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registry pack verification can fail open when provenance metadata is absent

Moderate
lukehinds published GHSA-hc4m-q9jh-xw4j Jun 7, 2026

Package

cargo nono-cli (Rust)

Affected versions

<=v0.61.2

Patched versions

0.62.0

Description

Summary

Registry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant:

  • ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json
  • ~/.config/nono/packages/<namespace>/<pack>/.nono-trust.bundle

Testing shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run.

Affected behavior

Observed with always-further/claude:

  1. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json.

    Result:

    nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force
    
  2. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle.

    Result: the profile loads successfully.

  3. Restore .nono-trust.bundle while the lockfile is still absent.

    Result:

    nono: Package verification failed for always-further/claude: pack 'always-further/claude' has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry - reinstall with: nono pull always-further/claude --force
    

Impact

If both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification.

This is especially important for pack-provided session hooks, because session hooks execute on the host outside the sandbox. A pack that contributes host-executed code should not run unless nono can verify that the code is a locked and trusted pack artifact.

Root cause

verify_profile_packs treats the lockfile entry as optional. Existing code fails when a trust bundle exists without a matching lockfile entry, but when the trust bundle is absent too, there is no equivalent hard failure.

That creates a fail-open state:

  • lockfile entry missing
  • trust bundle missing
  • pack directory still present
  • profile can load

Recommended fix

For any registry pack selected for execution, require both:

  1. A matching lockfile entry in ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json.
  2. A present and valid .nono-trust.bundle in the installed pack directory.

If either is missing, fail closed with a reinstall instruction, for example:

reinstall with: nono pull <namespace>/<pack> --force

This keeps verification monotonic: removing provenance metadata cannot downgrade a verification failure into a successful launch.

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

No CWEs