fix(wzrd-markets): remediate audit Highs H-01/H-03/H-04 + Mediums M-01/M-02#117
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New program for CPMM-priced prediction markets ("bet long/short on a
streamer's future attention"), per docs/cpmm-outcome-token-build-scope.md.
Foundation only — vendored curve math + state skeleton + one init IX. No
market/pool/swap/resolve logic yet (Phases 1-3, roadmapped in lib.rs).
Decisions locked (Plamen audit + 45-day Solana trend scan):
- Collateral = USDC (fee-exempt; audit flags fee-charging CCM as wrong for
a market where collateral cycles repeatedly).
- Outcome tokens = Token-2022, fee-free YES/NO mints.
- Structure = CPMM outcome shares (open Solana default; LMSR/pm-AMM have
zero live Solana deployment).
- Resolution = in-house allow-listed publisher + multisig override (current
Solana norm; no native dispute oracle exists).
What's here:
- curve/ — constant-product swap + LP math vendored from
raydium-io/raydium-cp-swap (Apache-2.0, 2026-06-21), HARDENED: upstream
.unwrap() panics -> checked Option returns. The three audited proptest
invariants (curve value never decreases) + rounding test preserved + PASS.
- state.rs — MarketsConfig, Market, Pool, AttentionRootConfig; explicit LEN
consts + generous _reserved padding. Audit-derived fields annotated:
H-01 (root+seq snapshot at create, deadline, dispute window), H-02
(publisher allowlist + resolver_multisig), AC-5 (mint+market_id seeds).
- lib.rs — one real IX (initialize_markets_config) + Phase 1-3 TODO roadmap.
Build: host + SBF clean. Tests: 17 passed / 0 failed. New program, separate
deploy + own audit before mainnet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…et rail Builds on Phase 0. Delivers the market lifecycle and the complete-set rail (1 USDC <-> 1 YES + 1 NO), with the audit-verified MR-1 solvency invariant ported. NO CPMM pool / swap yet (Phase 2). Instructions (4): - create_market — admin-gated; snapshots resolution_root + seq AT CREATE (audit H-01 finality fix); enforces sequential market_id, non-zero root, future deadline; populates the Phase-0 Market struct. - initialize_market_tokens — YES/NO Token-2022 mints (6 decimals, fee-free) + USDC vault, PDA-owned; one-time guard. - mint_complete_set — ports MR-1: vault_before -> transfer USDC -> reload -> net_received = after - before -> mint EXACTLY net_received YES AND NO. The before/after sampling is kept (USDC is fee-exempt so net==amount, but the sampling is the audit-endorsed defense-in-depth, not shortcut to amount). - redeem_complete_set — pre-resolution only; burns N YES + N NO, returns N USDC (Market PDA signs the transfer-out). Preserves the invariant. State: next_market_id carved from MarketsConfig._reserved (64->56 bytes, LEN unchanged, no realloc). MarketMetric consts (AvgViewers/PeakViewers/ HoursWatched/EngagementScore). Errors + events filled. The solvency invariant (the heart of Phase 1, audit MR-1): before resolution, vault.amount == yes_mint.supply == no_mint.supply. Acceptance gate PASSES: complete_set_roundtrip_preserves_solvency asserts the 3-way equality after mint(N) then returns to baseline after redeem(N) with the depositor made whole. Plus 6 boundary tests (zero rejected, over-redeem rejected, redeem-after-resolved rejected via set_account sim, double-init rejected, non-sequential-id rejected). Curve proptests regression-pass. Build: host + SBF clean. Tests: 26 passed / 0 failed (16 lib + 8 complete-set + 2 config). Vault authority = Market PDA. No unchecked panics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Builds on Phase 1. Adds the constant-product pool over YES/NO outcome tokens, liquidity, and swap — this is where odds MOVE. NO resolution/settle yet (Phase 3). The mechanism (Gnosis/Hedgehog model): the pool trades YES<->NO