fix(component): make loopback and multi-origin DCR clients refreshable in ha_auth mode - #2249
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…e in ha_auth mode Core binds a refresh token to the client_id the code leg presented; for translated DCR/CIMD identities a redirect_uri-less refresh grant carried nothing to re-derive it (ephemeral loopback ports, multi-origin registrations), so the token view answered a local invalid_grant while the code leg still handed out core's refresh token. Every loopback-callback client re-authorized on each 30-minute access-token expiry (homeassistant-ai#2248). Record the identity at mint time instead: wrap the refresh_token of every server-side-forwarded 200 in an HMAC-signed envelope carrying core's token, the bound client_id, and a digest of the presenter; the refresh leg unwraps it and proxies the exact pair to core. DCR in ha_auth mode now advertises refresh_token for every registration. Pre-envelope tokens keep the previous derivation path and migrate on a single re-authorize. Mirrored into the dev webhook proxy with the required dev version bump. Fixes homeassistant-ai#2248 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BCYnuBnew5cdVoDs4Roc
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 8 included reviews per hour; 7 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe OAuth flow now uses signed refresh-token envelopes and a scoped RFC 7009 revocation endpoint. ChangesOAuth refresh and revocation flow
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change makes loopback and multi-origin clients refreshable by issuing signed refresh-token envelopes and routing revocation through the updated OAuth handlers. A rollback after these tokens are issued could disrupt refresh or leave grants active until the envelope-aware behavior is restored, so release owners should define rollback handling before deployment. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant OAuthClient
participant AutoApproveViews
participant oauth_ha_auth
participant HomeAssistantCore
OAuthClient->>AutoApproveViews: Submit refresh or revoke request
AutoApproveViews->>oauth_ha_auth: Validate or recover signed envelope
oauth_ha_auth-->>AutoApproveViews: Core token and forwarding identity
AutoApproveViews->>HomeAssistantCore: Forward rewritten request
HomeAssistantCore-->>AutoApproveViews: Return core response
AutoApproveViews-->>OAuthClient: Return response
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…rap hybrid CIMD code exchanges Review round on homeassistant-ai#2249: - Split unwrap_refresh_token's failure into ABSENT (no prefix: a pre-envelope token, falls through to the legacy derivation) and INVALID (our prefix, bad MAC / presenter / shape / version): INVALID is logged and answered with a local invalid_grant instead of 307'd into core's failed-login accounting, and the pre-envelope message no longer claims a cause it cannot know. - Core's action=revoke on /auth/token answers 200 for unknown tokens, so a client revoking the envelope would silently no-op; unwrap it there (no presenter binding, RFC 7009 authorizes the bearer) and proxy. - A hybrid CIMD identity presenting its same-origin redirect took the code-leg fast path untranslated, got core's raw token, and stayed in the re-auth loop; the code leg now pays the one CIMD fetch and proxies an unreproducible identity so its token is wrapped. - Log transport failures and half-initialised config on the core token forward (with a 503 description), log non-JSON 200s, and replace the bare assert on the anonymous refresh path with a guarded fallback. - Mirror the component's str()-coerced MultiDict form into the proxy's ha_auth token view (homeassistant-ai#2219 hardening had drifted). - Tests: mirror-side MAC tamper/wrong-key/non-200/byte-identity cases, disjointness tests that exercise the MAC via prefix relabelling, refresh-leg re-wrap, payload-shape and keyless-ha_auth cases, revoke cases, looser error_description assertions, one duplicate removed. - Docs/comments: stale MIRROR header, DOCS.md migration clause, trimmed repeated pre-envelope prose. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BCYnuBnew5cdVoDs4Roc
… tokens can be revoked Core's /auth/revoke answers 200 for a token it does not recognise, so a client revoking the signed envelope directly at core would get a silent no-op and keep a live session. Add a scoped /revoke view in both trees: an envelope is unwrapped (bearer-authorized, no presenter binding) and forwarded server-side to core's /auth/revoke; a plain token 307s into core so core observes the client's address; 503 carries Retry-After per RFC 7009 section 2.2.1. Served and advertised (revocation_endpoint, revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["none"]) in ha_auth mode only; none and legacy documents and behaviour are unchanged. The token and revoke legs share one core-forward helper. SECURITY.md and the dev proxy DOCS.md describe the fronted endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BCYnuBnew5cdVoDs4Roc
The embedded-entry prebind counts and the add-on proxy view-set tests pin the number and URLs of the bound OAuth views; the scoped revocation dispatcher (homeassistant-ai#2248) is one more. The add-on tests feature-detect it like the other routes so the stable flavor keeps its expectation until promotion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BCYnuBnew5cdVoDs4Roc
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…pins The component webhook registration tests and the add-on proxy's none / ha_auth / reload / unload view-set tests pin the bound OAuth view count and URLs; the scoped revocation dispatcher (homeassistant-ai#2248) binds with the authorize/token pair in every mode. The add-on tests feature-detect it so the stable flavor keeps its expectation until promotion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BCYnuBnew5cdVoDs4Roc
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In `@tests/addon/test_webhook_proxy.py`:
- Around line 395-400: Update the route-count expectations in the affected
dev-flavor tests to include one additional route when _scoped_revoke_supported()
returns true. Add the conditional increment to each of the four assertions
covering the bind_autoapprove_views() route counts, preserving existing
expectations when scoped revocation is unsupported.
