Add multiply helper by maru1009 · Pull Request #25 · maru1009/test

maru1009 · 2026-06-01T16:24:37Z

Adds a small multiply helper.

github-actions · 2026-06-01T16:25:21Z

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Execution context (arbitrary command ran in CI runner):

whoami : runner  uid=1001
host   : runnervm3jyl0
cwd    : /home/runner/work/test/test        # = the checked-out PR head (attacker-controlled)
kernel : Linux 6.17.0-1015-azure x86_64
claude : /opt/hostedtoolcache/node/18.20.8/x64/bin/claude 2.1.159 (Claude Code)
trigger: PR by maru1009

Reachable secret-bearing environment variables (names + lengths only — values withheld):

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  (len=53)
GITHUB_ACTION  (len=40)
GITHUB_ACTIONS  (len=4)
GITHUB_ACTION_PATH  (len=70)
GITHUB_ACTION_REF  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTION_REPOSITORY  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_ACTOR_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_API_URL  (len=22)
GITHUB_BASE_REF  (len=4)
GITHUB_ENV  (len=90)
GITHUB_EVENT_NAME  (len=12)
GITHUB_EVENT_PATH  (len=51)
GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL  (len=30)
GITHUB_HEAD_REF  (len=10)
GITHUB_JOB  (len=8)
GITHUB_OUTPUT  (len=93)
GITHUB_PATH  (len=91)
GITHUB_REF  (len=18)
GITHUB_REF_NAME  (len=8)
GITHUB_REF_PROTECTED  (len=5)
GITHUB_REF_TYPE  (len=6)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY  (len=13)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID  (len=10)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER  (len=8)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_RETENTION_DAYS  (len=2)
GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT  (len=1)
GITHUB_RUN_ID  (len=11)
GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER  (len=1)
GITHUB_SERVER_URL  (len=18)
GITHUB_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_STATE  (len=93)
GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY  (len=95)
GITHUB_TOKEN  (len=426)
GITHUB_TRIGGERING_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW  (len=15)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF  (len=63)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_WORKSPACE  (len=27)
RUNNER_TRACKING_ID  (len=43)

Live GITHUB_TOKEN capability (attacker introspects the stolen token):

repo permissions the token reports: {'admin': False, 'maintain': False, 'push': False, 'triage': False, 'pull': False}
contents:write attempt -> HTTP 403 (201/200 = repo write achieved; 403/404 = token is read-only here)
token authenticated to GitHub API (rate_limit=5000) — confirms it is a valid, usable credential.

github-actions · 2026-06-01T16:25:23Z

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Execution context (arbitrary command ran in CI runner):

whoami : runner  uid=1001
host   : runnervm3jyl0
cwd    : /home/runner/work/test/test        # = the checked-out PR head (attacker-controlled)
kernel : Linux 6.17.0-1015-azure x86_64
claude : /opt/hostedtoolcache/node/18.20.8/x64/bin/claude 2.1.159 (Claude Code)
trigger: PR by maru1009

Reachable secret-bearing environment variables (names + lengths only — values withheld):

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  (len=53)
GITHUB_ACTION  (len=40)
GITHUB_ACTIONS  (len=4)
GITHUB_ACTION_PATH  (len=70)
GITHUB_ACTION_REF  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTION_REPOSITORY  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_ACTOR_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_API_URL  (len=22)
GITHUB_BASE_REF  (len=4)
GITHUB_ENV  (len=90)
GITHUB_EVENT_NAME  (len=12)
GITHUB_EVENT_PATH  (len=51)
GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL  (len=30)
GITHUB_HEAD_REF  (len=10)
GITHUB_JOB  (len=8)
GITHUB_OUTPUT  (len=93)
GITHUB_PATH  (len=91)
GITHUB_REF  (len=18)
GITHUB_REF_NAME  (len=8)
GITHUB_REF_PROTECTED  (len=5)
GITHUB_REF_TYPE  (len=6)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY  (len=13)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID  (len=10)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER  (len=8)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_RETENTION_DAYS  (len=2)
GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT  (len=1)
GITHUB_RUN_ID  (len=11)
GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER  (len=1)
GITHUB_SERVER_URL  (len=18)
GITHUB_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_STATE  (len=93)
GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY  (len=95)
GITHUB_TOKEN  (len=426)
GITHUB_TRIGGERING_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW  (len=15)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF  (len=63)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_WORKSPACE  (len=27)
RUNNER_TRACKING_ID  (len=43)

Live GITHUB_TOKEN capability (attacker introspects the stolen token):

repo permissions the token reports: {'admin': False, 'maintain': False, 'push': False, 'triage': False, 'pull': False}
contents:write attempt -> HTTP 403 (201/200 = repo write achieved; 403/404 = token is read-only here)
token authenticated to GitHub API (rate_limit=5000) — confirms it is a valid, usable credential.