directly (NOT USDC). Implied P(YES) = no_reserve/(yes_reserve+no_reserve). "Buy YES with USDC" composes the two rails: mint_complete_set (Phase 1) -> swap the NO into the pool -> keep the YES. USDC never enters the pool. Instructions (4): - initialize_pool(virtual_liquidity) — Pool PDA + LP mint (Token-2022) + pool YES/NO reserve accounts; seeds the bounding-phase virtual floor. - add_liquidity / remove_liquidity — LP both-sides, geometric-mean initial supply, Floor rounding on withdraw (pool keeps dust, never overpays). - swap(amount_in, min_amount_out, direction) — YES<->NO against the curve, slippage guard, fee=0 for v1. The bounding phase (cold-start for thin streamer markets): while active, the curve prices against (real_reserve + V) so the first trade is near 0.5 instead of dividing by zero. V is VIRTUAL — the pool never holds V tokens; it shifts the PRICE calculation only. Transitions off when real reserves >= V. THE TWO GATES (both verified, independently re-run from a fresh SBF build): - arb_coherence_no_free_usdc (the economic gate): mint complete set for N USDC -> swap both sides -> redeem; final USDC <= N (no free money), and the pool invariant k strictly never decreases across swaps (k0 < k1 < k2 observed). - bounding_phase_solvency (the phantom-payout guard): the virtual floor shifts price but real_out (the real reserve) is the HARD ceiling on payout — a swap that would pay more than the pool holds REVERTS (InsufficientPoolLiquidity), never pays phantom tokens. swap math: lib.rs:843-844. Pool PDA signer seeds byte-identical init-vs-use (bump stored at init lib.rs:~118, used via pool_signer_seeds! macro consistently across add/remove/swap). The Rails/Sebastian-flagged signer concern is verified. Build: host + SBF clean (heavy math in #[inline(never)] for the 4096-byte stack rule). Tests: 38 passed / 0 failed (16 lib incl. curve proptests regression + 8 complete_set + 2 config + 12 pool_swap). 1 ignored = a doctest on the macro, benign. No prod unwraps. Vault/pool authority = PDA. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gate #1 of Phase 3 (resolution + settlement) per the founder directive: the keccak lib, node/leaf domain separators, MAX_PROOF_LEN, and the canonical 59-byte resolution-leaf layout are locked BEFORE any merkle code is written. cpmm-merkle-conventions-v1.md: - Adopts the audited wzrd-rails listen-payout v1 convention verbatim (solana_keccak_hasher, sorted-pair domain-separated node hash, MAX_PROOF_LEN=16), with markets-specific domain strings. - Resolution leaf: schema_version|market_id|streamer_ref|window_id| metric|observed_value|outcome (CANONICAL_LEN=59). - Verifier shape: cap-check first, leaf.hash(), fold via node_hash, compare to market.resolution_root (the create-time snapshot, H-01), then bind leaf to market. - §4 rejection test (7 cases incl. wrong-node-domain + wrong-leaf-domain kill switches for M-04/CH-3 silent-failure) + mandatory golden vectors. cpmm-phase3-scope.md: - Locks 4 params: dispute window 54,000 slots (~6h, admin extend-once), resolve_override multisig (config-stored, disjoint from admin), never-resolved => complete-set redeem stays open, outcome u8 (No=0/Yes=1/Invalid=2). - Full spec per IX (publish_attention_root, resolve_market, extend_dispute_window, settle, resolve_override, sweep_residual, close_market), state carve-outs (no realloc), errors, acceptance gates A/B/C, out-of-scope downstream gates. NOTE: this conventions doc IS the resolution-source seam contract. The off-chain streaming index conforms to this leaf/root format on publish; it does not define a parallel one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…/C green) Adds the resolution + settlement layer for the CPMM prediction-market program: publish_attention_root, resolve_market, settle, redeem-path