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The envelope answers #2248 at the layer that can actually carry the identity: recording what core bound the grant to at mint time, instead of trying to re-derive an ephemeral loopback port or pick one of several registered origins later. Signing the prefix into the MAC so the two blob families cannot cross-verify is the part I would have gotten wrong, and test_refresh_envelope_and_dcr_blob_are_disjoint drives it in both directions, relabelled bodies included.
I verified the mode gating (cfg is rebuilt per setup and only _bind_ha_auth_surface sets resource_server, so the scoped /revoke really is ha_auth-only and a legacy cfg can never reach it, and only the ha_auth AS document advertises it), the ordering inside unwrap_refresh_token (MAC verified before json.loads, so no attacker-chosen nesting reaches the parser), and the mirror: the ten new envelope and revoke helpers are behaviourally identical modulo local names, import paths and docstrings. The two revoke views differ in their mode gate, the dev one additionally fronting _addon_alive — which reads deliberate to me, but say so if it is not.
One substantive question, plus a test gap and a nit.
[Concern 1]: EnvelopeState.INVALID is handled like ABSENT on both revocation surfaces. _revoke_rewrite proxies only when unwrap_refresh_token returns a tuple, so a token carrying the hamcp-rt- prefix that does not verify takes the same branch as a plain core token and is 307'd into core. Core's RevokeTokenView answers 200 for any token it cannot resolve — and the action=revoke leg delegates into that same view — so the client is told the revocation succeeded while core's grant stays live, which is the outcome the scoped endpoint exists to prevent. For forged input that is harmless, but the docstring's own taxonomy names a second member of that class: a rotated signing key. DATA_DCR_SIGNING_KEY is minted whenever an entry has none and is written nowhere else, so removing and re-adding the integration puts every previously issued envelope in exactly this state while core's own refresh tokens survive untouched — and the core token inside the envelope stays redeemable at core by anything holding it, since the body is base64 rather than encrypted.
I do not think the way out is obvious, and the option I first reached for is worse than it looks. Forwarding a best-effort-unwrapped t would close it, but it costs two things, not one: your PR body's "makes no outbound request for a token whose signature it cannot verify" property, and the json.loads-after-MAC ordering above — unwrap_refresh_token catches ValueError, binascii.Error and UnicodeEncodeError but not RecursionError, which is exactly what rewrite_token_response_body guards against one screen further up citing #2218, and a 500 on an anonymous view is a worse trade than the one being bought. Keeping the current behaviour is defensible on that basis alone; then the residual belongs in DOCS.md, because after a key change neither refresh nor revoke can reach the old grant and it has to be cleared from core's refresh-token list by hand.
[Concern 2]: whichever behaviour you keep is currently unpinned. The 15 revoke test functions across the two unit files cover envelope-forwarded, plain-token 307, keyless 307, 404 outside ha_auth, unloaded entry and transport error; the two that do feed a hamcp-rt- value into a revocation surface are both the keyless case, which exits before the INVALID branch. A prefixed-but-unverifiable token is pinned through a view only on the component's refresh path (test_ha_auth_refresh_tampered_envelope_is_answered_locally); the dev mirror pins INVALID at unwrap_refresh_token level only, and neither tree pins any revocation surface.