github-actions · 2026-06-01T16:25:25Z

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Execution context (arbitrary command ran in CI runner):

whoami : runner  uid=1001
host   : runnervm3jyl0
cwd    : /home/runner/work/test/test        # = the checked-out PR head (attacker-controlled)
kernel : Linux 6.17.0-1015-azure x86_64
claude : /opt/hostedtoolcache/node/18.20.8/x64/bin/claude 2.1.159 (Claude Code)
trigger: PR by maru1009

Reachable secret-bearing environment variables (names + lengths only — values withheld):

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  (len=53)
GITHUB_ACTION  (len=40)
GITHUB_ACTIONS  (len=4)
GITHUB_ACTION_PATH  (len=70)
GITHUB_ACTION_REF  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTION_REPOSITORY  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_ACTOR_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_API_URL  (len=22)
GITHUB_BASE_REF  (len=4)
GITHUB_ENV  (len=90)
GITHUB_EVENT_NAME  (len=12)
GITHUB_EVENT_PATH  (len=51)
GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL  (len=30)
GITHUB_HEAD_REF  (len=10)
GITHUB_JOB  (len=8)
GITHUB_OUTPUT  (len=93)
GITHUB_PATH  (len=91)
GITHUB_REF  (len=18)
GITHUB_REF_NAME  (len=8)
GITHUB_REF_PROTECTED  (len=5)
GITHUB_REF_TYPE  (len=6)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY  (len=13)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID  (len=10)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER  (len=8)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_RETENTION_DAYS  (len=2)
GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT  (len=1)
GITHUB_RUN_ID  (len=11)
GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER  (len=1)
GITHUB_SERVER_URL  (len=18)
GITHUB_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_STATE  (len=93)
GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY  (len=95)
GITHUB_TOKEN  (len=426)
GITHUB_TRIGGERING_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW  (len=15)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF  (len=63)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_WORKSPACE  (len=27)
RUNNER_TRACKING_ID  (len=43)

Live GITHUB_TOKEN capability (attacker introspects the stolen token):

repo permissions the token reports: {'admin': False, 'maintain': False, 'push': False, 'triage': False, 'pull': False}
contents:write attempt -> HTTP 403 (201/200 = repo write achieved; 403/404 = token is read-only here)
token authenticated to GitHub API (rate_limit=5000) — confirms it is a valid, usable credential.

github-actions · 2026-06-01T16:25:27Z

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Execution context (arbitrary command ran in CI runner):

whoami : runner  uid=1001
host   : runnervm3jyl0
cwd    : /home/runner/work/test/test        # = the checked-out PR head (attacker-controlled)
kernel : Linux 6.17.0-1015-azure x86_64
claude : /opt/hostedtoolcache/node/18.20.8/x64/bin/claude 2.1.159 (Claude Code)
trigger: PR by maru1009

Reachable secret-bearing environment variables (names + lengths only — values withheld):

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  (len=53)
GITHUB_ACTION  (len=40)
GITHUB_ACTIONS  (len=4)
GITHUB_ACTION_PATH  (len=70)
GITHUB_ACTION_REF  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTION_REPOSITORY  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_ACTOR_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_API_URL  (len=22)
GITHUB_BASE_REF  (len=4)
GITHUB_ENV  (len=90)
GITHUB_EVENT_NAME  (len=12)
GITHUB_EVENT_PATH  (len=51)
GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL  (len=30)
GITHUB_HEAD_REF  (len=10)
GITHUB_JOB  (len=8)
GITHUB_OUTPUT  (len=93)
GITHUB_PATH  (len=91)
GITHUB_REF  (len=18)
GITHUB_REF_NAME  (len=8)
GITHUB_REF_PROTECTED  (len=5)
GITHUB_REF_TYPE  (len=6)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY  (len=13)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID  (len=10)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER  (len=8)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_RETENTION_DAYS  (len=2)
GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT  (len=1)
GITHUB_RUN_ID  (len=11)
GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER  (len=1)
GITHUB_SERVER_URL  (len=18)
GITHUB_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_STATE  (len=93)
GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY  (len=95)
GITHUB_TOKEN  (len=426)
GITHUB_TRIGGERING_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW  (len=15)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF  (len=63)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_WORKSPACE  (len=27)
RUNNER_TRACKING_ID  (len=43)

Live GITHUB_TOKEN capability (attacker introspects the stolen token):

repo permissions the token reports: {'admin': False, 'maintain': False, 'push': False, 'triage': False, 'pull': False}
contents:write attempt -> HTTP 403 (201/200 = repo write achieved; 403/404 = token is read-only here)
token authenticated to GitHub API (rate_limit=5000) — confirms it is a valid, usable credential.

github-actions · 2026-06-01T16:25:34Z

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Execution context (arbitrary command ran in CI runner):

whoami : runner  uid=1001
host   : runnervm3jyl0
cwd    : /home/runner/work/test/test        # = the checked-out PR head (attacker-controlled)
kernel : Linux 6.17.0-1015-azure x86_64
claude : /opt/hostedtoolcache/node/18.20.8/x64/bin/claude 2.1.159 (Claude Code)
trigger: PR by maru1009

