Summary
validate_url_for_http_request() in backend/utils/validation.py is designed to prevent SSRF attacks by blocking private/internal IP addresses. However, it only checks literal IP addresses in the hostname — it does not resolve domain names before checking. This allows a trivial bypass via DNS rebinding or wildcard DNS services.
The function itself documents this limitation:
Note: This function does NOT perform DNS resolution. Domain names that resolve to private IPs will not be detected (DNS rebinding/internal DNS bypass possible).
Affected Code
[REDACTED]
Proof of Concept
[REDACTED]
Impact
[REDACTED]
Suggested Fix
Resolve the hostname to IP addresses before making the HTTP request, and validate the resolved IPs:
[REDACTED]
CVSS
5.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
(Requires EDITOR role = High privilege, but Changed scope since SSRF reaches internal network)
Summary
validate_url_for_http_request()inbackend/utils/validation.pyis designed to prevent SSRF attacks by blocking private/internal IP addresses. However, it only checks literal IP addresses in the hostname — it does not resolve domain names before checking. This allows a trivial bypass via DNS rebinding or wildcard DNS services.The function itself documents this limitation:
Affected Code
[REDACTED]
Proof of Concept
[REDACTED]
Impact
[REDACTED]
Suggested Fix
Resolve the hostname to IP addresses before making the HTTP request, and validate the resolved IPs:
[REDACTED]
CVSS
5.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
(Requires EDITOR role = High privilege, but Changed scope since SSRF reaches internal network)