fix(ci): scan the pinned upstream images before the release, not at it - #1743
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds shared container-image scanning logic and a scanner for pinned upstream digests. CI runs the scanner for release-image changes and during weekly rescans. Contract tests verify subject coverage, and documentation describes the updated remediation process. ChangesUpstream Image Vulnerability Scanning
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The new upstream-image scanning can report the wrong architecture when a pinned multi-platform image lacks the requested platform, potentially missing vulnerabilities in release evidence. The PR needs this bounded correctness issue fixed before it is merge-ready. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant PullRequest
participant CICD
participant SecurityScan
participant UpstreamScanner
participant Trivy
participant PolicyEvaluator
PullRequest->>CICD: Change release-image paths
CICD->>SecurityScan: Pass release_images_changed
SecurityScan->>UpstreamScanner: Run pinned-digest scan
UpstreamScanner->>Trivy: Scan linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
Trivy-->>UpstreamScanner: Return JSON reports
UpstreamScanner->>PolicyEvaluator: Check vulnerability policy
PolicyEvaluator-->>SecurityScan: Return pass or fail
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Linked Issues checkExplanation The pull request satisfies issue Full details: Out of Scope Changes checkExplanation The changes remain within scope. The workflow updates, shared scan logic, tests, vulnerability policy entries, reporting changes, and documentation directly support upstream image scanning and release-gate parity. Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 46.15% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 13 functions across 7 files. (4 skipped: 4 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/cicd.yml:
- Around line 200-208: Add scripts/lib/json.ts to the release-images path filter
in the release-images configuration so changes to the parser trigger the
upstream security scan alongside scan-upstream-images.ts and its existing
dependencies.
In `@scripts/scan-upstream-images.ts`:
- Line 56: Update the scanAll invocation in scan-upstream-images.ts to scan both
linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 platforms in the single script execution, while
preserving the existing subjects, directory, and annotate behavior.
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.github/workflows/ci-security-scan.yml.github/workflows/cicd.yml.github/workflows/rescan-main-images.ymldocs/contributor/vulnerability-remediation.mdxscripts/ci-contract.test.tsscripts/lib/image-scan.tsscripts/report-vulnerability-drift.tsscripts/scan-main-images.test.tsscripts/scan-main-images.tsscripts/scan-upstream-images.test.tsscripts/scan-upstream-images.tssecurity/vulnerability-policy.json
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The v0.75.0 evidence gate failed on `alpine does not satisfy vulnerability policy` for a finding that had been in the pinned digest for days. The pre-release scans covered only half the release's subject set: the build gate and the weekly rescan take `inventory.images`, while `verify-release-evidence.ts` takes `inventory.images` *and* `inventory.upstream`. The four upstream images are shipped by digest and never built here, so nothing scanned them until the release did. `scan-upstream-images.ts` scans them from the committed digests — no build, so it runs on the pull request that edits `security/release-images.json`, which is the pull request a Renovate digest bump opens, and again report-only in the weekly rescan. It shares `lib/image-scan.ts` and therefore the one evaluator and the one policy file with every other scan. `ci-contract.test.ts` pins the parity durably: it derives the pre-release subject set from the inventory's two halves and hands the manifest that would evidence it to `validateManifest`, the release gate's own validator, which rejects a manifest whose subjects are not exactly the inventory. Dropping either half fails the test. CVE-2026-14456 in the pinned alpine digest is dispositioned `not_affected` (`vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path`) for both packages on both platforms: alpine is the `volume-init` container, which chowns a volume and exits with `network_mode: none`, and