CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72797.
Summary
POST /api/notebook/getEncryptedNotebookStatus returns the identifier, name, and current lock state of every encrypted notebook, with no publish-access filtering. The route is registered CheckAuth only, no CheckReadonly, no CheckAdminRole so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Encrypted notebooks are private by design; their names frequently reveal the sensitive topic that motivated encrypting them.
Details
Route registration (kernel/api/router.go:131):
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/notebook/getEncryptedNotebookStatus", model.CheckAuth, getEncryptedNotebookStatus)The handler (kernel/api/notebook.go) accepts no arguments and contains no IsReadOnlyRoleContext branch and no publish-access filter of any kind. It returns, for every encrypted notebook, {id, name, unlocked}, the notebook's box.Name and its live lock state together with enabled, count, migrationPending, migrationBoxes, and hasHistoryDependency.
Guarded-sibling asymmetry. The primary notebook listing lsNotebooks, in the same file and also reader-reachable, does filter: it skips notebooks that are Closed and any notebook whose publishAccess entry is not Visible. The project therefore publish-scopes notebook listings but getEncryptedNotebookStatus enumerates all encrypted notebooks unconditionally.
Still unfixed at HEAD. The encrypted-notebook hardening series (issue #18034 idle auto-lock, lock-on-background, key handling, atomic unlock) is local-threat work. Commit f2d966659 ("Expose encrypted notebook unlock status to plugins") introduced this exposure, and no subsequent commit gates it for the publish/reader boundary.
Secondary effect. unlocked: true is a live indicator of exactly when an encrypted notebook's plaintext is resident in memory, the window during which reader-reachable code paths that accept a notebook argument can read its decrypted content.
Proof of Concept
Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. At least one encrypted notebook exists.
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/notebook/getEncryptedNotebookStatus
{}
Returns the full set of encrypted notebooks with their IDs, names, and current unlocked state including notebooks that lsNotebooks withholds from the same reader session. No arguments and no privileged access are required.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader learns which encrypted notebooks exist, what they are called, and whether each is currently unlocked. Notebook names are themselves sensitive: a user encrypts a notebook precisely because its subject matter is private, and the name commonly states that subject. Disclosing existence and naming to unauthenticated parties defeats that expectation, and the live lock state additionally reveals when the notebook's contents are decrypted in memory. Confidentiality-only.
Suggested fix
For IsReadOnlyRoleContext sessions, either reject the request or restrict the response to notebooks that are publish-visible, mirroring the filtering already applied in lsNotebooks. Encrypted notebooks arguably should never be enumerated to a reader at all.
Shirshakhtml Reporter
CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72797.
Summary
POST /api/notebook/getEncryptedNotebookStatusreturns the identifier, name, and current lock state of every encrypted notebook, with no publish-access filtering. The route is registeredCheckAuthonly, noCheckReadonly, noCheckAdminRoleso it is reachable by the publishRoleReadertoken and by the anonymous account whenPublish.Auth.Enableisfalse. Encrypted notebooks are private by design; their names frequently reveal the sensitive topic that motivated encrypting them.Details
Route registration (
kernel/api/router.go:131):The handler (
kernel/api/notebook.go) accepts no arguments and contains noIsReadOnlyRoleContextbranch and no publish-access filter of any kind. It returns, for every encrypted notebook,{id, name, unlocked}, the notebook'sbox.Nameand its live lock state together withenabled,count,migrationPending,migrationBoxes, andhasHistoryDependency.Guarded-sibling asymmetry. The primary notebook listing
lsNotebooks, in the same file and also reader-reachable, does filter: it skips notebooks that areClosedand any notebook whosepublishAccessentry is notVisible. The project therefore publish-scopes notebook listings butgetEncryptedNotebookStatusenumerates all encrypted notebooks unconditionally.Still unfixed at HEAD. The encrypted-notebook hardening series (issue #18034 idle auto-lock, lock-on-background, key handling, atomic unlock) is local-threat work. Commit
f2d966659("Expose encrypted notebook unlock status to plugins") introduced this exposure, and no subsequent commit gates it for the publish/reader boundary.Secondary effect.
unlocked: trueis a live indicator of exactly when an encrypted notebook's plaintext is resident in memory, the window during which reader-reachable code paths that accept a notebook argument can read its decrypted content.Proof of Concept
Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when
Publish.Auth.Enableisfalse, otherwise any publish reader account. At least one encrypted notebook exists.Returns the full set of encrypted notebooks with their IDs, names, and current
unlockedstate including notebooks thatlsNotebookswithholds from the same reader session. No arguments and no privileged access are required.Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish
RoleReaderlearns which encrypted notebooks exist, what they are called, and whether each is currently unlocked. Notebook names are themselves sensitive: a user encrypts a notebook precisely because its subject matter is private, and the name commonly states that subject. Disclosing existence and naming to unauthenticated parties defeats that expectation, and the live lock state additionally reveals when the notebook's contents are decrypted in memory. Confidentiality-only.Suggested fix
For
IsReadOnlyRoleContextsessions, either reject the request or restrict the response to notebooks that are publish-visible, mirroring the filtering already applied inlsNotebooks. Encrypted notebooks arguably should never be enumerated to a reader at all.