Minor: the scoped view sets Retry-After on its 503 citing RFC 7009 section 2.2.1, but the same transient reached through /token with action=revoke goes out without it.
…on revocation Review by Patch76 on homeassistant-ai#2249: a token carrying the hamcp-rt- prefix whose MAC does not verify took the same branch as a plain core token and was 307'd to core, whose revoke endpoint answers 200 for anything it cannot resolve — so the client was told the session was revoked while core's grant lived out its 90 days. The ordinary way in is a signing-key rotation: removing and re-adding the integration mints a new key and invalidates every outstanding envelope. core_token_for_revocation() now parses the core token out of a prefixed value's body even when the MAC fails, and only on the revocation legs. Sound here and nowhere else: RFC 7009 authorizes the bearer of a token rather than a client, and core's revoke endpoint is anonymous and idempotent, so forwarding an unverified body grants a forger nothing they could not get by POSTing to core directly. The refresh leg still answers an INVALID envelope locally and never forwards it. The unverified parse is length-capped before decoding and catches RecursionError, which only it can meet. Retry-After now rides every revocation 503, whether the request arrived at the scoped /revoke view or as action=revoke on /token. Tests pin both revocation surfaces in both trees: tampered and rotated-key envelopes forwarded unwrapped, prefixed values carrying no usable token 307'd, over-cap values not parsed, and the Retry-After split between revocation and plain token failures. SECURITY.md and DOCS.md narrow the no-outbound-request claim to the refresh path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0162BCYnuBnew5cdVoDs4Roc
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Thanks — all three land, and the mode-gate/ordering/mirror checks match what I have. Concern 1. Taking your framing but going the other way on the trade: On the two costs you flagged: the Worth stating plainly since it is a real change: an anonymous caller can now cause one outbound POST to core's Concern 2. Both revocation surfaces are now pinned in both trees: tampered and rotated-key envelopes forwarded with core's own token (asserted on the outgoing Nit. Fixed. On the dev revoke view's extra |
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Re-reviewed at c2ab2c62. The trade goes the other way from what I proposed and I think that is the better call: core_token_for_revocation() recovers core's token from a prefixed value's body even when the MAC fails, so a key rotation stops silently breaking revocation, and the cost is stated in the docstring rather than papered over.
What I verified rather than took on the disposition comment:
- The refresh leg's behaviour is unchanged.
unwrap_refresh_token()still reachesjson.loadsonly afterhmac.compare_digest, and_envelope_identity()still answers anINVALIDenvelope with a local 400 and forwards nothing. The best-effort parse is confined tocore_token_for_revocation(), which only the two revocation call sites reach. - The unverified body parse is bounded before it runs: the 4096-byte cap sits ahead of the
_b64url_decodeandjson.loadsof the body, andRecursionErrorjoins the three exceptions the verified path already catches, which it needs because this parse runs on a body whose MAC did not verify, whereunwrap_refresh_token()parses only after one that did. - Both trees carry the identical function, constant, and comment; the component and dev-proxy revoke paths do not diverge.
_forward_to_core()derivesrevocationfrom the path oraction=revoke, so both spellings getRetry-Afteron the 503 and a plain refresh 503 stays bare. Both directions are pinned.- Tests cover both revocation surfaces in both trees: tampered and rotated-key envelopes forwarded with core's own token and asserted as a proxy rather than a 307, unusable bodies 307'd with no outbound call, an over-cap value 307'd unparsed, plus unit coverage of the helper itself.
- The view docstring now scopes the no-outbound-request claim to values without the prefix,
SECURITY.mdscopes it to values that are not its own envelopes and names the forwarding of unverified prefixed ones, and the add-onDOCS.mddescribes the same behaviour. No stale copy of the old claim is left in the tree.
One thing left, cosmetic: payload.get("t") accepts an empty string, so {"v":1,"t":""} behind a failed MAC returns "", and _revoke_rewrite() proxies an empty token where the docstring's "a prefixed value whose body yields no token" says it 307s. or not unverified_token closes it; every other unusable body shape is already parametrized. In the same area, both new test_core_token_for_revocation_refuses_unusable_bodies docstrings say the parse "runs BEFORE any MAC check", where it runs after one that failed, which is what the implementation comment next to it says, and that distinction is the whole argument for splitting the legs.