the CVE is unbounded memory growth in an OpenSSL QUIC *server* listener an application has to open explicitly. Verified: `pnpm run format`, `pnpm run check`, actionlint and zizmor clean; the new script run end to end against real Trivy reports of all four pinned digests, and the evaluator run against real reports of the alpine amd64 and arm64 manifests, which now pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gate added in the previous commit rejected nats, nginx and traefik. Each finding is analysed on its own merits and dispositioned per package per platform. CVE-2026-14456 (OpenSSL QUIC server listener) is `not_affected` / `vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path` for all four images, on evidence gathered per image: alpine's volume-init container has `network_mode: none` and exits; nats-server and traefik are Go binaries that link no libssl or libcrypto at all (`ldd` reports none, traefik is statically linked); the nginx maintenance container compiles HTTP/3 in but is configured `listen 80;` with no `ssl` and no `listen ... quic`. No QUIC listener exists anywhere in the stack — Traefik declares only the TCP entrypoints :80 and :443 with no `http3` flag, and `grep -rniE 'http3|quic' docker/` is empty. nginx's libexpat findings are separate: the nginx binary does not link libexpat, which arrives only through the dynamic ngx_http_image_filter_module, and no `load_module` directive exists in the image or in our config. The container serves one static page and parses no XML. traefik's CVE-2026-84304 in google.golang.org/grpc is written `affected`, not `not_affected`. Upstream says both the server and the client transport are affected, and proving Traefik constructs no grpc-go transport would need an audit of Traefik we did not do. What is verified — no tracing or OTLP exporter, no gRPC route, availability-only impact — bounds the exposure but does not refute it, so it is an accepted risk with a 30-day expiry rather than a claim. Verified: the evaluator run against real Trivy reports of all eight subjects (four images, both platforms) reports `"status": "pass"` with `rejected: []`, and `scan-upstream-images.ts` exits 0 end to end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two review findings on the upstream scan, both real. The `release-images` path filter listed the gate's entry point but not the modules it loads, so a pull request touching `scripts/lib/json.ts` or `scripts/lib/process.ts` passed `release_images_changed: false` and skipped the scan. The closure is five files. Rather than trust a hand-maintained list — the same drift this PR exists to prevent — `ci-contract.test.ts` now re-walks the imports from the entry point and asserts every file it reaches appears in the filter, so the enumeration cannot fall behind the code. `scanAll` resolved only `linux/amd64`, while an exception matches on `image | platform | vulnerability | package | installedVersion`. A single-platform pre-release scan half-checks each subject, leaving an arm64-only finding — or an arm64 exception nobody wrote — to the release gate by construction. The upstream scan now covers both platforms, and `ScanOutcome` carries the platform so a result can name which half it is. `scan-main-images.ts` stays `linux/amd64`: a finding on either architecture of an image we build is fixed by the same rebuild, and the Version PR preflight scans both before a release is cut. A pinned upstream digest has no rebuild and its fix arrives as a digest bump in a pull request, so that scan cannot defer half a subject. Both the script and the remediation guide now say so. Verified: arm64 evidence re-gathered rather than assumed — qemu is unavailable, so the arm64 binaries were extracted and read with `readelf`. nats-server and traefik are static AArch64 executables with no dynamic section at all, nginx links libssl/libcrypto and not libexpat, and its embedded configure line carries the same --with-http_v3_module. Every justification holds unchanged, the arm64 finding sets are identical to amd64, and the gate reports all eight subjects pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/lib/image-scan.ts`:
- Line 74: Update resolveDigest so an array of raw.manifests throws when
selectPlatformDigest finds no entry for the requested platform, preventing
fallback to the index digest; retain the index-digest fallback only when there
is a single manifest.