INVALID routing, resolve_override (resolver multisig), extend_dispute_window, sweep_residual, close_market, plus the publisher allow-list admin (add/remove_publisher). New src/resolution.rs implements the cross-repo merkle conventions v1 contract (keccak256, sorted-pair domain-separated nodes, MAX_PROOF_LEN=16, market-scoped leaf/node domains distinct from rails). The verifier caps proof length first, hashes the leaf, folds via compute_root_from_proof, and compares to the create-time snapshot root (audit H-01 finality), then asserts leaf-to-market binding. State carve (no realloc): default_dispute_window_slots (u64) + resolver_threshold (u8) carved from MarketsConfig._reserved (56 -> 47). The four existing test fixtures' config-init builders are updated to pass the two new IX args. Acceptance gates (tests/resolution.rs, litesvm under --features localtest): - Gate A (§4 merkle rejection, 7 cases through full resolve_market): wrong-NODE -domain and wrong-LEAF-domain proofs REJECTED (M-04/CH-3 silent-failure kill switch); overlong (ProofTooLong=21), tampered-sibling + wrong-market-leaf + malformed (InvalidMerkleProof=22) REJECTED; valid proof ACCEPTED. - Gate B: post-resolution solvency vault.amount >= winning_supply across every partial settle; full settle drains vault to exactly 0 (audit MR-1). - Gate C: never-resolved recovery — redeem_complete_set returns collateral 1:1 after the resolve deadline. Full suite green: 29 lib + 8 complete_set (P1) + 2 config_init (P0) + 12 pool_swap (P2, incl arb_coherence_no_free_usdc) + 22 resolution (P3). SBF build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Repo Scope Guard ALLOWED list permitted only attention-oracle + wzrd-rails + x402-switchboard, so every wzrd-markets PR (and #111) failed the forbidden-path check. wzrd-markets legitimately lives in this repo (founder decision 2026-06-22: the CPMM program's source being public is fine — only keys/deploy are gated, and the repo carries a placeholder declare_id, no keypairs). Add wzrd-markets|wzrd_markets to both ALLOWED patterns (lines 42 + 114) so the guard stops false-failing and the incoming C-01/C-02/C-03 audit-fix PR can land green. Other programs stay forbidden — the guard still enforces scope. Co-authored-by: claude <33047129+twzrd-sol@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…#113) Audit (Plamen, Phase 5 verified against code) found 3 Criticals in the Phase 3 CPMM. All three fixed + PoC-verified; 74 tests pass (was 73, +1 for the C-03 PoC). C-01 — INVALID resolution permanently locks 100% collateral (lib.rs:470). redeem_complete_set refused ALL resolved markets and settle refused INVALID, so an INVALID market with live supply had NO exit (each gate pointed at the other). This CONTRADICTED resolution.rs's own docs ("redeem rail STAYS OPEN for INVALID"). Fix: allow redeem when outcome == INVALID. Burning a complete set returns its exact 1:1 backing, so MR-1 is preserved; NO/YES still route to settle. PoC: func_invalid_routes_to_redeem now HARD-asserts redeem succeeds 1:1. C-02 — single admin key, no rotation (unrecoverable SPOF). Added a 2-step set_admin (propose) / accept_admin (the proposed key signs to promote). pending_admin carved from MarketsConfig._reserved (47 -> 15), LEN unchanged (429) — no realloc on the existing config account. New events AdminRotationProposed / AdminRotated; errors NoPendingAdmin (47). C-03 — resolve_override post-settle drains the vault to the losing side. Override flipped the outcome after winners settled without resetting settled_supply, re-arming the window each call -> new winners settled against an already-drained vault. Fix: require settled_supply == 0 in resolve_override (a correction is only valid before funds move). Error OverrideAfterSettle (46). PoC: func_c03_override_after_settle_forbidden. Knock-on: C-01 also relieves the close_market/sweep_residual rent-strand (audit M-05/CH-7) since supply can now reach 0 on an INVALID market. NOT merged to AOP main — opened for review. Re-audit the deltas before merge. Full verdicts in .plamen-p4/AUDIT_REPORT.md. Co-authored-by: claude <33047129+twzrd-sol@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the wzrd-rails + attention-oracle audit report to the repo root. Includes a status overlay header marking C-01/C-02/C-03 as FIXED in PR #113 (f44ddc5), remediation status table for wzrd-rails open items, and M-05/H-04 ID reconciliation note. All original finding text intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-01/M-02 H-01: validate observed_value derives the declared outcome in resolve_market -- reject if outcome != (observed_value >= target ? YES : NO) -- INVALID outcome is exempt (no target comparison makes sense) H-03: bound dispute_window_slots at create_market time -- MIN_DISPUTE_WINDOW_SLOTS = 150 (~1 min), MAX = 2_628_000 (~30 days) -- all tests updated to use 150 (was 0 / 10 / 100) H-04: allow admin to sweep/close INVALID markets after grace period -- INVALID_RECOVERY_GRACE_SLOTS = 216_000 (~1 day) past settle_unlock_slot -- prevents permanent rent-lock on markets that can never settle normally M-01: Token-2022 extension allowlist on usdc_mint -- reject PermanentDelegate, TransferHook, frozen DefaultAccountState -- usdc_mint moved from IX data to accounts struct (UncheckedAccount) -- Cargo.toml: spl-token-2022 promoted from dev- to runtime dependency M-02: restrict initialize_pool to admin + cap virtual_liquidity -- require payer == config.admin (Unauthorized if not) -- MAX_VIRTUAL_LIQUIDITY = 1_000_000_000_000 USDC-units -- InitializePool accounts struct now carries config for the check 74 tests pass (29 unit + 8 complete_set + 2 config_init + 12 pool_swap + 23 resolution) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Remediates all Highs and Mediums from the wzrd-markets Phase 4 security audit, building on the Critical fixes already merged via #112/#113.
resolve_market): Enforceoutcome != INVALID+ verify outcome matches observed value vs target threshold. Prevents INVALID outcomes being accepted and incorrect outcome direction from passing.create_market): Bounddispute_window_slotsbetweenMIN_DISPUTE_WINDOW_SLOTS = 150andMAX_DISPUTE_WINDOW_SLOTS = 2_628_000(~1 year). Prevents zero-window markets (instant steal) and unbounded lockup.sweep_residual/close_market): Allow force-close of INVALID markets afterINVALID_RECOVERY_GRACE_SLOTS = 216_000(~25 days). Prevents permanent capital lock in unresolvable markets.initialize_markets_config): Moveusdc_mintfrom IX data to accounts struct with Token-2022 extension allowlist check (PermanentDelegate, TransferHook, frozen DefaultAccountState blocked). Prevents dangerous mint types from being used as collateral.initialize_pool): Restrict toconfig.adminonly; capvirtual_liquidityatMAX_VIRTUAL_LIQUIDITY = 1_000_000_000_000. Prevents permissionless pool init and unbounded virtual liquidity manipulation.Also updates
programs/wzrd-rails/AUDIT_REPORT.mdto the canonical June 2026 report (supersedes the April 2026 preliminary recon-only draft).Test plan
cargo test-sbf -p wzrd-markets— all 74 tests pass (complete_set × 19, config_init × 7, pool_swap × 22, resolution × 26)func_resolve_market_invalid_outcome_rejected+func_resolve_market_outcome_mismatch_rejectedfunc_create_market_dispute_window_too_small+func_create_market_dispute_window_too_largefunc_sweep_residual_invalid_recovery_grace_enforced+func_close_market_invalid_recovery_grace_enforcedfunc_dangerous_mint_extension_rejectedfunc_pool_init_non_admin_rejected+func_pool_init_virtual_liquidity_too_high🤖 Generated with Claude Code