer and the upgrade would silently stop happening — defeating the fix. Pass the SOURCE_COMMIT build argument the webapp build already receives to both builds, and consume it in the upgrade layer, so all three images cache-bust through one mechanism. webapp already had this via the ENV instruction that lands ahead of its upgrade. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Approved automatically: @FelixTJDietrich is listed in the REVIEW_POLICY_MAINTAINERS repository variable, which the repository treats as satisfying the review requirement. See the review policy in docs/contributor/ci-cd.mdx.
Closes #1713
What
gosuis a static Go binary the official postgres image bakes in for exactly one purpose: both upstream entrypoints (docker-entrypoint.sh,docker-ensure-initdb.sh) callgosu postgres "$BASH_SOURCE" "$@"once, as root, to step down to the postgres user. apt cannot reach it, so its Go stdlib CVEs cannot leave the image while the binary is in it.The image now deletes the binary and puts a
setpriv(util-linux) stand-in at the same path.setpriv --reuid postgres --regid <gid> --init-groupsmakes the identical switch and then execs, and it is an ordinary Debian package the OS updates keep patched — so these findings do not come back on the next rebuild the way a freshly rebuiltgosuwould.Two details worth reviewing:
gosuleft all 22 findings reported (Number of language-specific files num=1). Deleting first writes a whiteout, and the scan then reportsnum=0. This is the whole difference between 22 rejected and 0.gosu <user> <command> [args...]. Auser:groupspec or an option exits 1 rather than guessing at gosu's semantics and running a command with privileges nobody asked for. The build asserts the resulting identity — uid, primary gid and supplementary groups, since postgres is also inssl-cert— instead of trusting the script.Options considered
docker/postgres/Dockerfilealready floats onpostgres:${PG_MAJOR}-bookworm; a fresh pull today (sha256:1c59e2c3…) still shipsgosu 1.19 (go1.24.6 on linux/amd64; gc). There is no rebuild to wait for.gosuserver/compose.yamlbind-mounts./postgres-data, which Docker creates root-owned on the host; a non-root container cannot createPGDATAinside it, so every contributor'spnpm run devwould break.docker/preview/compose.app.yamllikewise documents the root step-down in itscap_addlist. The root path has to keep working.gosuagainst a current Go would clear today's 22 and start accruing tomorrow's;setprivmoves the privilege drop onto the OS package set thataptalready maintains.security/vulnerability-policy.jsonis untouched, and no entry expires into a re-cut.Vulnerability scans
Trivy
--severity HIGH,CRITICAL --scanners vulnon locally built images, evaluated throughevaluate()fromscripts/check-release-vulnerabilities.tsonci/scan-images-at-build-time(#1710) against this branch'ssecurity/vulnerability-policy.json, so the numbers are what the gate will say and not a raw count:All 22 rejected findings were
stdlib v1.24.6inusr/local/bin/gosu(CVE-2025-68121 CRITICAL, 21 HIGH). The remaining 76 are unfixed in Debian 12 (affected/will_not_fix), which the gate does not reject.libexpat1Already resolved, and not by this PR. #1710 measured
libexpat1 2.5.0-1+deb12u2/ CVE-2026-56408 as rejected; a build against today's index installs2.5.0-1+deb12u3, which fixes it. The fourlibexpat1findings that remain (CVE-2025-59375, CVE-2026-25210, CVE-2026-45186, CVE-2026-66046) all carry no fix in Debian 12, so none is rejected. Nothing to do here — the Dockerfile'sapt-get updatealready picks it up, and #1709'sapt-get upgradekeeps it that way.Verification
Built and smoke-tested the real image. The fresh-init run used the preview stack's confinement (
--security-opt no-new-privileges:true,--cap-drop ALL,--cap-add CHOWN,DAC_OVERRIDE,FOWNER,SETGID,SETUID) to provesetprivdrops privileges under exactly the capability set the deployed stack grants:Fresh
initdbon an empty volumePID 1 is the server running as uid 999 — the step-down happened and
setprivexec'd rather than forked, so PostgreSQL keeps PID 1 and its signal handling.Restart on an existing data directory
docker stop→LOG: database system is shut downafter a complete checkpoint, so SIGTERM still reaches PID 1.Root-owned bind mount (the
server/compose.yamlshape, and the case that rules out option 2): container starts, chowns the directory, steps down,PGDATAinitialises at18/dockerowned by uid 999.Stand-in refuses what it does not implement
Overlap with #1709
#1709 adds
apt-get upgrade -yinside the existingRUNindocker/postgres/Dockerfile. This PR appends a newRUN+COPYbelow that block and does not touch it, so the two should merge without a conflict; whichever lands second needs no rework. They are complementary: #1709 keeps the OS packages patched, which is now the mechanism that keeps the privilege drop patched too.libexpat1is covered under either.Quality gates
pnpm run formatthenpnpm run check— both pass.Cache-busting the upgrade layer (review follow-up)
An upgrade layer with no changing build input is cache-stable forever, and the reusable builder imports
cache-mainunconditionally (cache-from: type=registry,...:cache-main-<platform>, with neitherno-cachenorpullset). BuildKit would therefore replay a stale package layer and the upgrade would silently stop happening — the exact failure this PR exists to prevent.webappwas already covered:ENV BUILD_GIT_COMMIT=$SOURCE_COMMITlands one instruction ahead of itsapk upgrade. The other two jobs received nobuild-argsat all, soSOURCE_COMMIT=${{ github.sha }}is now passed toagent-pi-buildandpostgres-buildtoo and consumed in the upgrade layer. One mechanism for all three; no--no-cache, so dependency layers stay cached when the commit is unchanged.Verified by three consecutive
postgresbuilds —aaaa1111executes the upgrade,aaaa1111again reports#5 CACHED,bbbb2222re-executesapt-get update/apt-get upgrade -y. Same result foragent-pi, andwebappre-confirmed (Upgrading libapk (3.0.6-r0 -> 3.0.8-r0)on a changed commit).In
agent-pithe upgrade sits second, so busting it also rebuilds the Pi SDKnpm installbelow it. Accepted: that job only runs whenagent_images_changed == 'true', and a correct agent image beats a fast one that ships stale packages.