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…tform `resolveDigest` fell back to the index digest whenever `selectPlatformDigest` returned undefined, but that happens for two opposite reasons: a single manifest, where asking for its own digest is right, and an index with no manifest for the requested platform, where it is not. Trivy resolves a multi-platform reference against the host it runs on, so the second case scanned `linux/amd64` and filed the result as the requested platform's evidence. Confirmed against the real alpine index: handed the index digest, Trivy reported `architecture: amd64` and echoed the index digest back as `ArtifactName` — so the evaluator's ArtifactName guard passes, because the reference Trivy scanned is the one it was handed. Silent, and it produces false confidence rather than a failure. Harmless while every subject was scanned on the host architecture; a live trap now that the upstream scan covers arm64, and one a Renovate bump to an image without an arm64 variant would spring. `isImageIndex` separates the two cases and the index-without-the-platform branch throws. Verified: the guard fires against a real index asked for a platform it does not publish, and all eight upstream subjects still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The changesets action pushes the Version PR with GITHUB_TOKEN, and a push made with that token starts no workflow run. The conclusion drawn from that was that the Version PR cannot be checked at all, so it merged through a standing ruleset bypass. workflow_dispatch is one of the two documented exceptions to the no-new-run rule, so the same token starts the same CI/CD workflow on the Version PR's own branch — no app, no personal access token, no long-lived credential. Every Version PR head commit gets one run, decided by asking whether the head already has one, so a missed dispatch heals on the next push to main. That run also carries a release evidence preflight. #1743 pinned subject parity — the pre-release scans cover the images the release covers — but the vulnerability policy is only one of the things the release gate evaluates, and a release was still the only thing that ever produced an evidence bundle. SBOM triple validation, the licence report binding, index membership, and the linux/arm64 vulnerability policy for the images we build could each fail for the first time at a release; the pinned upstream digests need no build, so #1743 already covers both of their platforms on the pull request that changes them. The preflight generates and verifies a real bundle over the images its own run built, through the one generator and the one verifier the release uses, so the only checks a release can be the first to perform are the signature checks that need signing material a release creates. Evidence generation and image-digest resolution move out of release.yml into scripts/generate-release-evidence.ts and scripts/resolve-release-images.ts so there is one of each rather than a second copy the preflight could drift from. Platform resolution reuses isImageIndex, so a release subject that is a single manifest fails rather than falling back to the index digest. ci-contract.test.ts asserts both callers run both scripts and that the verifier's only mode-conditional behaviour is signature verification, so a check gated on anything else fails the contract test rather than a release; release-management.mdx carries the check-by-check table and why the upstream images are deliberately judged twice on the Version PR. Verified with pnpm run format and pnpm run check, and with the new node:test coverage for the resolver's retry and hand-off, the generator's manifest against the real verifier, and the dispatcher's branch and run decisions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What changed and why
The v0.75.0 re-cut failed at the release evidence gate with
alpine does not satisfy vulnerability policy, on a finding that had been sitting in the pinned digest for days. The pre-release scanscovered only half the subject set the release gate covers:
reusable-docker-build.yml(blocking)scan-main-images.ts(weekly)inventory.imagesverify-release-evidence.ts(release)inventory.imagesandinventory.upstreamThe four upstream images — alpine, nats, nginx, traefik — are shipped by digest (alpine is the
volume-initcontainer indocker/compose.app.yaml) and never built here, so nothing had a subjectfor them until the release gate did.
scripts/scan-upstream-images.tsscans them straight from the committed digests. They need no build,so it runs on the pull request that edits
security/release-images.json— which is the pull requesta Renovate digest bump opens, since Renovate's
Track release image tags and digestscustom managermatches exactly that file — and again, report-only, in the weekly rescan. It shares
scripts/lib/image-scan.tswithscan-main-images.ts, so it reaches the one evaluator and the onesecurity/vulnerability-policy.jsonthat every other scan does.The durable fix is the parity assertion in
scripts/ci-contract.test.ts. It derives the pre-releasesubject set from the inventory's two halves, builds the release manifest that would evidence exactly
that set, and hands it to
validateManifest— the release gate's own validator, which rejects amanifest whose subjects are not exactly the inventory. Adding an image to the inventory can no longer
escape pre-release scanning, and dropping either half fails the test (verified by mutation:
release manifest does not match the image inventory).Fixes #1741.
How to test
node --test scripts/ci-contract.test.ts scripts/scan-upstream-images.test.ts scripts/scan-main-images.test.tspnpm run formatthenpnpm run check— both green.SHELLCHECK_OPTS=--severity=warning) and zizmor 1.29.0 at--min-confidence medium: no findings on the three changed workflows.dispositions the gate exited 1 naming exactly what it rejected.
--report-onlyexits 0 and stillwrites the
.policy.jsonfilesreport-vulnerability-drift.tsreads.inspection:
check-release-vulnerabilities.tsover all four images on both platforms reports"status": "pass"withrejected: [], and the gate script itself exits 0. Output in the notes below.Release impact
No changeset.
verify-changesets.ymlscopesSHIPPED_PATHStoserver,webappanddocker;this PR touches only
.github/,scripts/,security/anddocs/, none of which are shipped code.Notes for reviewers
The gate is green (CI/CD
completed/success; theSecurity / Pinned upstream imagesjob logsalpine: pass nats: pass nginx: pass traefik: pass). Scanning the pinned digests turned up blocking findings in all four images, notjust alpine; each is analysed on its own merits below, one entry per package per platform (22
entries), every one with
owner: FelixTJDietrich, an HTTPS upstream advisory, and an expiry insidethe cap.