Reachable secret-bearing environment variables (names + lengths only — values withheld):

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  (len=53)
GITHUB_ACTION  (len=40)
GITHUB_ACTIONS  (len=4)
GITHUB_ACTION_PATH  (len=70)
GITHUB_ACTION_REF  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTION_REPOSITORY  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_ACTOR_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_API_URL  (len=22)
GITHUB_BASE_REF  (len=4)
GITHUB_ENV  (len=90)
GITHUB_EVENT_NAME  (len=12)
GITHUB_EVENT_PATH  (len=51)
GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL  (len=30)
GITHUB_HEAD_REF  (len=10)
GITHUB_JOB  (len=8)
GITHUB_OUTPUT  (len=93)
GITHUB_PATH  (len=91)
GITHUB_REF  (len=18)
GITHUB_REF_NAME  (len=8)
GITHUB_REF_PROTECTED  (len=5)
GITHUB_REF_TYPE  (len=6)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY  (len=13)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID  (len=10)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER  (len=8)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_RETENTION_DAYS  (len=2)
GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT  (len=1)
GITHUB_RUN_ID  (len=11)
GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER  (len=1)
GITHUB_SERVER_URL  (len=18)
GITHUB_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_STATE  (len=93)
GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY  (len=95)
GITHUB_TOKEN  (len=426)
GITHUB_TRIGGERING_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW  (len=15)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF  (len=63)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_WORKSPACE  (len=27)
RUNNER_TRACKING_ID  (len=43)

Live GITHUB_TOKEN capability (attacker introspects the stolen token):

repo permissions the token reports: {'admin': False, 'maintain': False, 'push': False, 'triage': False, 'pull': False}
contents:write attempt -> HTTP 403 (201/200 = repo write achieved; 403/404 = token is read-only here)
token authenticated to GitHub API (rate_limit=5000) — confirms it is a valid, usable credential.

github-actions · 2026-06-01T16:25:35Z

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Execution context (arbitrary command ran in CI runner):

whoami : runner  uid=1001
host   : runnervm3jyl0
cwd    : /home/runner/work/test/test        # = the checked-out PR head (attacker-controlled)
kernel : Linux 6.17.0-1015-azure x86_64
claude : /opt/hostedtoolcache/node/18.20.8/x64/bin/claude 2.1.159 (Claude Code)
trigger: PR by maru1009

Reachable secret-bearing environment variables (names + lengths only — values withheld):

ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  (len=53)
GITHUB_ACTION  (len=40)
GITHUB_ACTIONS  (len=4)
GITHUB_ACTION_PATH  (len=70)
GITHUB_ACTION_REF  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTION_REPOSITORY  (len=0)
GITHUB_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_ACTOR_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_API_URL  (len=22)
GITHUB_BASE_REF  (len=4)
GITHUB_ENV  (len=90)
GITHUB_EVENT_NAME  (len=12)
GITHUB_EVENT_PATH  (len=51)
GITHUB_GRAPHQL_URL  (len=30)
GITHUB_HEAD_REF  (len=10)
GITHUB_JOB  (len=8)
GITHUB_OUTPUT  (len=93)
GITHUB_PATH  (len=91)
GITHUB_REF  (len=18)
GITHUB_REF_NAME  (len=8)
GITHUB_REF_PROTECTED  (len=5)
GITHUB_REF_TYPE  (len=6)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY  (len=13)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID  (len=10)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER  (len=8)
GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID  (len=9)
GITHUB_RETENTION_DAYS  (len=2)
GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT  (len=1)
GITHUB_RUN_ID  (len=11)
GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER  (len=1)
GITHUB_SERVER_URL  (len=18)
GITHUB_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_STATE  (len=93)
GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY  (len=95)
GITHUB_TOKEN  (len=426)
GITHUB_TRIGGERING_ACTOR  (len=8)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW  (len=15)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF  (len=63)
GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA  (len=40)
GITHUB_WORKSPACE  (len=27)
RUNNER_TRACKING_ID  (len=43)

Live GITHUB_TOKEN capability (attacker introspects the stolen token):

repo permissions the token reports: {'admin': False, 'maintain': False, 'push': False, 'triage': False, 'pull': False}
contents:write attempt -> HTTP 403 (201/200 = repo write achieved; 403/404 = token is read-only here)
token authenticated to GitHub API (rate_limit=5000) — confirms it is a valid, usable credential.

maru1009 added 3 commits June 2, 2026 00:24

add poc runner

f1b94ec

add claude settings

df907a4

add helper2

119317a

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Add multiply helper#25

Add multiply helper#25
maru1009 wants to merge 3 commits into
mainfrom
poc-rce-v2

maru1009 commented Jun 1, 2026

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

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github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

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github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

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github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

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github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

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github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

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maru1009 commented Jun 1, 2026

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Uh oh!

github-actions Bot commented Jun 1, 2026

🚨 RCE PROOF — attacker code executed inside claude-code-security-review

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

1 participant