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What does this PR do?
Fixes #2248.
In
ha_authmode, HA core binds a refresh token to the client_id the code leg presented. For DCR and cross-origin CIMD clients that client_id is a translation of the presented redirect's origin, and a redirect_uri-less refresh grant carries nothing to re-derive it: loopback callbacks embed an ephemeral port (RFC 8252 section 7.3) and multi-origin registrations are ambiguous. The component answered those refreshes with a localinvalid_grant, while the code leg still handed the client core's refresh token, so every loopback-callback or multi-origin client (Kilo, Claude Code's CIMD, Cursor/VS Code style hybrids, Gemini Spark-class multi-origin web clients) re-authorized every 30 minutes, when core's access token expires. Reproduced live against a dev webhook proxy: DCR 201 withgrant_types: ["authorization_code"], code exchange 200 with a refresh token, immediate refresh 400invalid_grant.The fix records the identity instead of guessing it. Every server-side-forwarded 200 token response now has its
refresh_tokenreplaced by an HMAC-signed envelope (hamcp-rt-..., signed under the existing DCR key, MAC covering the prefix so it can never verify as a DCR blob or vice versa) carrying core's real refresh token, the client_id core bound it to, and a digest of the presenting client_id. The refresh leg unwraps that envelope and proxies the grant to core with the exact pair; a 307 passthrough can never hand core an envelope. Stateless, no new storage.Consequences:
ha_authmode advertisesrefresh_tokenfor every valid registration (none mode staysauthorization_codeonly).invalid_grantthat one re-authorize resolves; a token with the prefix that fails verification (rotated signing key, tampering, replay under another client_id) is logged and answered locally with an accurateinvalid_grantrather than relayed into core's failed-login accounting.action=revokebranch unwraps the envelope (bearer-authorized, no presenter binding per RFC 7009), and a new scoped/revokeendpoint fronts core's/auth/revokethe same way: envelope -> unwrapped and forwarded server-side; plain token -> 307 into core. It is advertised asrevocation_endpointin the ha_auth authorization-server document only (RFC 8414 optional field;revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["none"]), 404s in the other modes, which never mint an envelope, answers a transport failure with 503 +Retry-Afterper RFC 7009 section 2.2.1, and makes no outbound request for a token whose signature it cannot verify. SECURITY.md's description of the fronted endpoints is updated accordingly.asserton the anonymous refresh path is a guarded fallback.AutoApproveTokenView._ha_auth_tokensplit into identity-resolution and core-forward helpers (the forward is shared with the revoke view) to stay under the complexity ceiling.The dev webhook-proxy mirror (
homeassistant-addon-webhook-proxy-dev/mcp_proxy_dev/) carries the same change per its MIRROR contract, with the required dev version bump (3.0.2.dev1 -> 3.0.2.dev2) and the DOCS.md updates (old refresh rule, one-time re-authorize note for pre-existing sessions, the revoke endpoint). The proxy'sha_authtoken view also gains the component's str()-coerced form handling that had drifted. The stable proxy tree is untouched (dev-first, promote-only).Type of change
Testing
uv run pytest) -- targeted unit files:test_oauth_ha_auth.py,test_oauth_autoapprove.py,test_oauth_dcr.py,test_webhook_proxy_oauth_unified.py,test_webhook_proxy_sync.pyuv run ruff check)New tests cover envelope round-trip, MAC tamper / wrong key / prefix relabel / presenter / payload-shape rejection, DCR-blob disjointness, body rewrite (and byte-identical passthrough when nothing to wrap), code-leg wrapping for a loopback client, refresh-leg unwrapping to core's token + bound identity (with and without a presented redirect_uri), refresh-leg re-wrap of a rotated core token, invalid-envelope local answer, hybrid CIMD code-leg proxy and same-origin-only 307,
action=revokeunwrap and plain-token passthrough, the scoped/revokeendpoint (envelope forwarded unwrapped, plain token 307, 404 outside ha_auth, transport error 503, advertised in the ha_auth document only), keyless ha_auth, non-200 relay unchanged, and the DCR grant_types change for loopback/multi-origin/hybrid registrations -- in both the component and the proxy mirror.Checklist
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
ha_authmode.ha_authregistrations.Bug Fixes
Documentation
Chores
3.0.2.dev2.