CVE-2026-14456— OpenSSL QUIC server listener (all four images)not_affected/vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path. The stack-wide fact first: QUIC is enablednowhere.
docker/compose.proxy.yaml:19-20anddocker/self-host/compose.single-host.yaml:40-41each declare exactly two entrypoints,
--entrypoints.http.address=:80and--entrypoints.https.address=:443, both TCP; Traefik serves HTTP/3 only for an explicit--entrypoints.<name>.http3, which appears in neither, andgrep -rniE 'http3|quic' docker/returnsnothing. Per image, verified against the pinned digests:
volume-initrestart: "no",network_mode: noneldd /usr/local/bin/nats-servershows no libssl/libcrypto linkage — Go binary, TLS iscrypto/tls. Config islisten: "0.0.0.0:4222"+http_port: 8222, both TCP, notlsblock at all, published on127.0.0.1by defaultmaintenancepagelisten 80;only — nossl, nolisten ... quic; the stock/etc/nginx/nginx.confadds no listener eitherldd /usr/local/bin/traefik→ "Not a valid dynamic program" (statically linked), zerolibssl/OPENSSL_strings in the binary. Never loads OpenSSL under any configurationTwo nuances I am disclosing rather than hiding, because they weaken the naive version of the claim:
nginx -Von this digest reports--with-http_v3_module, andthe binary does link
libssl/libcrypto. So for nginx this is a reachability claim, not acomponent claim: the QUIC listener exists in the binary and is never opened, because no
listen ... quicdirective exists in the mounted config or the stock one.loads OpenSSL at all.
CVE-2026-66046/CVE-2026-76641— libexpat quadratic-runtime XML DoS (nginx)not_affected/vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path, argued separately from the OpenSSL finding.Both are DoS through parsing crafted XML. Verified against the pinned digest:
ldd /usr/sbin/nginxshows no expat.ngx_http_image_filter_module.so, vialibgd→libfontconfig.load_module, and there is none —grep -rn load_module /etc/nginx/in the image is empty, and ournginx-default-configfragment adds none.location / { rewrite ^ /index.html break; }).No XML, no upload path.
CVE-2026-84304— gRPC-Go heap exhaustion (traefik) — writtenaffected, notnot_affectedThis is the claim I declined to stretch. Upstream (GHSA-vp52-pcj8-j9qc)
says both the server and the client transport are affected. A
not_affectedclaim would have toestablish that Traefik constructs no grpc-go transport at all — that requires auditing Traefik's
initialisation, which I did not do, so I will not assert it.
stringsconfirmsgoogle.golang.org/grpc@v1.82.1is compiled into the binary.What is verified bounds the exposure without refuting it: Traefik's full flag set here is the
docker and file providers,
--metrics.prometheus=true(HTTP pull),--ping, and ACME — no--tracing.*and no--metrics.otlp.*, so the OTLP gRPC exporters that would open a grpc-goclient transport are off; no service in the Hephaestus stack speaks gRPC, so no router proxies it;
impact is availability-only (CVSS 3.1
A:H). So: an accepted risk with a 30-day expiry(2026-10-02) rather than a 90-day non-applicability claim, retired by a traefik digest bump once
upstream rebuilds on grpc 1.83.1. The other 20 entries expire 2026-11-21.
Proof, not inspection
The evaluator run against real Trivy reports of each pinned digest, both platforms:
Every finding stays counted in
highCriticaland visible in the signed evidence bundle, as thepolicy intends — nothing is hidden, only dispositioned. And the gate itself, end to end:
Overlap: rebased onto
mainafter #1744 landed. The only conflict was the import block ofscripts/ci-contract.test.ts, resolved by keeping both sides; #1744’splan-release.tsimports andtests are untouched and all 24 CI-contract tests pass together. #1742’s PR touches
.github/workflows/release.yml, which this PR does not.Model and harness: Claude Fable 5 via Claude Code.
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